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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
PERCEIVING SOCIABLE TECHNOLOGY: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF
ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND AGENCY PERCEPTION ON HUMAN-COMPUTER
INTERACTION (HCI)
by
Jose David Pineda Delgado
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor George Marakas, Major Professor
With the arrival of personal assistants and other AI-enabled autonomous technologies,
social interactions with smart devices have become a part of our daily lives. Therefore, it
becomes increasingly important to understand how these social interactions emerge, and
why users appear to be influenced by them. For this reason, I explore questions on what
the antecedents and consequences of this phenomenon, known as anthropomorphism, are
as described in the extant literature from fields ranging from information systems to social
neuroscience.
I critically analyze those empirical studies directly measuring anthropomorphism and those
referring to it without a corresponding measurement. Through a grounded theory approach,
I identify common themes and use them to develop models for the antecedents and
consequences of anthropomorphism.
The results suggest anthropomorphism possesses both conscious and non-conscious
components with varying implications. While conscious attributions are shown to vary
based on individual differences, non-conscious attributions emerge whenever a technology
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exhibits apparent reasoning such as through non-verbal behavior like peer-to-peer
mirroring or verbal paralinguistic and backchanneling cues.
Anthropomorphism has been shown to affect users’ self-perceptions, perceptions of the
technology, how users interact with the technology, and the users’ performance. Examples
include changes in a users’ trust on the technology, conformity effects, bonding, and
displays of empathy. I argue these effects emerge from changes in users’ perceived agency,
and their self- and social- identity similarly to interactions between humans.
Afterwards, I critically examine current theories on anthropomorphism and present
propositions about its nature based on the results of the empirical literature. Subsequently,
I introduce a two-factor model of anthropomorphism that proposes how an individual
anthropomorphizes a technology is dependent on how the technology was initially
perceived (top-down and rational or bottom-up and automatic), and whether it exhibits a
capacity for agency or experience. I propose that where a technology lays along this
spectrum determines how individuals relates to it, creating shared agency effects, or
changing the users’ social identity. For this reason, anthropomorphism is a powerful tool
that can be leveraged to support future interactions with smart technologies.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

For little over two decades we have known humans react socially to artificial
agents, applying social rules and expectations to their interactions and causing individuals
to “humanize” technology. Humans stereotype technology, may feel need to reciprocate
favors or benefits and may even perceive personalities in them, however, research in other
fields has suggested that these social reactions are far more than a mindless response to
social cues and may instead be an example of humans’ brains perceiving the technology as
possessing intention and mental and affective states not much difference from other
humans or other animals capable of acting on their own and with which an individual may
interact with (Gray, Gray, and Wegner, 2009) (Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal, 2015). As
artificial agents become more widespread, and developments such as artificial intelligence
allow them to be more autonomous and social, understanding why we perceive these
technological artifacts as something more than a tool becomes increasingly important.
Therefore, there is a growing need for researchers in IS to understand the underlying
mechanisms that cause humans to perceive a technological artefact as a tool under one
situation and as a subject in a different one, as well as what factors cause differences in
perception between individuals and the implications that these changing perceptions have
over the behavior and beliefs of an individual.
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The Arrival of Artificial Agents
The field of Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) has been attempting to replicate humanlike thinking in machines since the early 20th century, with researchers such as Alan Turing
suggesting that a point may arrive where we cannot differentiate machines from humans
as we interact with them. While such a point remains distant in the future, sociable
technology that relies on typically human-to-human methods of communication or
behaviors are becoming widespread. On one hand, embodied robots have achieve a
widespread penetration in the global market for the first time with personal and domestic
services robots accounting for over 4 million units sold with an estimated value of $1.7
Billion USD in 2013 alone, and estimated growth figures going for over 18 million units
sold by 2020 for a total market value speculated to be above $15 billion USD (Kumar,
2015) (Robotics, 2014). Contrary to prior technologies, these embodied robots are
performing household tasks with a level of autonomy never seen before.
On the other hand, smart devices in the form of Chatbots and Virtual Personal
Assistants (VPAs) such as Apple’s Siri, Google’s assistant, Amazon’s Alexa, or
Microsoft’s Cortana are offering new ways of interaction that had typically been reserved
for humans’ interaction with other humans such as voice conversations, body gestures, and
even the capability to initiate conversations. These artificial agents have become
widespread gaining a market size of $1.64 billion USD worldwide in 2017 and with the
expectation that they will reach a market of $16.79 billion USD by 2021 (Statista, 2018)
with the total amount of assistant enabled devices being expected to surpass human
population as early as 2021 (Renesse, 2017).
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Developing Human-like Robots & Machines
While researchers in the field of Information Systems (IS) have recognized this
social nature of the interaction with technology (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994) (Marakas,
Johnson, & Palmer, 2000), most of the research into this phenomenon has come from the
literature on Anthropomorphism within the fields of Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) and
Social Psychology (Broadbent, Interactions With Robots: The Truths We Reveal About
Ourselves, 2017) (Kiesler & Hinds, Introduction to This Special Issue on Human-Robot
Interaction, 2004). These researchers have look at the psychology behind individuals’
interaction with robots to improve their interactions within fields such as:
-

healthcare for older adults where robots are being used to assist people with
physical tasks (e.g. walking or carrying objects), cognitive issues (e.g. memory
games), health management (e.g. fall detection) and psychological issues (e.g.
companionship and entertaining) (Robinson, MacDonald, & Broadbent, 2014).

-

Communicating with children with autism where the less complex nature of
robots is being used to teach the children about different social cues (Simut,
Vanderfaeillie, Peca, Perre, & Vanderborght, 2016) (Diehl, Schmitt, Villano, &
Crowel, 2012).

-

Education where robots have been used to learn technical skills, assist teachers
in foreign language classes, and in sexual education classes (Mubin, Stevens,
Shahid, Mahmud, & Dong, 2013).
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-

Guides in Shopping Mall and Museums where robots have been used to
improve the experience individuals have in the facility and as a method for
studying their interactions (Sabelli & T., 2015).

Apart from exploring the usage of robots within different fields, researchers have
also conducted vast research into the relationship between anthropomorphic perception of
a machine and some other factors. Current research of antecedents of anthropomorphism
in HRI has gone beyond just considering the appearance of machines (Fong, Nourbakhsh,
& Dautenhahn, 2003) (Hancock, et al., 2011), and explore the impact of signals and cues
emitted by robots (Hegel, Gieselmann, Peters, Holthaus, & Wrede, 2011), the inclusion of
both appearance and human-robot interaction factors (e.g. autonomy, imitation, intrinsic
moral value, privacy, & reciprocity) (Choi & Kim, 2009) (Khan, Ishiguro, Friedman, &
Kanda, 2006), verbal and non-verbal communication (Mutlu, Yamaoka, Kanda, Ishiguro,
& Hagita, 2009) (Salem, Eyssel, Rohlfing, Kopp, & Joubling, 2011), the perceived emotion
of the robot (Eyssel F. , Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger, De Ruiter, & Hegel, 2012), among
others.
The consequences of perceived anthropomorphism have also been explored in the
literature. Different appearances for the same machine have been associated with different
perceptions of intelligence and intentionality (Hegel, Krach, Kircher, Wrede, & Sagerer,
2008), anthropomorphic devices lead to more visual attention than a perceived inanimate
device (Bae & Kim, 2011), the perception of anthropomorphism changes the perceived
personality traits of the machine (Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn, & Te Boekhorst, 2009),
and the origin and language of use has also been associated with different mental models
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of the robot’s perceived mind (Lee, Lau, Kiesler, & Chiu, 2005). The appearance of a robot
was found to affect the non-verbal communication of humans, but not their verbal
communication (Kanda, Miyashita, Osada, Haikawa., & Ishiguro, 2005), and the role of
the robot was also found to affect the way humans provided commands to the robot
(Austernmann, Yamada, Funakoshi, & Nakano, 2010).

1.1

PROBLEM STATEMENT
Humans can perceive other entities as either objects or subjects on different

situations potentially leading to different interaction dynamics. However, there is a
paucity of empirical researcher exploring the factors leading to perception of technology
as a subject and its effects on users.

While practitioners continue to develop artificial agents that engage humans
through modes of interaction typically reserved for human to human interaction, our
current theories fail to take into account how different perceptions of a technology can alter
how users interact with it, and instead focus on the use of technologies as tools. This view,
fails to take into account that as technologies are perceived as social agents, users may
become vulnerable to effects typical of the social interactions with others such as social
pains (Eisenberger, 2012), they may develop feelings of empathy and pro-social behavior
(Lieberman, 2012), gain a sense of shared-agency on a task with an artificial agent, or they
may feel social pressures and a need to harmonize thus changing their sense of self
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(Lieberman, 2013). Additionally, without furthering our understanding of what makes
individuals change their perception of technology under different circumstances, society’s
response to any technology that is perceived as human-like cannot be correctly predicted,
potentially leading to unexpected and possibly detrimental effects to the introduction of the
technology. Therefore, there is a need to explore how this form of interaction takes place
and what differentiates it from our current understanding of technology as a tool.

1.2

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study will significantly contribute to the current knowledge in the field on how

human interaction with artificial agents can become social, what factors cause variations
in perception among different individuals, and how it affects the individuals themselves.
The study will cover not only empirically tested behavioral responses, but also known
psychological and neurological correlates of these perceptions which will provide insights
that will allow both practitioners and researchers to alter the user’s perception of the
technology as it may fit them. The findings of this study will help practitioners gain control
over the perception of their technologies allowing them to develop their technologies to
make users more comfortable and trustful, and allowing the practitioners to encourage
desired behaviors and changes in beliefs such as the promotion of empathy in children or
helping elderly and lonely individuals become socially active. On the other hand, it will
help researchers by providing them with a basis upon which they explore the impact of
these changes in perception on our current theories including to what extent do humans
become more susceptible to the social effects of their interaction, and how their behavior
and beliefs may change over the long-term.
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1.3

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to expand our understanding of the underlying process

leading a person’s perception of technology as a social agent and develop propositions as
to how this phenomenon affects our field. As new technologies appear offering new modes
of interaction that resemble more and more the interactions between humans, the likelihood
of a user anthropomorphizing an entity and interacting with it socially drastically increase.
Therefore, by exploring how this attribution of socialness takes place, what factors affects
it, and which effects it has over the individuals involved in the interaction we will be able
to expand on our current understanding of how humans interact with human-like
technologies beyond what the CASA framework proffers, allowing practitioners to design
technologies to provoke or inhibit the social perception of their technologies as needed to
achieve their goals, and researchers to evaluate how the differences in perception of
technology may change current theories, and how it may affect individuals in the long term.
Therefore, our aim is to:

Develop an empirically-based model of the social perception of technology based
on the extant literature and including the salient factors that lead to it and its known
effects over the user in order to develop propositions on how it may affect our current
theories and an individual’s behavior and beliefs.
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This study will be based on a combination of theories of the attribution of mind to
others as exemplified by Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (2015) and Airenti (2018) that view
the attribution of socialness to artificial agents as being a form of anthropomorphism
bounded to the interaction modality and based on the same mechanisms that humans use
to understand other humans. The study will use the results of the extant empirical research
within the fields of information systems, human-robot interaction, and social psychology
and neuroscience in order to build an empirically-based model that is informed by previous
theoretical pieces to provide a foundation upon which this phenomenon could be further
researched in our field.

1.4

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on our literature review, it appears that the social perception of technology
is dependent on an individual’s anthropomorphism of it. At the same time, the
anthropomorphism appears to be a modality of the interaction dependent on the role we
give a given technology and not a fundamental characteristic of the technology itself,
however, it the results from empirical studies appear to suggest that there exist both internal
and external factors to the technology and the individual interacting with it that can
encourage or inhibit this perception, key among them being the perception of intention and
agency. Additionally, research suggests it depends on the same biological processes used
when human interact with other humans and therefore it appears likely that a person
anthropomorphizing the interaction with a technology could not only react socially to it,
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but be vulnerable to the same effects on their behavior and sense of self that their interaction
with other humans could have (e.g. groupthink, social conformity, and harmonizing effects
on behavior). Based on this, our explicit research questions are:

1. What are the factors that encourage an individual to perceive technology as a
social agent?

2. What effects does the perception of socialness on technology has over its users?

1.5

SUMMARY
As new technologies are developed to become more social and autonomous while

relying on methods of interaction typical of human to human interaction such as voice or
written conversations or the expression of body gestures, the need to understand how our
perceptions of these technologies may change and its repercussions becomes much more
important. While research in Information systems is limited, other fields such as human
robot interaction and social psychology and neuroscience promise to expand our
understanding of this phenomenon after having benefited from recent advances in brain
imaging techniques that allow them to explore it in an unprecedented level. By leveraging
on advances in theories of attribution of mental states to others, as well as empirical results
on the interaction between humans and human-like technologies this paper will develop a
comprehensive model that will fill in the gaps on how we perceive other entities and
attribute socialness to them, as well as on what the implications of doing so are for the
individuals involved and our current theories in the field.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In the following sections we will explore the extant literature related to how
individuals perceive other non-human entities as either objects without capacity to act on
their own or feel, or subjects with minds and capable of social behavior. This literature
review will cover the state of the art research into this phenomenon from 3 levels of
analysis: a behavioral level that explores what the phenomenon entails, a psychological
level that explores why we perceive others as being agents in some scenarios, and a
physiological level that explains how the human brain attributes mental states to others
that enable them to be perceive as social agents. To be precise, the literature review will be
separated into 4 parts: The first part will cover our current understanding of social machines
within the Information Systems (IS) discipline. Afterwards, we will explore behavioral
studies and theories regarding how humans interact with anthropomorphic machines as
explored within the field of Human-Robot Interactions (HRI) including how we may
perceive these machines to have minds and be capable of experiencing the world around
them. Thirdly, we will explore the psychological processes that enable the perception of
others as agents. Finally, we will explore the functions and structures in the human brain
that enable and support these perceptions. At the end of the literature review we will
proceed to summarize how these findings support each other to provide a better overview
of the phenomenon.
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2.1

EARLY STUDIES IN IS

Since its early days, the field of Information Systems has been focused on exploring
the role and impact of technology on individuals and organizations while they interact with
it, with the majority of researchers recognizing it as an important tool that enhances the
effects of other factors on variables such as user satisfaction and organizational
performance. While this view has become widespread and well supported, recent research
has suggested that as humans interact with technology, humans may place a role on it as a
social agent giving it the capacity to elicit social responses on individuals (Tahiroglu &
Taylor, 2018) (Airenti, The Development of Anthropomorphism in Interaction:
Intersubjectivity, Imagination, and Theory of Mind, 2018). In the following sections we
will describe the beginning of research on technology as a social agent as well as the stateof-the-art theories on how humans’ perception of technology can vary between a tool and
an agent.

2.1.1

The Media Equation: Computers are Social Actors (CASA)

Early studies into the social perception of technology can be traced back to the early
to mid-1990s to the seminal works of a researcher by the name of Clifford Nass and his
colleagues who conducted a series of experiments in which they demonstrated that people
tend to treat computers and other as if they were other humans, even when they are aware
they are not human (Nass & Moon, 2000). These experiments culminated in the
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development of the seminal work of the Computers are Social Agents (CASA) framework,
which states that people mindlessly (i.e. non-consciously) apply social rules and
expectations to their interactions with computers and other media and that, therefore most
social science findings should be capable of being replicated through the interactions
between humans and computers (Nass & Moon, 2000) (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994). In
essence, Nass and his colleagues (Nass & Moon, 2000) proposed that as individuals pay
conscious attention to some contextual cues in their interactions with computers, these cues
trigger various scripts and expectations in the mind of individuals that cause them to
unconsciously react as they have done so in the past. Nass et al. based their conclusions on
3 facets of the human cognition:

1) The overuse of human social categories which refers to the use of categories in
society like race, gender, ethnicity, young/old, etc. To test this idea, Nass et al.
(Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997) conducted an experiment with a computer that
interacted with user’s through its voice. In this experiment the participants used the
computers through 3 phases, while the researchers monitored the differential
impact for the gender of the voice in the computer. The results of the study indicated
that the participants did apply stereotypes to the computer, as shown by their
consideration that the male voiced computer was friendlier than the female voiced
computer, or that the participants perceived the female-voiced computer to be more
knowledgeable about traditionally female topics such as love and relationships. The
authors also conducted similar experiments about other categories such as ethnicity
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(Nass, Isbister, & Lee, 2000), and ingroup vs outgroup behavior (Nass, Fogg, &
Moon, 1996), obtaining similar results that supported the hypothesis that
individuals applied these social categories to computers.

2) Individual’s engagement in overlearned social behavior, that is repeated
behaviors that became a 2nd nature (such as being polite) are reapplied
unconsciously due to how ingrained it is in their minds. This hypothesis was tested
by examining if people were polite to computers (Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999).
Nass, Moon, and Carney explain that when a person asks another person to evaluate
them in a face to face meeting, the resulting evaluation tends to be positively bias
showing a form of politeness. The authors replicated this same study by having
participants work with a computer, and after the work was finalized, asking then to
evaluate the performance of the computer. The evaluation was given in one of two
ways: Either the participants evaluated the computer in the same computer they had
used in the previous phase, or they used a different computer to submit the
evaluation of the performance of the previous computer. As the authors expected,
the evaluations given on the same computer that had been used before by the
participants were consistently more positive than those given to a different
computer even though the participants claimed their answers were not biased (Nass,
Moon, & Carney, 1999).

13

3) People’s tendency to conduct premature cognitive commitments by making and
holding assumptions early on based on incomplete information. Nass and his
colleagues tested this hypothesis by categorizing a TV as either a specialist (only
shows one type of tv show) or a generalist (shows both entertainment and news
coverage). Participants assigned to the generalist group were allowed to watch TV
from a TV they were told could show both entertainment and news shows, whereas
the participants that were assigned the specialist group were told they would watch
the 2 categories on 2 different occasions. After having the participants view a series
of news and entertainment segments, the participants in the specialist condition
evaluated the news as being of higher quality than the participants in the generalist
condition did, even though the programming did not vary between the specialist
and generalist TVs (Nass & Moon, 2000). This provided support to the hypothesis
that people make premature cognitive commitments that influence them.

Nass et al. (2000) discarded anthropomorphism as a possible alternative
explanation for the CASA framework based on the argument that Anthropomorphism was
a mindful process in which people belief that computers are essentially human, and that it
argues “that social responses to computers emerged from ignorance concerning the
ontological status of computers qua people” [page 93]. The authors argued that the fact all
the participants in one of their experiments stated they would never respond socially to a
computer was evidence that anthropomorphism was not at play. Moreover, they contended
that while individuals could develop very strong relationships with computers and other
objects, the emotional attachment was not a direct response to the object themselves but
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were the result of an evocation of memories or of emotion management. These arguments
however, tend to contradict the definition of anthropomorphism used by other researchers
which considers it to have both a conscious (Guthrie S. E., 1993) (Guthrie S. , 1995) and a
non-conscious component (Waytz, Klein, & Epley, Imagining Other Minds:
Anthropomorphism Is Hair-Triggered but Not Hare- Brained, 2013) (Sundar, 2004) (Kim
& Sundar, 2012). These arguments for a dual process of anthropomorphism have also been
empirically supported in the literature (Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2018). Additionally, factors
such as emotional attachment towards computers could be explained through
Anthropomorphism (Hortensius, Hekele, & Cross, 2017).
2.1.2

The Computing Technology Continuum of Perspective
After Nass and his colleagues published their findings, other researchers began

exploring ways in which they could build use it to improve user interfaces and the overall
experience of interacting with technology. Building upon this framework, Marakas,
Johnson and Palmer explored how individuals differed in their use of anthropomorphism
as a form of describing the behavior of technological artefacts as humans interact with them
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000). The authors examined the social perception of
technology as an attribution process in which individuals recognize technology as either
being a neutral tool that responds to the actions of the individual, or as a social actor capable
of stimulating social responses from its users. Following this view of anthropomorphism,
they proposed a computing technology continuum of perspectives through which on one
side individuals perceived computers to be tools completely under the control of humans
(locally simplex), and on the other they are perceived to be social actors that exert control
or influence an individual’s daily life (locally complex). Rather than claim individuals are
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in one category permanently, Marakas et al. developed a theoretical model of the computer
as a social actor in which they examined the possible inputs to the anthropomorphism
attribution process that explain what leads people to view technology from a locally
simplex or locally complex perspective, or somewhere in between. This model claims that
the degree to which a particular perspective dominates is dependent on the characteristics
of the individual (such as her Core self-evaluation), characteristics of the technology that
indicated socialness (such as perceived intelligence), the nature or context of the
interaction, and perceived cues in the information exchanged.
Since its development, parts of this model have been empirically tested. The impact
of a person’s core self-evaluations on the attribution process and on the continuum of
perspective, as well as the impact of the social character of the technology on the
attribution, and the impact of the continuum perspective on the attribution itself were found
to be all significant (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, Differential Social Attributions Toward
Computing Technology: An Empirical Investigation, 2006). However, the self-esteem of
the person was not found to be a significant factor in a later study (Tussyadiah, When cell
phones become travel buddies: Social attribution to mobile phones in travel, 2013).

2.1.3

Anthropomorphizing Machines

Parallel to these studies on sociable behavior towards computers in IS, researchers
in other fields have explored how we anthropomorphize non-human and non-living entities
by perceiving them as being human-like and sociable (Broadbent, et al., 2013) (Broadbent,
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Interactions With Robots: The Truths We Reveal About Ourselves, 2017). The term
anthropomorphism refers to the tendency that humans have to attribute human
characteristics to non-human entities such as inanimate objects, animals among others
(Duffy, 2003). The word originates from the Greek word Anthropos (referring to man) and
morphe (referring to form), but it is usage is not limited to recognizing an entity as being
alive, or to describing its physical characteristics or engaged behavior, and instead focuses
on the attribution of human-like properties, characteristics or mental states to non-human
agents (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, On Seeing Human: A Three-Factor Theory of
Anthropomorphism, 2007). The process of anthropomorphism is recognized as occurring
within each human observer and consequently it is not an innate property of the entity being
observed, though the entity’s external characteristics can influence its attribution
(Zlotowski, 2015). Therefore, research on the process of anthropomorphism tends to
explore the characteristics of the anthropomorphized entity, the context where the
attribution happened, and the characteristics of the individual making the attribution
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Hancock, et al., 2011) (von Zitzewitz, Boesch, Wolf,
& Riener, 2013) (Choi & Kim, 2009).
“Anthropomorphism is therefore a process of inference about unobservable
characteristics of a nonhuman agent, rather than descriptive reports of a nonhuman agent’s
observable or imagined behavior”

- (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007)
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ORIGINS OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM
Many researchers from the fields of psychology and anthropology consider
anthropomorphism to have evolved as an adaptive trait in early hominids. They belief that
recognizing the human-like characteristics on non-human agents allowed them to improve
their interactions and form alliances by enabling them to interpret shapes as faces and
bodies (Guthrie S. , 1995). While these areas of research can be tracked down through the
decades, the construct of anthropomorphism has only been applied to technology within
the past few decades. In our field, early studies on anthropomorphism can be tracked down
to Sherry Turkle and her studies of human computer interaction (HCI) during the 1980s.
Turkle performed a series of psychoanalytic studies on children in order to better
understand how they interacted with machines (Turkle, 1984). During these studies, she
noticed how children would describe and interact with machines using human terms,
describing simple machines as “cheating machines” when they fail to make the same
mistakes twice while playing games, or even going as far as calling computers “sort of
alive” because they must “know how to do [pictures]” when showing pictures (Turkle,
1984). These studies provided her with early evidence of how humans and computers
interacted and assisted her record anecdotical evidence of the child’s perceptions of the
anthropomorphic characteristics of computers which formed the foundation for later
research on the construct.
2.1.4

Sociality, Effectance, and Elicited Agent Knowledge (SEEK)
As researchers continue to explore social responses to computers, and

anthropomorphism, a question appears: Why do different individuals anthropomorphize at
different rates? In order to answer this question Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2007)
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develop a theory that aims to explain the process through which people anthropomorphize
non-human entities. Based on this theory, they propose that we can better understand when
people are likely to anthropomorphize and when they are not, and by extension when
people are likely to Dehumanize other individuals. Epley et al. proposed that
anthropomorphism is a process of inductive inference, and therefore it should possess the
same basic cognitive operations (e.g. acquisition of knowledge, activation or elicitation of
knowledge, etc.) of other inductive processes (Higgins, 1996). Based on this principle,
Epley et al. (2007) proposed 3 components that determine a person’s likelihood of
anthropomorphizing an entity:
-

The primary determinant of anthropomorphism is the elicitation of knowledge
about the agent itself. Because knowledge about humans and the self are likely
to be acquired earlier and to be richer than knowledge about nonhuman agents,
the authors argue that this knowledge is more likely to be accessible by
individuals whenever they attempt to make a judgement about a nonhuman
agent thus increasing their chances of anthropomorphizing until adequate
mental models about the entity are created. Some studies argue that the
elicitation of agent’s knowledge can be induced if the perceived entity already
possesses some human-like attributes such as a human-like appearance or
behavior (Zlotowski, 2015).

-

The motivation that individuals’ have to interact effectively with others can
also lead them to perceive other entities as processing human-like
characteristics and mental states when their behavior appears to be complex. By
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doing so, individuals expect to improve their capacity to explain the behavior
of others in the future.

-

An individuals’ need and desire to establish social connections which can
lead individuals to feel isolated which increases their tendency to treat other
entities as if they were humanlike social agents. This component has received
support in a series of studies conducted by Epley et al. to study the impact of
chronic isolation as well as induced feelings of loneliness on a person’s
likelihood to anthropomorphize non-living entities (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2008).

Additionally, they argue that these factors work in conjunction to increase or
decrease the extent that a person will anthropomorphizes a nonhuman agent (Epley, Waytz,
& Cacioppo, 2007). This theory has been widely applied in the field of Human-Robot
Interaction (HRI) (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008) (Eyssel, Hegel, Horstmann,
& Wagner, 2010) (Kuchenbrandt, Eyssel, Bobinger, & Neufeld, 2013) (Salem, Eyssel,
Rohlfing, Kopp, & Joubling, 2011), though due to the field’s focus on the design of the
robots most studies review the effectance motivation component without considering the
others (Zlotowski, 2015).
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Role of Appearance & Behavior
Other theories of anthropomorphism have focused more on the physical
characteristics that affect our perception of human-likeness and lead us to assign mental
states to entities instead on the mental processes proposed by Epley and colleagues. A
model of human-likeness proposed by von Zitzewitz (von Zitzewitz, Boesch, Wolf, &
Riener, 2013) and colleagues attempts to characterize our perception as being dependent
on both the static aspects of appearance which reflect what we perceive through our
different senses (visual appearance, sound, smell, haptic appearance, and taste), and
dynamic aspects of behavior which includes how the entity moves, its verbal and
nonverbal communication, its capacity to interact with an individual, and the social
behaviors that it signals to the perceiver. While the model proposes both aspects to be
critical, the authors suggest that the appearance of the entity might be more significant at
the beginning of the interaction, while the behavioral factors become more important as
the interaction progresses.
Other authors have explored the impact of both the appearance and behavior of an
entity towards how likely we are to anthropomorphize it, and have found supporting
evidence of this impact leading to the perceiver of the interaction to recognize mind in the
agent and change both how they rate it (Looser & Wheatley, 2010) (Waytz, et al., 2010)
(Hackel, Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014) (Martini, Gonzalez, & Wiese, 2016), and how they
perceived it had performed (Kiesler, Powers, Fussell, & Torrey, 2008) (Morewedge, 2009)
(Süßenbach & Schönbrodt, 2014) (Wiese, Wykowska, & Müller, 2014) (Mandell, Smith,
Martini, Shaw, & Wiese, 2015).
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While appearance related factors, and behavior related factors have become
accepted as instrumental to the perception of anthropomorphism, the effects of these 2
categories appears to differ from each other with some researchers exploring the
differential these factors have on other constructs. One study in particular found that both
factors appeared to function in isolation with the appearance of an entity having a higher
impact on the attitudes towards said entity, and its behavior having a stronger effect on the
perceived performance of the entity (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017).
Interaction related Factors and the Pass of Time
Another model of the perception of anthropomorphism developed by Lemaignan
and colleagues recognized the importance of robot-related factors (perceived) as suggested
by von Zitzewitz et al. in perceiving anthropomorphism but expands upon their view by
proposing the inclusion of human-related (perceiver), and context-related factors
(environment)

as

additional

critical

factors

influencing

the

perception

of

anthropomorphism (Lemaignan, Fink, Dillenbourg, & Braboszcz, 2014) in a similar way
as was proposed within the Computing Technology Continuum Perspective before
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000). Lemaignan continued to expand upon this model by
proposing that the perception of anthropomorphism is not something fixed, but that instead
it can change through time as the perceiver develops and adapts her own mental model of
the agent. The model proposed 3 stages of adaptation:
-

A pre-cognitive phase where other entities are intuitively perceived as being
alive and emotional responses such as empathy can be developed. After
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observing or interacting with the agent for some time, individuals move to the
following phase.
-

In the familiarity-based phase individuals project familiar mental models
upon the entity. After continuing to interact with it for some more time the
individual moves to the third and final phase.

-

The adapted phase is characterized by the individual recomposing the existing
mental model about the entity, based on prior experience with it, in order to
improve its accuracy. This phase leads towards an adapted interaction modality
that could still be anthropomorphic depending on the person’s understanding of
the inner workings of the entity, as well as his/her tendency to
anthropomorphize. At this point the impact of both the appearance and behavior
of the entity is significantly reduced.

Figure 1 The phases of anthropomorphism. From Lemaignan et al. (2014).
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Anthropomorphism & Dehumanization

An alternative approach to exploring anthropomorphism has been to explore the
process of dehumanization. Contrary to Anthropomorphism which projects human mental
attributes to others, dehumanization describes the process through which we fail to
“attribute basic human qualities to others” denying their humanness (Waytz & Epley,
2012). Because of the similarity of the 2 concepts, some researchers have suggested that
they might be opposite sides of the same construct (Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010) and
thus suggest that exploring this concept could bring about clarity to process of
anthropomorphization. As part of his dissertation, Zlotowski conducted the first
comprehensive attempt to test the validity of using an inverse process of dehumanization
as a tool to anthropomorphize machines (Zlotwski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, & Ishiguro,
2017). In his theory, he proposes that by exploring the factors that cause people to
dehumanize others, we can understand what factors may have an impact on a robot’s
anthropomorphism. Zlotowski looked at the factors identified in Haslam’s theory of
dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) which proposes that 2 senses of humanness based on
perceived personality traits:
-

A first set of characteristics were associated with being Uniquely Human (UH)
in that they were proposed to be exclusive of the human species. This included
complex characteristics such as civility, intelligence, moral sensitivity,
rationality and maturity.
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-

The second set of characteristics were though of being part of the Human
Nature (HN) and differed from the Uniquely Human characteristics in that they
could be shared with other living beings. This included primary emotions and
warmth, as well as other factors such as cognitive openness, agency,
individuality and depth.

Zlotowski (Zlotwski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, & Ishiguro, 2017) notes that HU
characteristics tend to represent the socialization and culture of others, and therefore it
reflects their social learning which can vary across different cultures. On the other hand,
HN tends to be part of a person’s biological dispositions since birth, and therefore it tends
to be prevalent among populations and cultures. HN tends to represent essential
characteristics of a living being, while HU tends not to be perceived as essential (Haslam,
2006). Nevertheless, the results from Zlotowski’s study were inconsistent, and suggested
that there are no 2 dimensions of anthropomorphism based on humanness and instead only
the HN and not the HU traits tend to be influential (Zlotowski, Stasser, & Bartneck, 2014)
(Zlotwski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, & Ishiguro, 2017).
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Table 1 Facilitators of Anthropomorphism based on main theories available.
Study
(Epley, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2007)

Facilitators of Anthropomorphism
1) Anthropomorphism can be induced when an entity
appears more humanlike

Bottom Line
Anthropomorphism as a psychological
process depends on our perception of

2) Perceived agents are complex or behave in a complex

the entity we interact with, or likelihood

way inciting us to look for explanations of their

of perceiving it as an agent based on our

behavior to predict their future state.

own need to explain its behavior and our

3) Loneliness enhances our likelihood of

need for social contact.

anthropomorphizing in an attempt to establish social
connections.

(von Zitzewitz,
Boesch, Wolf, &

- Static aspects of appearance: Visual appearance, sound,
smell, haptic appearance, and taste.

Anthropomorphism depends on 2 key
aspects: The Appearance and behavior

Riener, 2013)

of others. The appearance appears to
predispose us to perceive others as
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- Dynamic aspects of behavior: Movement, nonverbal

agents if they are “human-like”, and the

communication, interactive behavior, verbal

behavior is what ultimately drives our

communication, and social behavior.

perceptions about the entity with more
human-like behavior being perceived as
social agents. Von Zizewitz brings about
some factors that we can exploit to
comprehensively and consciously
design robots and other machines.

(Lemaignan, Fink,
Dillenbourg, &
Braboszcz, 2014)

1) Perception of Human-likeness varies through time.

Anthropomorphism is not constant and

2) Human-Centered Factors: Personality and individual

as we interact with an artificial agent,

traits of the human user: Psychological

we can begin to perceive it as having

characteristics/determinants that influence a person’s

mental states, or we can stop perceiving

tendency to anthropomorphize artifacts [age, gender,

it that way.

cultural background, professional background]
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3) Robot-Related Factors: robot’s design and how it

It also discusses the need to include the

appears to the human user including the

human, machine, and context related

characteristics of the robot’s form, behavior, and

factors typical of HCI.

interaction modalities.
4) Situation-Centered Factors: real or imagined purpose
of the robot, situational context in which it is used,
and role in which the robot is used/experienced.

(Haslam, 2006)

1) Human Nature factors

Some authors argue for

2) Uniquely Human factors

Anthropomorphism to be the inverse
process of Dehumanization. Haslam’s
theory describes dehumanization as
being composed of 2 types of factors:
uniquely human factors that if denied

28

equal humans to animals and automata,
and human nature factors that if denied
equal humans to objects.
(Gray, Gray, &
Wegner, 2007)

1) Perception of Agency (i.e. self-control, morality,

Humans cannot know if other entities

memory, emotion recognition, planning,

possess actual mental processes or are

communication, & thought)

just automata and therefore what matters

2) Experience (i.e. feel hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, rage,

is whether we perceive others to have a

and desire, to have personality & consciousness, to

mind. Humans may perceive others as

feel pride, embarrassment & joy)

having any combination of these 2
factors: adults may have both high
agency and experience, children may
have low agency but high capacity to
experience, and robots may have high
agency but low capacity to experience.
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(Airenti, The

-

Development of
Anthropomorphism
in Interaction:

-

Anthropomorphism is bound to an interaction and

Anthropomorphism is a mode of

not to the technology itself

interaction where human’s give the role

An individual could interact with an artefact as if

of interlocutor to a technology and it is

it were a tool or a subject under different contexts

more dependent on the cognitive

Intersubjectivity,

processes of the individual than on any

Imagination, and

characteristic of the artefact.

Theory of Mind,

The cognitive processes of an individual

2018)

are more important to how they will
interact with a technology than the
technology’s appearance or behavior.
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2.2

PERCEIVING MIND IN ARTIFICIAL AGENTS
The attribution of mind to non-human entities has been identified as being an

important determinant of anthropomorphism (Zlotowski, Proudfoot, Yogeeswaran, &
Bartneck, 2015), and recent research has supported that individuals tend to differentially
attribute mind to a wide range of entities, from animals, to other humans and even other
nonliving entities (Eyssel, et al., 2016). While the question of whether machines can think
as made famous by Alan Turing’s imitation game (Turing, 1950) is certainly an important
one, what we explore here is not the actual existence of a mind, but the perception of one
by an individual observing another entity including other humans, animals, and artificial
agents.
The perception of mind has often been defined by researchers such as Abubshait &
Eva Wiese (2017) as “the degree to which an agent is judged to have a mind as a function
of their physical humanness” (Hackel, Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014) (Martini, Gonzalez, &
Wiese, 2016), suggesting that mind perception is dependent on the level of
anthropomorphism that we attribute to others. This interpretation relating mind perception
and anthropomorphism is further supported by the theory of Theory of Mind (ToM).
Similarly to how anthropomorphism refers to the attribution of mental states to non-human
animals and things, Theory of Mind refers to the ability that agents (humans in particular
but potentially also other animals) possess to perceive mind in others attributing them with
different mental states ranging from intentions, hopes, expectations, desires, and beliefs
among other states while going as far as understanding that others may have beliefs about
others’ beliefs (Leslie, 2001).
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At its core, Theory of Mind represents the capability that an agent has to develop
hypotheses about the thoughts of other perceived agents with a focus on 3 key capabilities,
i.e. 1) reflecting on the goals of the other agents which is often referred to as their desires,
understanding their beliefs about the world, and understanding whether they mean what
they say and do through an inference of their intention or pretense (Leslie, 2001) (Breed &
Moore, 2012) (Pedersen, 2018). Humans are not born with a fully developed capacity to
perceive mental states in others, which is why Theory of Mind research has focused on
understanding when this psychological understanding about others emerges and how it
changes as a child grows into a full adult (Lagattuta, et al., 2014). This perception has also
been shown to be influenced by gaze cues, facial expressions, vocal cues, and other
behavior related factors such as kinematics (Ansuini, Cavallo, Bertone, & Becchio, 2015).
Following the similarities between theory of mind and anthropomorphism, some
researchers have chosen to study humans reaction to human-like machines by focusing on
the perception of intention and therefore of a mind on these machines (Martini, Gonzalez,
& Wiese, 2016) (Wiese, Wykowska, & Müller, 2014) (Wiese, Shaw, Lofaro, & Baldwin,
2017). In their studies on what leads to mind perception and its moral implications, Wegner
and Gray argued that we can never be certain of the existence of others’ minds (Wegner &
Gray, 2016) and instead when we interact with others we infer the likelihood that they have
a mind based on our perception of 2 dimensions: an agent’s capacity for agency which
includes the capability of planning and acting independently out of free will (i.e. emotion
recognition, communication, planning, thought, etc.), and the capacity for experiencing
emotions which refers to the capability to express emotions, inner life, and vitality (i.e.
hunger, joy, personality, consciousness, etc.) (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) (Wegner &

32

Gray, 2016). In this sense, the authors argue, we are not limited to just arguing if an entity
has a mind or not, and instead we can view if an entity has some components of mind.
For example, a fully grown man could be said to have both high agency and high
experience and therefore we could conclude that the person has a mind, but in the case of
a baby while no one would debate the humanness, an individual might perceive the baby
as having low agency but high experience creating a mismatch between the perceived mind
and the humanness due to the baby not being completely developed. These dimensions can
therefore allow us to perceive minds in robots and other technological devices, that could
be perceived as having little experience, but a moderate degree of agency (Broadbent,
Interactions With Robots: The Truths We Reveal About Ourselves, 2017).
2.2.1

Perceptions of Agency

Within the field of psychology, the attribution of mental and affective states to
others has often been associated with the perception of agency in others (Gray, Gray, &
Wegner, 2007) which is typically dependent on the detection of an intentional behavior.
When humans perceive an entity as conducting an intentional behavior, they are also
typically perceiving its source as being an agent capable of taking action for its own
interests. This line of though comes from our understanding of the concept of agency which
refers to the capability that an entity has of influencing their own functioning and the course
of some events by performing an action (Bandura, Agency, 2017) and leading an individual
to have a sense of being the agent or owner of an action (Schlosser, 2015). Agency is often
characterized as consisting of 4 functions (Bandura, Agency, 2017) (Bandura, Toward a
Psychology of Human Agency: Pathways and Reflections, 2018): First, people form
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intentions and plan to how to realize these intentions over-time. Secondly, people attempt
to foresee what proper goals could be to realize their intentions and what the possible
outcomes of their own actions could be. Thirdly, an agent self-regulates their own actions
to align with their expectations. And finally, they execute functional self-awareness, where
they reflect upon their efficacy at achieving their intended goals and make corrective
adjustments as needed. In this sense, the extant literature has relied on the close relationship
between agency and intention to measure the perception of agency on machines through
both the direct measurement of the perception of agency, or through the direct and indirect
measurements of the perception of intention.

Integral to the concept of the perception of agency is that of the Sense of Agency
(SoA) or the sense that we have of doing something, being in control and being the agent
or owner of the action (Schlosser, 2015). While an individuals’ Sense of Agency had
traditionally been defined and explored as a single construct, researchers now argue in
favor of a model of the sense of agency consisting of 2 elements that work at different
levels to provide us with our overall Sense of Agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen,
2008): an individual’s Feeling of Agency (FoA) which refers to the lower level nonconceptual and nonconscious feeling of being an agent, and a Judgement of Agency (JoA)
which refers to the higher-level conceptual and conscious judgement of agency (Moore J.
W., 2016). The theoretical development of the Sense of Agency and its components is
explored This distinction can better be explained by looking at the historical development
of research into how we perceive agency.
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The Model of Apparent Mental Causation

The first model that attempts to explain the sense of agency is Wegner’s “model of
apparent mental causation” which indicates that the sense of agency or “experience of
conscious will” arises when we interpret a conscious intention to perform an action as the
cause of the action (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) (Wegner D. M., 2002) (Schlosser, 2015).
Therefore, this model argues that for a sense of agency to be perceived (i) the intention to
carry out an action must occur before the action is observed (priority), (ii) the intention
must be consistent with the action taking place such that, for example, the direction
towards which a ball travels is consistent with the location where we hit the ball in the first
place, and (iii) the intention must be the most likely cause of the action detected
(exclusivity) (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) (Moore & Obhi, 2012). In essence, Wegner’s
model examines the sense of agency as a reconstruction of perceived causes and effects
which in turn allow for incorrect attributions of agency as demonstrated in an experiment
by Wegner and Wheatley where by priming subjects with a though before they saw a cursor
moving encouraged them to attribute the movements to themselves even when the
movements were caused by another person (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). While this model
was the first to attempt to explain the functioning of the sense of agency, it quickly became
rejected by most researchers as empirical evidence suggested that the sense of agency was
more than just self-interpretation (Schlosser, 2015).
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The comparator Model of Motor Control

An alternative model of the sense of agency was proposed shortly afterwards as an
extension of the “comparator model of motor control”. The comparator model was
originally developed as a theory of motor control which proposes that for a movement to
take place, the motor control system must first send a command to the necessary muscles
to perform an action and at the same time it sends a copy of that command to an internal
predictive model. The predictive model is constantly attempting to make predictions
(called a forward model) of the trajectory of the movement based on the effect the
command will have on the muscles and a sub-personal motor control system compares the
intended movement against the predicted movement in order to make corrections. After the
movement takes place and is perceived through sensory feedback, the sub-personal motor
control system makes another comparison between the actual action and the predicted
action in order to fine-tune subsequent movements which compensates for different states
of the muscle and the environment that may be affecting the intended movement.
While the model is meant to explain motor performance, researchers have proposed
that the same comparisons can help explain the sense of agency of an individual by bringing
about feelings of control over our own actions (Frith C. , 2005). This is believed to happen
whenever a positive match between the actual and intended actions is provided in the
comparison (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Alternatively, it can also disrupt the
sense of agency whenever a mismatch between the action and intention takes place. The
comparator model thus explains the sense of agency as an internal impulse-responding

36

process and therefore it has been argued to be neither sufficient nor necessary to explain
the Sense of Agency, after all, it can only explain behaviors that happen as a reaction to a
stimulus where a comparison between actual and expected actions are possible based on
feedback captured through sensory perception, but it lacks any mechanism through which
it could explain attribution of agency in those situations where no sensory perception took
place (Haggard, 2005) (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007) (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008).
A Hybrid Model for the Sense of Agency
Finally, as the field continued to develop, researchers began to recognize the
competition between the previous 2 models as being somewhat of an unnecessary
dichotomy and instead argued for a third “hybrid” model that combines the main ideas of
the previous theories. Proponents of the hybrid model view the sense of agency as being
composed of a personal level that offers a post-act conscious evaluation of agency referred
to as the “Judgement of Agency” (JoA) and a non-conceptual and phenomenologically thin
sub-personal (nonconscious) level known as the “Feeling of Agency” (FoA) that rely on
both internal sensorimotor signals and external situational information to develop the sense
of agency in an individual (Moore & Fletcher, 2012) (Frankish, 2009) (Synofzik,
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Researchers argue that these cues influence the perception of
agency differently based on how reliable they appear to be through a process of cue
integration where the cues are weighted and integrated to reduce the variability of the
estimated origins of an action (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Researchers argue the comparator
model is well suited to explain the basic Feeling of Agency whereas other theories of selfreflection like the model of apparent mental causation can be distorted in some scenarios
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008) (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007) (Gallagher, 2007).
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2.2.2

Measuring our Perception of Agency
While research into the sense of agency has mostly focused on studies of the

perception of agency of the self, these studies and their measuring methodology have also
been tested to work on the perception of agency in others (Wegner & Gray, 2017) (UrquizaHaas & Kotrschal, 2015) (Limerick, Coyle, & Moore, 2014) with recent studies going so
far as testing their efficacy in virtual environments typical of HCI technologies
(McEneaney, Agency Attribution in Human-Computer Interaction, 2009). These
perceptions can be measured in multiple ways with different approaches existing for
measuring the Feeling of Agency than for measuring the Judgment of Agency. Typically,
the Judgement of Agency is experimentally measured either through a self-reported scale
of agency, or by asking participants if they or the entity being studied are agents resulting
in a binary response.
More interesting are the measures of the implicit Feeling of Agency which include
both sensory attenuations paradigms (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998) and studies of
the perceptions of the timing between an action and an effect called intentional binding
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The sensory attenuation paradigms refer to our
differential perception of normal movements where an individual perceives identical
sensory inputs differently depending on whether the movement was self-generated or
generated by others (Burin, et al., 2017) (Macerollo, et al., 2015). Studies have shown that
this type of paradigm can be used to measure the sense of agency or perception of agency
in others as well as to measure impairments of the sense of agency (Macerollo, et al., 2015).
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Intentional Binding

The second approach used to measure the Feeling of Agency consists of using the
perceived time of intentional actions and their consequences as detected through sensory
feedback as a measurement of the non-conscious sense of agency through a method called
Intentional Binding (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In this methodology
participants report the perceive time at which an action was initiated and the perceive time
where the effects of said action took place, if the action was perceived to be intentional and
we attribute agency to its source, research has shown that the timing between the initiation
of the action and its effect will be reported as being bound closer together with the initiation
of the action being reported as happening slightly later and its effects slightly sooner.
Figure 2 Intentional Binding as reported in Limerick, Coyle, & Moore (2014)
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While Intentional Binding was originally described as happening due to the
perception of intentionality by the source agent, recent research suggest that both
intentional action and mechanical causes result in temporal binding suggesting that the
binding actually happens due to the perceived causal relation linking actions with their
consequences (Buehner, 2012).

2.3

NEUROLOGICAL BASIS FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF MENTAL STATES

For the past couple of decades, the field of social cognitive neuroscience has been
exploiting advances in brain imaging techniques that explore the biological roots of
psychological phenomena typically explored in the social sciences. Early studies of human
brain showed that they don’t function as general-purpose machines, and instead are
composed of multiple specialized networks and areas each of which possesses some
specialized function related to human cognition such as perceiving faces, empathizing with
others, perceiving mental states in others, among other functions (Kanwisher, 2010).
Additionally, studies have shown that information about the properties of objects
and other perceived beings is stored within the same motor and sensory networks that were
active when the information was first gathered suggesting that salient information on
different categories of entities would be stored on different networks in the brain as implied
by selectively impaired recollection of knowledge about animate objects and animals, and
knowledge about inanimate and manmade objects such as tools (Martin A. , 2007) (Mahon,
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Anzellotti, Schwarzbach, Zampini, & Caramazza, 2009) (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999)
(Caramazza & Mahon, The Organization of Conceptual Knowledge: the Evidence from
Category-Specific Semantic Deficits, 2003) (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). Arguments
about the differential processing and analysis of different categories of entities are further
supported by the identification of two main networks in the brain that are pivotal in how
humans process how we perceive and analyze our environment: The Task Positive
Network and the Default Mode Network (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015).
Perceiving the Physical and Social Worlds
During the early days of social neuroscience, researchers attempted to identify
specific areas of the brain correlated with known psychological processes as well as those
correlated with the execution of specific task. While most functions where identified to be
correlated to different areas of the brain, some regions showed correlation in their
activation suggesting they were part of a network within the brain associated with certain
functionality. One particular network of regions was found to become active whenever
individuals performed attention demanding tasks such as focusing on the external
environment in order to execute some tasks, when a person focuses on external or internal
sensations, make plans for the future, or perform complex motor tasks such as interacting
with tools and other objects. Because this network, known as the Task Positive Network
(TPN), has been shown to become active when we interact with our environment it has
been argued to form the basis for our physical cognition and our analysis of non-social
tasks (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015). However, the TPN is not a single network of
brain areas that work in conjunction all the time, and instead it contains within itself other
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subnetworks such as the salience network which determines which stimuli deserves our
attention at any given time (Uddin, 2016), the Dorsal Attention Network which is
believed to mediate guided voluntary allocation of attention (Vossel, Geng, & Fink, 2014),
and the executive networks of the brain which is involved in maintaining working memory
as well as problem solving and decision making (Menon, 2011) (Petrides, 2005).
As research into brain correlates of actions continued, Gordon Shulman and
colleagues conducted an experiment aiming to study which brain regions would show
increased activity whenever a person is not performing a cognitive, motor or visual task.
This study led to the discovery of another major network of the brain referred to as the
Default Mode Network (DMN) due to it becoming active by “default” when an individual
is at rest (Shulman, Corbetta, Buckner, & Fiez, 1997) (Raichle, et al., 2001). While at first
researchers were not certain what the increased activity in the DMN represented, newer
studies have associated it with social cognition and higher-order tasks such as mind
wandering, thinking about others and their intentions as well as their mental states thus
leading some researchers to consider the DMN to be or at the very least contain the “Social
Network” of the brain (Mars, et al., 2012) (Smith D. G., 2018) (Lieberman M. D., 2013).
While studies have successfully shown that performing social cognitive tasks cause them
to have increases in activity within their DMN, other studies have shown that the reverse
is also possible as the automatic engagement of the DMN can prime individuals to engage
in social cognitive activities (Spunt, Meyer, & Lieberman, The Default Mode of Human
Brain Function Primes the Intentional Stance, 2015).
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Researchers have also shown that activity in the TPN and the DMN are not
independent of each other and instead they are anticorrelated as increases in activity in one
network is typically followed with an inhibition in the other therefore suggesting that as an
individual perceives other entities and implicitly perceives them as either objects or
subjects the area of the brain that would handle the analysis and reasoning of the interaction
would change significantly suggesting that while non-social analytical reasoning, and
social analytical reason are subjectively perceived as being quite similar, they are actually
fundamentally distinct from a physiological perspective (Lieberman M. D., 2013). While
research into the activation of these networks has typically focused on social interactions
between humans and other humans, recent research has suggested that these findings hold
when interacting with other non-human entities as the DMN shows increased activity when
a person interacts with an animal and animated objects such as anthropomorphic robot
(Kaiser, Shiffrar, & Pelphrey, 2012) (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999) (Gobbini, Gentili,
Ricciardi, & Bellucci, 2011) (Shultz, Lee, Pelphrey, & McCarthy, 2011) (Kupferberg,
Glasauer, & Burkart, 2013) (Cullen, Kanai, Bahrami, & Rees, 2014).

Perceiving the Mind of Others
As humans interact with others, the DMN becomes an indispensable component
that supports basic social functions such as emotion recognition, self-other distinction, and
understanding of others. The brain relies on these functions in order to solve two problems
that enable social interactions: First, it must make an estimation of the mental state that
other animated entities possess at a time, and secondly, it must use those estimated mental
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states to make predictions about how the other entity will behave (Lieberman M. , 2007)
(Frith C. D., 2007). Of particular importance in solving these problems is our ability of
mentalizing. Mentalizing refers to process that allows individual’s to understand and
manipulate their own as well as other people’s mental states guiding their overt behavior
while allowing them to perceive others as subjects (Frith & Frith, 1999) (Gage & Baars,
2018, p. 479). In particular, the top part of the DMN including the dorsal MPFC (dMPFC)
subsystem and its connections with the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC) appear to support our ability for mentalizing (Li, Mai, & Liu, 2014).

Three types of theories have been developed in order to explain why we mentalize.
The first type of theory proposed is that of theory theories. These theories propose that
individuals develop implicit theories to explain the behavior of others and themselves, and
that those theories changes as a person matures and gains new information gaining theory
of mind abilities in the process (Carruthers & Smith, 1996) (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012).
These theories suggest that major changes will take place in an individual’s understanding
of their own and others minds as they gained additional information such as exemplified
on Piaget’s conservation theory which explains that by gathering and understanding new
knowledge children mature in a series ordered stages that cause a qualitative change in how
they perceive the world around them (Piaget, The construction of reality in the child, 1955)
(Piaget, 1965).

44

2.3.1

Module Theories of Mentalizing & Theory of Mind
A second type of theories consist of module theories that attempt to explain the

mentalizing process by proposing that humans have a section of their brains dedicated to
the attribution of mental states to oneself and others which that feeds from other mental
abilities in order to develop a knowledge base of rules for social cognition (Baron-Cohen,
Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind, 1995) (Gage & Baars, 2018).
Researcher Simon Baron-Cohen proposed a theory of mind model of this nature composed
of 4 components that enable individuals to understand and predict mental states: a detector
of intention, a detector of eye direction, a mechanism for enabling shared attention, and a
module for conducting the theory of mind functions (Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: An
essay on autism and theory of mind, 1995) (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015).

Figure 3 Source: Fundamentals of Cognitive Neuroscience: A Beginner's Guide
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The first component identified by Cohen indicates that to achieve theory of mind,
a person must first be able to detect intention in other entities regardless of the form that
represents it. Studies about detection of intention on animals and humans using single-cell
evidence, and neuroimaging respectively suggest that the posterior superior temporal
sulcus (pSTS) is involved in this process of action interpretation. The intention detection
component is thought to have a dyadic interaction with the detection of eye direction of
the entity which is the second component proposed by Cohen. This detection of eye
direction refers to the tendency that individuals have to detect eye and eye-like stimuli
while determining the direction towards where it appears to be directed while interacting
with others (Kawai, 2008). Through a combination of the perception of gaze direction and
the detection of intentionality individuals can detect nonverbal information that may later
lead to shared attention. Gaze direction has been observed to be correlated with activity in
the anterior superior temporal sulcus (anterior STS) (Carlin, Calder, Kriegeskorte, Nili, &
Rowe, 2011).
Cohen’s model proposes the existence of a shared attention mechanism that by
relying on inputs from the previous two components, enable individuals to notice that
others may not simply be staring at an object or event, but rather may be paying attention
to it and that said individual could also look too and join in the activity. Having shared
attention shows that we can understand that others possess covert intention and mental
states and thus it facilitates the attribution of mental states that takes place in the TOMM
component of Baron-Cohen’s theory of mind (Tipples, 2006) (Kawai, Attentional shift by
eye gaze requires joint attention: eye gaze cues are unique to shift attention, 2011)
(Abubshait & Wiese, 2017) (Shaw, Bryant, Malle, Povinelli, & Pruett Jr., 2017).
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Finally, the TOMM (Theory of Mind Module) is believed to enable higher-order
theory of mind activities that recognize that appearance and reality can differ as different
individuals can possess a different understanding of the world around them as exemplified
in the Sally-Ann Task that was develop to evaluate children’s capacity to understand false
beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Recent brain
imaging studies have given support to this theory by identifying various brain regions that
show activation when we think about others and what they may be thinking, thus
suggesting the existence of a mentalizing network in the brain (Lieberman M. , 2007)
(Lieberman M. D., 2013).
2.3.2

Simulation theory & the Role of Mirror Neurons

The final type of theory for explaining why we mentalize are the simulation
theories. These theories argue that individuals understand the mental states of others by
conducting internal simulations of their situations which allow individuals to adopt others’
perspectives and perceive mental states as they resonate with their own (Goldman A. I.,
1989) (Davies & Stone, 1995) (Davies & Stone, 1998). Simulation theories have risen in
prominence after receiving partial support from the discovery of mirror neurons as a
potential mechanism for enabling simulations (Gallese & Goldman, Mirror neurons and
the simulation theory of mind-reading, 1998). Mirror neurons were first discovered
serendipitously while studying activation of synapses on a neuron by neuron basis in
Macaque monkeys’ as they perform motor behavior (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, &
Fogassi, 1996). Nevertheless, the researchers noticed that the some of the same neurons
that showed activity when the monkey raised a peanut were also showing activity when the
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monkey witnessed the researchers pick up the peanut themselves (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi,
& Rizzolatti, 1996) indicating that contrary to other neurons that are activated in either
action execution or action observation, mirror neurons seem to be capable of both while
showing activation patterns specific to certain actions. This has been taken to suggest that
the neurons being measured where not just perceiving an action or creating a motor
response but instead were involved in detecting self and other agent initiated action and
therefore providing a strong basis for the simulation theories of mentalizing (Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004) (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) (McEneaney, 2009).
Nevertheless, the mirror neurons theory has been criticized for trying to explain
many phenomena including action understanding, perception of intention, mentalizing and
empathizing without providing much evidence to support the claims or even despite
contradictory evidence (Kilner & Lemon, 2013) (Saxe, 2005). Additionally, most of the
research conducted in humans has been carried out with imaging techniques that show
activation of clusters of neurons and not at the neuron level itself and thus while researchers
agree that a mirror system is likely to exist, scarce evidence has been provided to support
the argument that it functions at the neuron level like in Macaques (Keysers & Perrett,
2004) (Hickok, 2009).
While the debate continues about what the most appropriate theory for mental state
attribution may be, most researchers now agree that a complete explanation of mental state
attribution will likely involve a combination of all 3 types of theories (Saxe, 2005) (Gage
& Baars, 2018) (Lieberman M. D., 2013). As such studies have been conducted in order to
identify the differential role that each system plays in the process of mental state attribution
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to others including identifying what others are doing, how they do it and why they are
doing it (Lieberman M. D., 2013). These studies have found strong evidence the mirror
system and the mentalizing system having complementary functions where the mirror
system consistently detects intentionality in the perceived actions of others based on their
visual characteristics regardless of whether a person was paying attention to them or not,
while the mentalizing system has been shown to become active when a person reflects
about the perceived intention (Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008).

Other studies have found that the mirror systems becomes active when we perceive
and action and consider how it happened indicating that the mirror system is involved in
understanding what other are doing and how they do it, while on the other hand the
mentalizing system has been shown to become active when considering why others
performed the actions (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012) (Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011)
(Spunt, Falk, & Lieberman, 2010).

Similar patterns of activation has been observed in other scenarios such as how we
communicate where the mentalizing system becomes critical in planning communication
by the sender, and in interpreting intention behind the messages received, as well as in how
we understand and attribute emotion where the mirror system tends to activate while
identifying overt emotional behavior like smiling and the mentalizing system activates
when considering the cause of such behavior (Noordzij, et al., 2009) (Spunt & Lieberman,
2012).
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Furthermore, studies exploring the activation of the mirror system and the
mentalizing network in contexts varying in cognitive load found that while both networks
showed activation under low cognitive load, the mentalizing network became more
inhibited as the cognitive load increased while activation in the mirror system remained the
same (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007) (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012).
These findings have led researchers to the argue that the mirror system and the
mentalizing system work in conjunction. While the mirror system detects and combines
perceived movement into perceived intentional actions such as interpreting the movement
of fingers over a keyboard as ‘typing’, the mentalizing system reflects upon the meaning
and motive behind such actions (Lieberman M. D., 2013). Finally, while these studies have
focused on exploring how a person interacts with other humans, studies have provided
evidence that they hold for interactions with human-like machines (Gazzola, Rizzolatti,
Wicker, & Keysers, 2007) (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001).
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1

RESEARCH AND DESIGN

The aim of this chapter is to present the research methodology used to explore the
research questions. In order to answer our research questions, this study relies on a
qualitative analysis of the current theories and empirical results of the extant research
related to the perception of socialness through the attribution of mental and affective states
to others which is argued to lead to the social responses to technology under some
situations. We will follow this analysis with a conceptual analysis of the implications it has
for future research and for the development of new more sociable technology.

Data about the variables that have been studied empirically, their connection to the
attribution of mental and affective states as well as their causal factors and effects are being
collected for this analysis from the fields of information systems, human-robot interaction
and social psychology and neuroscience. This chapter will outline the research approach
for this study including its data collection methodology and data analysis approach as well
as the philosophical assumptions that define what valid data is.
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3.1.1

Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to understand the process through which individuals

attribute socialness to technological artefacts, including its antecedents and effects and to
develop propositions as to how it may impact the field. Therefore, this study aims to
develop a model of the social perception of technology by answering the following
questions:
3. What are the factors that encourage an individual to perceive technology as a
social agent?
4. What effects does the perception of socialness on technology has over its users?

3.2

PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS
To set the boundaries of our research we must first define the 4 philosophical

assumptions that function as the foundation for our research. These are the ontological,
epistemological, axiological, and methodological assumptions (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

The first assumption we need to clarify are the ontological assumptions of the study
which refers to what constitutes the nature of reality. Different researchers possess different
realities based on their own (Creswell & Poth, 2018), and as such we must take care of
reporting the multiple forms of evidence used in these studies and the variations in their
themes and how they relate, especially since this study aims to combine results from
multiple fields where researchers possess separate traditions and somewhat different terms
for describing the same phenomenon.
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Secondly, the epistemological assumptions refer to understanding and explaining
what counts as knowledge. In this study, we are combining results from multiple fields of
research, each of which handles their separate definition for the same phenomenon on how
we perceive other entities as social entities and have different methodological preferences
for testing their hypotheses (Creswell & Poth, 2018). These variations in themes range
from anthropomorphism which represents the attribution of mental and affective states to
non-human entities to mentalizing which is the application of Theory of Mind which
consists of the ability to attribute mental and affective states to others. Because such
differences exist, we must describe how they vary, describe all points of views and explain
how they relate to one another as supported by the context of their studies and the extant
literature supporting their approaches. In the context of this study, we follow the arguments
of Airenti (2018) who argues that anthropomorphism is a modality of interaction and
dependent on any given knowledge about the entity being anthropomorphized or a
fundamental characteristic of it, and Urquiza-Hass and Kotrschal (2015) who argues that
these constructs are not only conceptually similar, but also rely on the same fundamental
mental processes and therefore should be considered to be part of the same phenomena.
Thirdly, the axiological assumptions argue that all qualitative research is affected
by the values and biases of the nature of the information gathered and the view points of
the researchers (Creswell & Poth, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing
Among Five Approaches, 2018). Therefore, as we analyze the data, we will discuss how
these varied values and biases may affect the study’s results.
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Finally, the methodological assumptions of the study need to be discussed. These
refer to the research process we follow to answer our research question and its
characteristics. In this study, we use inductive reasoning in order to first explore the data
as described in other studies and then make the new model based on our analysis of the
results and findings in those studies (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

3.3

RESEARCH APPROACH

Taking into account the need to integrate the findings from multiple disciplines on
how we attribute mind and socialness to technology, it becomes apparent that before any
hypothesis can be explored or propositions developed, there is a need to coherently
aggregate the extant literature into a single theoretical model of social perception of
technology from which we can develop these propositions and hypotheses about the
impacts that sociable technology has. Therefore, we aim to approach this study in 3 phases
that will enable us to comprehensively support our understanding:
First, we must identify the extant literature specifically the theoretical studies that
support how humans attribute agency an experience to others while identifying what
factors and effects have been empirically shown to be relevant for the phenomenon.
Secondly, taking into account that these factors are coming from different discipline
and may offer different methods and levels of analysis as well as different names for similar
constructs, we must group similar influences into named factors as we work on integrating
them into a comprehensive conceptual model showing the human, technology and
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interaction related factors that affect this perception as well as the effects that they have
shown to cause. Finally, we must analyze the role that these factors play on different
theories within the field, and from there develop propositions as to how it may affect
practice and future research. The following figure concretely summarizes our intended
process.

Figure 4 Methodology.
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3.4

DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE
In order to properly answer the research questions and achieve the goal of developing

a comprehensive model for the social perception and interaction with technology we
collected a comprehensive listing of the extant literature regarding anthropomorphism and
the Computers are Social Agents (CASA) framework. For inclusion, each study had to
meet the following criteria: (1) the study must focus on the interaction between
anthropomorphic technology and users, (2) it must either evaluate the construct as an
independent variable (IV) or as a dependent variable (DV), and (3) it must be published in
a peer reviewed academic journal. 305 and 52 peer reviewed studies were located within
the ABI/INFORM Collection and PubMed databases respectively for a total of 357 peerreviewed studies. We used the following query to conduct the research:

("computers as social actors" OR "computers are social actors" OR
Anthropomorphism) AND (robot OR computer)

In order to properly categorize these studies, we collected information about the (1)
methodology used, (2) the sample size, (3) the source of the sample, (4) the average age of
the sample (5) the proportion of each gender in the sample, (6) All IVs and (7) DVs
available, (8) a summary of relevant findings, and (9) general notes about the study’s
purpose, methodology and/or implications.
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3.5

DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH
In order to analyze the data collected, we decided to follow the coding guidelines

of Grounded Theory as proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998). This approach has been
recommended when a theory is not available in the literature or models and theories are
available but were developed and tested on populations different from the population of
interest for the study or in the case the current theories are incomplete because they fail to
address key variables (Creswell & Poth, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design:
Choosing Among Five Approaches, 2018, p. 174). While the attribution of mental and
affective states to others has been studied in different fields, each field has focus on
different aspects of the interaction with the field of human robot interaction focusing
mostly on the machine-related aspects that affects this perception and their effects, and
social psychology and neuroscience focusing mostly on understanding the underlying
process mainly within the context of human to human interaction. Therefore, by analyzing
each of these studies as individual data points and developing a new theory for the
interactions between humans and anthropomorphized machines we will be able to achieve
a comprehensive model that represents the overall understanding of phenomenon that will
function as a baseline for the developing of new propositions and hypotheses for how we
can continue to expand our research in the field.
While our sample is limited to the available empirical peer-reviewed studies, the
presence of distinct theories and models (i.e. Computers are Social Actors,
Anthropomorphism, perception of mind, and Mentalizing) as well as representation of key
factors (e.g. anthropomorphic appearance has ranged from the presence of a human-like
body, to a realistic image of a face on a computer)as well as the fact that the methodology
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lends itself to the development of theories that include the causal, contextual and
intervening conditions and consequences of a phenomenon (Creswell & Poth, Qualitative
Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches, 2018, p. 170) makes
this coding strategy an appropriate match for this study’s goals. Therefore, the coding
scheme that we aim to follow possesses the following steps:
a) First, we must begin with an open coding approach by identifying the IVs and DVs
being studied in the literature as well as any other themes that appear to repeat
often relating to the influences of the attribution of mental and affective states or
its underlying process. For each influencer and theme that we find a code is
developed and recorded for use in the following stage.
b) Secondly, after multiple open codes are developed, themes and processes must be
identified through a process of axial coding in order to group together codes based
on their similarities into the different factors that will form our theory. For
example, despite the multiple approaches to exploring the impact of the physical
features of a machine including its face’s characteristics and realism of its body
into a theme for appearance.
c) Finally, after having identified the main themes of the study, a selective coding
process will be carried out in order to identify the overarching themes that cover
the relationship between these topics allowing for the development of propositions
that support a story describing the interrelationships between the different factors
of the theory (Creswell & Poth, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design:
Choosing Among Five Approaches, 2018, p. 172) (Creswell & Brown, 1992).
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3.6

RIGOR
In order to ensure that our research remains credible and its conclusions transferable

to other scenarios our data points must be reliable themselves and therefore we have chosen
to limit our sample to studies that have been peer-reviewed in the past (Lincoln & Guba,
1985).
The dependability of our framework refers to how well the results of the study
hold up over time and various contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and is ensured by the
reliability of the studies that we analyze which shows the cumulative expertise of multiple
researchers in various relevant areas to the interaction of users and sociable technology,
this additionally has the benefit of strengthening its the transferability of the framework,
allowing it to be applied or generalized to other relevant contexts (Graneheim & Lundman,
2004). We further promote the transferability of our findings by providing a clear
description of our methodology, the context within which we interpret the available
research, the characteristics of the studies we use as sample and the data collection and
analysis approach in use (Elo & Kyngas, 2008).
The credibility of the study refers to how well the data source used in the study
and its method of analysis help us address the intended goals (Graneheim & Lundman,
2004) and we ensure it by relying on a sample of studies that covers the overall process of
the social perception of machines from a behavioral, a psychological and biological point
of view while we analyze the studies with a comprehensive coding methodology that allow
us to consolidate the results of these studies in a single framework. Additionally, we
provide a detailed table of analysis for our framework development that includes our notes
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on the used variables in each study, their findings, and our notes on our interpretation of
the findings and methodologies used.
The confirmability or objectivity of the findings are further supported by taking
steps to minimize possible biases in our study (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Our data source
helps us ensure confirmability of the findings as our reliance on empirically tested studies
means that each interaction has been thoroughly tested and further reviewed by peers.
Additionally, by providing a table with our notes and summary information on each study
we will bring support to our analysis and coding process making our framework transparent
and allowing for other researchers to confirm its authenticity.
Additionally, the use of the constant comparative analysis through the grounded
theory approach allows for a systematic approach to analyzing the current studies and
developing a comprehensive framework. By using this approach, we can add credibility
to the findings by providing a basis for the codes and relationships we identify. However,
the study is not without limitations. First, relying on a secondary data source such as
research studies means that we are not directly observing the phenomenon, though this is
minimized thanks to the expertise of the researchers in charge of each study. Secondly,
because each study follows slightly different conceptualizations and theories as basis, there
is a risk on the credibility of the findings as minor variations in operationalizations could
be the cause of discrepancies in results, though nevertheless our coding strategy should
help minimize these risks. Finally, as any other qualitative study, the views and
perspectives of the researchers are likely to influence the results of the study in some way
and therefore we offer a comprehensive literature review in this study in order to minimize
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the risks associated with our understanding of prior theories over influencing our analysis
of our results.

3.7

SUMMARY

A qualitative inductive approach was chosen to perform a comprehensive and
transparent analysis of the prior studies, allowing us to develop a representative framework
for the analysis of the social interaction between humans and machines. Afterwards, the
relationships in this framework will be analyzed to offer propositions as to how the
changing perception of technology from a tool towards a social agent can affect our current
understanding of the interactions between human and machines, and how we can further
manage the perceptions of this new type of technology in order to encourage desired
behaviors and attitudes, or limit unintended effects on the users of our technologies.
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CHAPTER 4: ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN INTERACTION

As a form of interaction with technology, the construct of anthropomorphism holds
great promise for the field of Information Systems (IS). Nevertheless, research into
anthropomorphism has been spread among multiple fields of research, with each field
focusing on different aspects, and with few studies working towards a consolidation of the
extant literature and its applicability towards human-computer interaction and business in
general. In this chapter, we aim to explore the relevance of anthropomorphic research
towards IS. The objective of this section is to: 1) present a conceptual model of antecedents
and consequences of anthropomorphism, 2) present an integrated model of the empirical
findings from the existing research into the anthropomorphization of technology based on
the literature from the disciplines of IS, social psychology and social neuroscience that
defines the nature of anthropomorphism in terms of its antecedents and consequences, and
3) to present a comprehensive review of the existing literature on anthropomorphism using
our empirically based model as a framework through which we can understand the
empirical results obtained so far.

In the following sections we will review our approach to identifying studies
relevant for research into the anthropomorphization of technology and follow with an
assessment of the state of research in the related fields. Afterwards, we will present our
empirically derived model and review the state of the research into each theme under our
model.
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Identifying and Reviewing the Available Research
This chapters presents a comprehensive listing of the extant literature on
anthropomorphism and technology. For inclusion, the studies had to: 1) the studies primary
focus be on anthropomorphism or the social perception of technology, 2) the study must
explicitly measure anthropomorphism as an Independent Variable (IV) or Dependent
Variable (DV) of interest or it must develop a measurement of the Anthropomorphism, and
3) it was published in a recognized journal or conference proceedings.
Studies that were identified as mentioning anthropomorphism but not being focused
on it or that were focused on anthropomorphism but in a context unrelated to the use of
technology were excluded. Additional exclusion criteria included the removal of studies
that explored anthropomorphism but did not measure it or any other proxy for the social
perception of technology, as well as those studies or articles that were not published on
recognized journals or conference proceedings.
During our search for relevant articles of anthropomorphism in the extant literature,
we relied on a query to systematically review the literature within the databases of
ABI/INFORM Collections and PubMed which provided us with a list of potential articles
to review. Our initial search resulted in a total of 736 articles that mentioned either
Anthropomorphism or the Computers are social actors paradigm (CASA) as well as the
word Computer, Technology or Robot. We narrowed this list down to 234 relevant articles
based on their focus on anthropomorphism and the social perception of technology
(inclusion criteria number 1). In this phase, excluded articles discussed anthropomorphism
in unrelated feels like its appropriateness as a tool for interpreting animal behavior.
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Afterwards, we categorized each research study into either a study possessing direct
measurements of Anthropomorphism or relying on indirect measurement. This led to a
reduction of the list to 102 different articles adequate for inclusion. Within these studies,
we identify key factors such as the explored hypotheses, Independent and Dependent
Variables Used, whether mediators or moderators were considered, the authors and year of
publication, the source journal, the nature of the task participants carried out, the findings,
and the sample size, gender distribution and source.

Apart from the original set, additional studies were gathered from two sources.
First, we identified other studies by the same authors that were primarily focused on
anthropomorphism of technology or its social perception but were not identified during the
initial search of the databases. Secondly, we identified other studies that were frequently
cited by our initial set and were also primarily focused on anthropomorphism.

These studies could be classified in two categories. The first group measured
anthropomorphism directly or measured a proxy variable of the social perception of
technology. These studies were included in the analysis of the factors related to
anthropomorphism and were combined with the list above to provide a stronger
explanation of the phenomenon.
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In the second group, the authors reported anthropomorphism as being the
underlying mechanism that explained the relationship being explored but did not measured
whether the technology was perceived as a social agent and therefore failed to meet
inclusion criteria 2. Because of this constraint, we combined these sets of articles with those
that indirectly explored anthropomorphism. We decided to include the set of studies that
explored anthropomorphism indirectly for analytical purposes due to their potential
explicative power of the phenomenon.

Model Development
To build our empirical model, initial factors for our model were gathered from the
results of the anthropomorphism-related hypotheses tested empirically in our list of
identified studies. Using a qualitative coding strategy based on grounded theory, we
analyzed the content of each research study to capture the essence of the factors and
relationships being explored and developed axial codes (referred to here as themes) and
Selective codes (referred here as overarching themes) (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) (Creswell
& Poth, 2018, p. 174). This approach was chosen so that new themes could be capture from
the commonalities between studies that could have otherwise gone unnoticed. Below we
report a full list of the antecedents and consequences found on the initial exploration of the
databases, and a sample of the representative work that supports each construct of the
model. The numbers match to the specific hypotheses testing these constructs in relation
to anthropomorphism as reported in the appendix under table 10.
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Table 2 Empirical Literature Supporting the Anthropomorphism Model

After analyzing the results, we found three overarching themes for the antecedents
of anthropomorphism including 1) Individual, 2) Contextual, and 3) IT Technology-related
factors, and seven overarching themes for its consequences including effects 1) on the
perception of the technology and others, 2) on the perception of the self, 3) on the
perception of the interaction, and its effects on 4) on intentions to use the technology and
the users’ performance.

66

Each of these overarching themes is composed of several subthemes which we
explored separately. For example, the section on contextual factors as antecedents of
anthropomorphism explores a) framing and emotional priming effects, b) cognitive load
and awareness of an entity’s nature, and c) the type of interaction involved. The
comprehensive lists of Overarching Themes, Themes, and Categories for antecedents and
consequences can be found below.
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Table 3 Coding of Antecedents of Anthropomorphism.
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Table 4 Coding of Consequences of Anthropomorphism.
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In the following pages, we will present our findings for both the antecedents and
consequences of anthropomorphism in the extant literature, including a model based on the
results of the empirical studies identified, and a table with the reference studies and
hypotheses that tested each factor mentioned.

4.1

ANTECEDENTS OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM
Research into the antecedents of anthropomorphism tends to focus on the

components of an interaction from the point of view of a participant involved in the
interaction. Namely researchers tend to explore the characteristics that encourage
participants to anthropomorphize technology from the point of view of: 1) the individuals
involved in the interaction and how they vary, 2) the perceived characteristics of the
technology (i.e. the artificial agent), and 3) the relational context in which the interaction
takes place. We will review each of these areas as we explore the extant literature on
antecedents of anthropomorphism.
Table 5 Categories of Interest for Exploring the Antecedents of Anthropomorphism.
Antecedents

Sub-category
•

Demographics & Culture

•

Psychological Determinants

•

Beliefs and Mental Models

Context-related

•

Framing & Emotional Priming

Factors

•

Cognitive Load & Awareness

•

Type of Interaction

Individual Factors
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Technology-related

•

Agent Embodiment, Appearance, and behavior

Factors

•

Apparent Social Cues

•

Responsiveness and Interactivity

•

Discourse, Gestures, and Body Language

•

Paralinguistic Cues

4.2

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

While anthropomorphism was first described as a non-conscious phenomenon that
affect everyone homogeneously, the homogeneity assumption has come under challenge
for the past couple of decades and the phenomenon is now though to vary significantly
between individuals and be dependent on both conscious and non-conscious processes
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Chin, Sims, Clark, & Lopez, 2004) (Letheren, Kuhn,
Lings, & Pope, 2016). Among these studies exploring how people differ in their social
perception of technology, we seem two trends.

First, we have studies that explore how individuals’ motivation affect their
tendency to anthropomorphize a technology including factors such as how lonely a person
feels, and their desire to understand the behavior of others (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2007).
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A second stream of research focuses on those factors inherent to the humans that
alter their propensity to anthropomorphize, or in other words, lead to individual differences
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2006) (Johnson,
Marakas, & Palmer, 2008). These studies focused on factors that were more nuance to an
individual such as the person’s core beliefs and personality (Letheren, Kuhn, Lings, &
Pope, 2016) (Wang W. , 2017). The differences in these streams of research are reflected
in the themes we identified as appreciated in the model below.

Table 6 Individual Factors Supporting the Anthropomorphism Model
Antecedents
Age

Representative Work
(Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, &

Reference Hypotheses
162, 169

Sturre, 2012)
Gender

(Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, &

163, 168

Sturre, 2012)
Computer Self-Efficacy

(Nowak & Rauh, 2008)

118, 119

Homophily

(Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt,

155, 156, 158, 159, 160,

2012)
Self-Awareness

(Sah & Peng, 2015)
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72, 73

Culture

(Bartneck, 2008) (Yu &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Ngan, 2019) (Salem,

Individually.

Ziadee, & Sakr, 2014)
(Shahid, Krahmer, &
Swerts, 2014)
Tendency to

(Marakas, Johnson, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Anthropomorphize

Palmer, 2000) (Epley,

Individually.

(Continuum of Perspective

Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007)

[CP] & IDAQ)

(Letheren, Kuhn, Lings, &
Pope, 2016) (Waytz,
Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010)
(Severson & Lemm, 2016)

Motivation to Understand

(Epley, Waytz, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Cacioppo, 2007) (Tam,

Individually.

2015)
Availability of Mental

(Epley, Waytz, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Models

Cacioppo, 2007)

Individually.

Sociality Motivation

(Epley, Waytz, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Cacioppo, 2007) (Epley,

Individually.

Waytz, Akalis, &
Cacioppo, 2008) (Bartz,
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Tchalova, & Fenerci, 2008)
(Bodford, Kwan, &
Sobota, 2017)
Self-esteem

(Johnson, Marakas, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Palmer, 2006) (Johnson,

Individually.

Marakas, & Palmer, 2008)
(Tussyadiah, 2013)
Locus of Control

(Johnson, Marakas, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Palmer, 2006) (Johnson,

Individually.

Marakas, & Palmer, 2008)
(Tussyadiah, 2013)
Beliefs

(Johnson, Marakas, &

*Hypotheses Not Listed

Palmer, 2006) (Johnson,

Individually.

Marakas, & Palmer, 2008)
(Waytz, Cacioppo, &
Epley, 2010) (Waytz,
Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010)
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Figure 5 Model of the individual-related overarching themes influencing anthropomorphism.
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4.2.1
Age.

Demographics & Culture

Out of the papers identified to have measured anthropomorphism directly, Pak et
al (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012) was the only to make an explicit and direct
comparison between age groups and the effects of anthropomorphism on a complex task.
In their study, they compared the effects of a decision aid (anthropomorphic, vs a nonanthropomorphic vs no aid) on factors related to the decision making of the user and found
that young adults reported significantly higher levels of trust on the anthropomorphic
decision aid, than on the non-anthropomorphic aid or the scenarios with no aid, suggesting
that young adults were anthropomorphizing the technology. While this effect was not
observed for older adults, an analysis of the behavior of the participants during the
experiment showed that both young adults and older adults exhibited significantly higher
levels behavior associated with trust (referred to as “behavioral trust”) when interacting
with the anthropomorphic aid than with any other group.
Another study by Vollmer et al (2018) showed similarly inconsistent results in
different age groups when exploring social conformity. In their experiment, the authors
relied on the Ash paradigm to test whether a group of adults tasked with evaluating the
proper length of a line, would conform to the peer pressure of a group of robots answering
incorrectly before them. While the adults showed no indication of conforming, a second
experiment with a sample of children did achieve the expected results when the participants
exhibited a tendency towards aligning with the groups’ predominant answer rather than
sticking with what they considered to be the correct answer.
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While these studies may seem to suggest that the age of participants was either an
antecedent or a moderator of anthropomorphism as some researchers have argued before
(Piaget, 1929), alternative hypotheses can be interpreted from these results. For instance,
Vollmer and colleagues noted that while adults seem to attribute human-like qualities to
machines, they appear to be able to inhibit the effects of normative influence. While no
underlying mechanism was given for this explanation, this argument matches results from
other studies that suggest cognitive dissonance between the non-conscious tendency to
anthropomorphize and the conscious understanding of the nature of technology causes
individuals to significantly alters their responses to compensate their tendency to
anthropomorphize (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015). Therefore, the results discussed
above could be the result of the older adults becoming uneased by the uncommon scenario
of being placed among a group of humanoid robots in Vollmer’s study, or becoming unease
by the anthropomorphic agent in Pak’s study.

In the case of the study by Pak and colleagues, the inconsistent results may simply
be the result of individual differences in the individuals composing the young adults and
the older adults. Whereas the study relied on university students to gather the sample of
young adults, the older adults’ group was composed of respondents to a newspaper
advertisement. It seems reasonable to suspect that the older adults responding to the
newspaper may be less familiar with this type of interfaces causing them to react with
similar unease as we described above for Vollmer’s participants.
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Gender.
Multiple studies have explored the impact of an individuals’ gender on their
tendency to anthropomorphize technology. An early study relying on anthropomorphism
as a theoretical basis on how humans interact with technology, showed significant effects
of gender over how much individuals interacted with technology (Luczak, Roetting, &
Schmidt, 2003). This study suggested that women interacted significantly more with
technical devices than men. On the other hand, more recent studies have found no effects
of gender on anthropomorphism (Kim, Cho, Ahn, & Sung, 2019) (Bartneck, 2008)
(Chaminade, Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007) (Banks, Westerman, & Sharabi, 2017). In
particular, even when considering combinations of gender of the participant and the
perceived gender of the technology, results for the effect of gender over anthropomorphism
remained non-significant (Kang & Watt, 2013).
Gender has also played a major role in the development of instruments to measure
anthropomorphism and anthropomorphic tendencies. Early on, Chin and colleagues (Chin,
Sims, Clark, & Lopez, 2004) developed a questionnaire for measuring individual’s
tendency to anthropomorphize and showed that gender led to differences in
anthropomorphism of animals with women having a stronger tendency to self-engage in
anthropomorphic behaviors. Nevertheless, this tendency did not translate into the
anthropomorphism of artifacts where no gender effects were found. At the same time,
researchers Johnson, Makaras, & Palmer engaged in a series of studies testing their
Continuum of Perspective (PC) which aimed to predict differences in anthropomorphism
tendencies among individuals (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2006) (Johnson, Marakas, &
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Palmer, 2008). Within these studies, the authors found significant gender effects over and
individual’s Continuum of Perspective and their tendency to attribute human-like qualities
to technology, with women being more likely to hold social beliefs of about the technology
as well as perceive the technology as possessing a higher ability to control personal rights.

Culture.
Another area of interest in the literature has been whether the cultural orientation
of an individual affect their perception of the technology and the likelihood that a person
will anthropomorphize it (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000). These studies recognized
that variations in culture could affect how humans perceive and interpret information from
their environment as well as how they respond to it altering the both the likelihood that
they would anthropomorphize the technology and how they will respond to an
anthropomorphized artificial agent (Culley & Madhavan, 2013) (Yogeeswaran &
Dasgupta, 2014).
Early empirical results explored whether these topics, and consistently showed that
different cultures would react differently to different types of robots altering how they
anthropomorphize them (Salem, Ziadee, & Sakr, 2014). For example, Bartneck
demonstrated that US participants would anthropomorphize more robots based on the
human-likeness of their faces, but Japanese participants would anthropomorphize more
humanoid and toy robots faces (Bartneck, Who like androids more: Japanese or US
Americans, 2008).
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Furthermore, studies that indirectly rely on anthropomorphism have supported
these arguments. Yu & Ngan (2019) showed that variations in cultural orientation as
exemplified by power distance can lead to different interpretations of a technology’s
apparent behavior as shown by variations of the perceived warmth of a technology.
Similarly, other studies have shown that children from different cultures can interpret
interactions with a social robot as being closer to interaction with toys or with other
children (Shahid, Krahmer, & Swerts, 2014).
Nevertheless, other studies have shown that finer detail is needed in these studies.
In his exploration of social disposition and anthropomorphism, Wang (Wang W. ,
Smartphones

as

Social

Actors?

Social

Dispositional

Factors

in

Assessing

Anthropomorphism, 2017) showed that the cultural orientation of an individual in terms of
how individualist or collectivistic that person is, is not a significant direct determinant of
anthropomorphism and suggested that rather than the culture itself being the defining factor
that leads to anthropomorphism, some underlying aspects of a culture that account for
variations in attitudes, motivations, and behaviors may be at the root of the reported effects
of cultural orientation on anthropomorphism.
While the number of studies exploring the relevance of culture for
anthropomorphism is limited, the results tend to be consistent in that some aspect of a
person cultural orientation can affect their that person’s tendency to anthropomorphize. A
major limitation of this stream of research is that it mostly focuses on exploring variations
in tendency to anthropomorphize rather than whether anthropomorphism actually took
place, and those studies that explore the actual phenomenon tend to imply that
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anthropomorphization took place (Shahid, Krahmer, & Swerts, 2014) (Yu & Ngan, 2019),
or rely on variations in the country of origin of the sample as a proxy of culture rather than
actually measuring the culture of the participants (Salem, Ziadee, & Sakr, 2014).
Apart from variations in interpreting signals, Waytz and colleagues argues that, just
as Piaget once suggested, these cultural differences can be the result of different exposures
to animals and religions which in turn change the mental models children possess about
others which remain as they grow up and affect their tendency to anthropomorphize
(Waytz, Klein, & Epley, Imagining Other Minds: Anthropomorphism Is Hair-Triggered
but Not Hare- Brained, 2013) (Piaget, 1929). In other words, as we interact with other
entities, whether they be animals or objects, we develop alternative explanations for their
apparent behavior, and these models ultimately affect our values, practices, and beliefs
which can trigger the anthropomorphization of a given technology (Waytz, Klein, & Epley,
Imagining Other Minds: Anthropomorphism Is Hair-Triggered but Not Hare- Brained,
2013).
4.2.2 Psychological Determinants of Anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism and the Computing Technology Continuum of Perspective
Following Nass and colleague’s demonstration of the pervasiveness of social
responses to media and technology (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994), multiple researchers
have questioned the homogeneous nature of the phenomenon. Marakas, Johnson and
Palmer (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) first hypothesized that the social response to
technology described by Nass would be influenced by situational and dispositional factors
of the interaction. One such key factor proposed by Marakas and colleagues is that of an
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individual’s core self-evaluations. A person’s core self-evaluations have been defined as
those fundamental evaluations about ourselves and our relationship to our environment that
differentiate us from each other (Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997).
Judge, Erez, Bono, and Thoresen (2002) further argued that a person’s core selfevaluations is a personality trait composed of a person’s self-reported believe that they can
achieve a needed behavior (generalized self-efficacy), their view of themselves as worthy
of respect (self-esteem), their beliefs of whether they are in control of a situation rather
than an external force (locus of control), and the extent of their emotional stability
including their propensity to be optimistic or have doubts and worries (emotional
stability/neuroticism) (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011).
In two separate follow up studies, Johnson and colleagues provided support for the
effects of core self-evaluations over research on the social perception of technology. First,
they tested the relationship between the core self-evaluations as a construct and both the
social perception of technology, and on the continuum of perspective (Johnson, Marakas,
& Palmer, 2006). They found significant support for both relationships with the core selfevaluations positively influencing the social perception of technology directly, and
indirectly through an individuals’ continuum of perspective.
Interestingly, the authors also explored whether the nature of the relationship may
change for individuals at the extreme sides of the Continuum of Perspective (CP). The
results show that for individuals on both extremes of the Continuum of Perspective, the
Continuum of Perspective fully mediates the effects of the core self-evaluations on the
social perception of technology as the direct effects of the core self-evaluations dissipate
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(Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2006, p. 454). In the final study of the series on the
continuum of perspective, the authors expanded on the conceptualization of the Continuum
of Perspective to include factors related to a person’s believes about the intelligence,
socialness, control, and control rights of the technology (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer,
2008). Once more, the results showed the significant effects of an individual core selfevaluations on a person’s Continuum of Perspective and, through it, on the social
perception of technology.
General Computer Self-Efficacy
Following Bandura’s (1997) argument that domain specific measures of selfefficacy are more predictive, Marakas and colleagues argued that focusing on a person’s
General Computer Self-Efficacy (GCSE) would lead to improvements in predictive power
when compared to measuring a person’s general self-efficacy (Marakas, Johnson, &
Palmer, 2000). The authors defined the construct of General Computer Self-Efficacy as a
person’s perceived capacity in performing tasks while using a computer (Marakas, Yi, &
Johnson, 1998). While the GCSE was not tested directly to confirm its influence on the
social perception of technology, as mentioned above, when included as a component of a
person’s core self-evaluations, it was found to have a significant influence over the social
perception of technology and that individual’s Continuum of Perspective (Johnson,
Marakas, & Palmer, 2006) (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2008).
Other studies have explored the influence of self-efficacy on anthropomorphism
and the social perception of technology more directly. Wang explored this very relationship
on his dissertation (Wang W. , 2015) as well on an article published from it in Computers
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in Human Behavior (Wang W. , 2017). Wang takes on the attributional process model
developed by Marakas and colleagues and their continuum of perspective, and attempts to
expand it by exploring the relevance of other dispositional factors while conducting an
exploratory analysis of the role that smartphone self-efficacy plays on the
anthropomorphization of technology. Smartphone Self-efficacy was a specific computer
self-efficacy adapted from Marakas, Johnson, and Clay (Marakas, Johnson, & Clay, 2007).
Interestingly, the exploratory analysis suggested that neither the history of smartphone
ownership, nor the reported self-efficacy were relevant to the attribution of
anthropomorphism (Wang W. , 2017, p. 339).
Nowak, and Rauh (2008) expanded on these findings by exploring whether an
increase sense of self efficacy due to higher usage of an instant messaging application,
could result in a decrease in the perceived anthropomorphism of an avatar representing the
other person they were interacting with. While their hypothesis was not supported as the
increased self-efficacy failed to significantly affect the attribution of anthropomorphism
directly, they found that the increase in computer efficacy led by higher usage of instant
messaging and an increased in perceiving avatar androgyny, which in turn interacted with
the

frequency

of

usage

of

instant

messaging

to

significantly

affect

the

anthropomorphization of the avatar. In other words, the study seems to suggest that
computer efficacy by itself alters the perceptions of the appearance of the technology,
which in turn may lead to changes in the anthropomorphization of the technology
depending on other contextual factors.
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Finally, Banks and colleagues (Banks, Westerman, & Sharabi, 2017) add to the
complexity of the results shown by Nowak and Rauh by showing that anthropomorphism
and self-efficacy can be influenced in the same direction by the perception of physical
engagement that holding a device brings to the user. In their study, Banks and colleagues
argue that such “mere holding effect” can lead users to perceive a sense of psychological
ownership (PO) over the device that can reduce their assessment of personhood of potential
partners based on their online profile. Because the components of psychological ownership
need not be correlated, the authors explore the impact of holding the device on each
separate component including self-efficacy.
The result showed that self-efficacy was significantly affected by whether the
device was handheld or not, but contrary to what was hypothesized the handheld condition
led to a lower perceived self-efficacy rather than an increase on it. This is interpreted as the
physical engagement resulting from holding the device negatively affecting the assessment
of self-efficacy of the user, and thus suggesting a correlation between self-efficacy and
anthropomorphism in the opposite direction than hypothesized by Marakas et al. (Marakas,
Johnson, & Palmer, 2000).
Locus of Control, and Self-esteem
Research into other components of a person’s core self-evaluations have been
significantly limited. The role of the locus of control, or an individual’s beliefs that he or
she has control over his or her environment (Rotter, 1990), as well as that of a person’s
self-esteem, or his or her self-evaluation that he or she is worthy of respect, have been
mostly ignored by the extant literature. Johnson, Marakas and Palmer found support for
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both factors as having both direct effects on the attribution of social roles to technology as
well as indirect effects on it through the construct by affecting an individual’s Computing
Technology Continuum of Perspective (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2006). However, the
locus of control and self-esteem appeared to influenced different components of the
Continuum of Perspective (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2008). In this study, individuals
with a higher locus of control were more likely to ascribe intelligence, socialness, control,
and control rights to the technology. On the other hand, those participants with a high selfesteem were only significantly influencing the ascription of socialness, control, and control
rights, but not intelligence (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2008, p. 177).
The influence of a person’s locus of control on the attribution of social roles
towards computing technology was further explored by Tussyadiah (2013). Tussyadiah
adapted the Computing Technology Continuum of Perspective to fit the context of
smartphone usage and renamed the construct “Mobile Technology Continuum of
Perspective” or MTCP. In her study, she aims to explore why some tourists tend to make
social attributions towards their mobile devices when they travel. While the study found
significant effects of the social characteristics of the mobile phones, and the purpose of the
travel of the users (as a contextual factor representing circumstance attribution), the study
failed to support the hypothesis that the core self-evaluations of the tourist would influence
those social attributions of the mobile devices. Although the component of self-esteem was
not considered, none of the other three components of self-evaluations used by Marakas
and colleagues (namely General Computer Self-efficacy, locus of control and Neuroticism)
achieved significance. The author argues that the lack of support for the core self-
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evaluations may reflect the strong power of the anthropomorphic design of the smartphones
which overpowered the effects of the users’ core self-evaluations.
The data from the study also suggest further considerations. For instance, the author
notes that the core self-evaluations of the participants did not fall into a normal distribution,
and after revising the data, it seems that most participants were high on self-efficacy (feel
capable of taking the needed actions), low on neuroticism (emotionally stable), and low on
external orientation (feel they are the capable of changing their environment), and therefore
they should fall into a locally simplex attitude which would suggest low likelihood of
attribution of social characteristics, yet this results were not observed. This could be
explained by something as uninspiring as an issue of the data collection, but it could also
be the case that the measurements used may need to be refreshed to reflect the changing
nature of technology. After all, key studies offering explanations of the social nature of the
technology, and anthropomorphism date back to the 90s and mid 2000s when not even
smartphones as we know them today were available, much less virtual assistants or
autonomous technology.
Tussyadiah (2013) also explored the social attribution towards mobile phones.
While the components of Perceived Intelligence, and Perceived Socialness of the
Continuum of Perspective had significant effects in increasing social attribution to mobile
devices, the influence of the Perceived Control of the technology was not supported.
Additionally, neither were any of the core self-evaluation factors including the locus of
control, though self-esteem was not considered for this study.
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Research into the locus of control and anthropomorphism has been very limited.
While our literature review could not find other studies that address the locus of control
and anthropomorphism, multiple studies do focus on the perceive control over the
interaction, or the desire for control of the user. These studies typically follow the
motivational determinants of anthropomorphism presented by Epley and colleagues and
will be further discussed in a separate section.
Neuroticism and the Big 5 Personality Traits
The final core self-evaluation proposed by Marakas and colleagues is that of
emotional stability also referred to as Neuroticism (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000).
Neuroticism refers to how emotionally stable an individual is, including how susceptible
she is towards anxiety, and feelings of dependence and helplessness or prone to optimism
and free of doubts (Costa & McCrae, 1988) (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011). As
mentioned above, Marakas and colleagues found significant direct effects of neuroticism
on the social attributions made to technology by aggregating it into the construct of core
self-evaluations, as well as significant indirect effect through the influence of the core selfevaluations on the individual’s Computing Continuum of Perspective (Johnson, Marakas,
& Palmer, 2006). In addition, neuroticism was found to be related to all four dimensions
of the Continuum of Perspective: Perceived Intelligence, Socialness, Control, and Control
Rights (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2008). Nevertheless, contrary to these results,
Tussyadiah found no direct effects of Neuroticism on the social attribution towards mobile
devices by tourists, though indirect effects were found through Neuroticism influence on
the Continuum of Perspective in turn influencing the social attribution (Tussyadiah, 2013).
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The importance of Neuroticism in influencing social responses to computing
technology is further signaled by other researchers. Luczak, Roetting and Schmidt (Luczak,
Roetting, & Schmidt, 2003) showed similar effects as participants reported their
experiences engaging with multiple technologies in their everyday life. In particular, the
authors found similar results to Marakas et al. (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) as they
found that participants that reported being highly neurotic also reported perceiving
themselves as being less technically competent, a factor related to the self-efficacy
construct. While these traits were not reported in conjunction with actual social
attributions, the effects on technical competence do suggest an indirect effect on the social
attribution of the technology. The authors expanded on this trait by exploring the relevance
of two more personality traits on the social attribution to the technology based on the big
five personality traits (Rothmann & Coetzer, 2003). A low level of agreeableness, or the
level of individual concern for social harmony and altruistic behavior that a participant
reported, led to similar results as a high neuroticism in participants, being associated with
significantly lower levels of technical competence of the user. Furthermore, an analysis of
the participants extraversion trait (representing how social, assertive, and active the
participant reported themselves as being) was reported as being associated with
significantly higher levels of interaction with the technology.
In their study exploring the persuasive effects of androids, Ogawa, Bartneck, and
Sakamoto argued that the matching of the personality of the participant and the personality
of the robot were critical in order to make the persuasive appeals effective (Ogawa,
Bartneck, & Sakamoto, 2009). As part of the study, the authors reported that the personality
traits ascribed to the artificial agent could be significantly influenced by the personality of
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the users themselves. Specifically, they noticed that the level of openness of the participant
significantly influenced the ratings of extraversion given to the artificial agent and thus
could influence the social attributions given to the technology. While the nature of this
relationship is not discussed, it does make a point that even the level of openness of a
person can affect the social attributions made to a technology.
Letheren, Kuhn, Lings, and Pope (2016) noticed the limited research into the
relationship between personality traits and anthropomorphism, and hypothesized that both
a person’s openness to experience as well as her agreeableness would correlate positively
with their anthropomorphic tendency. In particular, the authors argued that since
anthropomorphism is a creative process that benefits from being open to others’ way of
seeing the world, a person who rated highly on openness will make that person specially
sensitive to inferring humanness and perceive social connections to those non-human
others and therefore they would be specially prone to making anthropomorphic
attributions.
On the other hand, the authors argue that an individual with a high level of
agreeableness would be prone to take the perspective of others and feel sympathy and
empathy for them. Since these characteristics have led other researchers to study the
correlation between agreeableness and theory of mind (Nettle & Liddle, 2008), the authors
argue that it’s likely that it will lead to an increase likelihood of anthropomorphism.
The results of the study showed a positive correlation between openness to
experience and anthropomorphic tendencies but failed to support the hypothesis that
agreeableness and anthropomorphic tendencies were related. The authors argue that these
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findings suggest that people with high openness do not suppress their anthropomorphic
tendencies as much as others increasing the likelihood that an anthropomorphic attribution
will take place. On the other hand, the authors argue that since personality can be applied
different depending on the context of an interaction, the expected relationship between
agreeableness and anthropomorphic tendencies may have failed to be supported due to the
influence of factors related to the context of the interaction that were not taken into account.
Finally, Salem and colleagues (Salem, Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, & Dautenhahn,
2015) explored the role that extraversion personality traits and emotional stability played
in influencing anthropomorphic tendencies. The authors argued that the participant’s
extraverted and emotionally stable personality would enable the anthropomorphization of
social robots and affect a person’s willingness to collaborate with it.
While the big 5 and the core self-evaluations overlap to an extent, Judge and
Kammeyer-Mueller (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011) noted that other researchers have
shown even when considering all these personality factors, they remain statistically
significantly independent from one another. Therefore, there is value in considering the
importance of all of them at once.
Inductive Thinking & Motivational Determinants
A second stream of research exploring the psychological determinants of
anthropomorphism developed in parallel within the field of social psychology. Epley,
Waytz, and Cacioppo (2007) noticed that only a small set of studies focused on the
psychology behind anthropomorphic perceptions, and proposed a theory based on
motivation and inductive thinking that attempts to explain why anthropomorphism takes
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place. They propose that anthropomorphism was likely an inductive process and therefore
it must work through similar means as other inductive processes. Specifically, the authors
argued that an anthropomorphic inference must be contingent on the mental model a person
holds during an interaction which would be dependent on:
1) the likelihood of activating knowledge about interactions with other humans,
2) the likelihood of correcting the mental model brough by said knowledge to
reflect the non-human knowledge about the nature of the interaction partner, and
3) the likelihood that the person will apply these models on the other agent during
an interaction.
This inductive process of anthropomorphism, which the authors called “Elicited
Agent Knowledge” due to its theorized reliance on human mental models when interacting
with perceived agents, was argued to interact with a person’s motivations to produce
anthropomorphic attributions of non-human entities. Two types of motivations were said
to be especially significant. First, an individual’s motivation to interact effectively with the
environment and explain complex phenomena while also being able to predict and entity’s
future behaviors. By anthropomorphizing other entities, humans gain an increased ability
to explain or make sense of that entity’s perceived actions. They referred to this as
“Effectance Motivation”. Secondly, the authors argue that individuals’ need and desire to
relate to others and establish social connections with them, or “Sociality Motivation”,
would also significantly affect their likelihood to anthropomorphize (Epley, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2007). By anthropomorphizing a perceived entity, humans transform the entity
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into another human with which they can relate. We discuss the available support for each
component in the following pages.
Elicited Agent Knowledge
Direct research into the role of the elicited agent knowledge factor as a source of
anthropomorphic attributions has been limited. Some researchers have chosen to explicitly
explore this factor and attempt to operationalize it by testing whether the design of a
technology encourages social responses and biases from the user (Eyssel F. ,
Kuchenbrandt, Hegel, & de Ruiter, 2012), while others studies have carried out similar
experiments but made little to no reference to an inductive process being the source of this
perception (Hertz & Wiese, 2018). Finally, a third group of researchers has shown a strong
linkage between anthropomorphism and neurological processes involved in the social
perception of other humans, suggesting that we do rely on at least similar mental processes
for both forms of interactions (Chaminade, et al., 2010) (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015).
Within the first group, Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Hegel, and de Ruiter (2012)
attempted to vary the accessibility of human mental models by varying the characteristics
of a robot. Specifically, the authors operationalized the elicited agent knowledge factor by
assuming that an increase in the use of human-like vocal cues such as the human-likeness
of the voice (as opposed to a robot-like voice) would encourage the anthropomorphization
of the robot as evidenced by a person interacting with the robot responding to it as if it
were a human, applying biases and social judgements to the robot. These findings are also
supported by earlier studies by Powers and Kiesler (Powers & Kiesler, 2006) that explore
whether the mental models a person held about a robot could mediate the relationship
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between its physical characteristics and the participant’s intention to take the robots advice.
While the study was not meant to explore anthropomorphism or attribution of mental states,
it did show that the design and use of different humanlike characteristics of the robot could
influence the mental model the participants held about the robot including and, through it,
their impression of it as a sociable robot (i.e. activated non-social categories such as
machine, or social categories like “nice people”) resulting in significantly different
intentions to follow its advice.
Furthermore, Eyssel and Kuchenbrandt (2012) continued on to suggest that the
original arguments made by Epley and colleagues on the nature of elicited agent knowledge
needed to be expanded. They proposed that individuals use of mental models would include
knowledge structure associated with other human-related characteristics such as
nationalities and culture as well as the originally proposed anthropocentric knowledge (e.g.
knowledge about oneself and others). Therefore, experimental investigation seems to
support the argument that inductive reasoning is a critical process through which
anthropomorphism takes place.
The second set of studies follows a similar operationalization to the first set, with
varying levels of the human-likeness of physical characteristics of the entity as well as of
its behavior in order to produce a social response from the individual interacting with the
entity. However, these studies differ in that they do not explicitly explore the role of
inductive reasoning or changing mental models in the relationship between the varying
levels of human-likeness and the social effects the authors aim to explore. Instead, these
studies tend to either imply that anthropomorphism will take place (Go & Sundar, 2019)
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or rely on a different argument for why anthropomorphism should happen (Urquiza-Haas
& Kotrschal, 2015). Since the focus of these studies tend to be on the effects of the design
characteristics of the technology rather than on how anthropomorphism takes place, we
will continue their discussion under the Technology-related factors section below.
Finally, studies exploring the neurological correlates of anthropomorphism have
also consistently shown correlations between activation in brain networks associated with
the anthropomorphization of non-human entities and those used when humans interact with
other humans. While these studies provide some support for the argument that technologies
are anthropomorphized as mental models of humans are applied to them (i.e. inductive
reasoning), the majority of the studies focus on either implicit and automatic mechanisms
for the perception of other, or on mechanism associated with causal reasoning. Therefore,
it seems likely that while anthropomorphism has some inductive component to it, it also
possesses properties of causal reasoning, and implicit and automatic perceptions.
An early study was carried out by Chaminade and colleagues (Chaminade,
Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007) that aim to explore how the appearance of a virtual character
affects the perception of its actions. The authors conducted an experiment where they asked
participants to characterize a virtual character’s motion as either biological or artificial
while they varied the character’s appearance from least to most human-like, and its motion
between captured biological motion data and motion designed by an animator. The results
of the experiment showed significant effects of both the character’s appearance and motion
on its anthropomorphic perception with the more human-like its appearance and behavior,
the more human-like the character was perceived.
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In the 2nd part of the study, the authors put the same participants through a fMRI
analysis while they took a similar experiment as before. The results showed significant
effects of the character’s appearance on the perception of motion having a biological origin,
and significantly higher activity in brain areas associated with the Mentalizing system of
the brain as the appearance became more human-like. Since the mentalizing system is well
regarded as the system that allows humans to attribute inner mental states such as emotions,
thoughts and intentions to other humans (Geiger, et al., 2019), Chaminade’s findings
(Chaminade, Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007) provide some support for Epley and colleagues
(Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) theory in favor of human mental models being used as
humans interact with anthropomorphized entities. These results are further extended by a
separate study by Chaminade and colleagues (Chaminade, et al., 2010) where the authors,
through the use of fMRIs, found similar brain structures being used by humans to read
emotions in other humans and in anthropomorphized non-human entities. Nevertheless,
neither study clarifies whether inductive reasoning is the actual cause of
anthropomorphism, or whether other processes such as causal reasoning may be at play.
Contrary to the results found by Chaminade and colleagues, Kühn, Brick, Müller,
and Gallinat (2014) found no activation in the Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) and the
Medial Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) of the Mentalizing network when participants were
exposed to car fronts and asked for adjectives that characterized the car fronts while
undertaking an fMRI. Nonetheless, the study did find that looking at the car fronts led to
activation in the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), a specialized area of the visual system
responsible for discrimination that requires expertise such as facial recognition (Sergent,
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Ohta, & Macdonlad, 1992) (Isabel, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). This
suggests that car fronts were recognized as faces, but not attributed cognitive abilities.
Other studies have provided additional support for individual differences in how
these attributions are made. While dealing with anthropomorphization of animals rather
than technology, researchers Spunt, Ellsworth, and Adolphs (2017) found that participants
undertaking an fMRI who observed facial displays of humans and non-human animals
while judging the acceptability of emotional and facial descriptions showed similar brain
activation in the prefrontal and anterior temporal cortices which are regions associated with
causal explanations. Since the similarity in brain activation seemed to vary depending on
the participants’ self-reported beliefs in the mental capacities of the non-human animal, it
seems that, at least in the case of anthropomorphism of animals, causal reason also plays a
significant role in anthropomorphism.
Finally, Cullen, Kanai, Bahrami, and Rees (2014) found that while the mentalizing
system is activated non-consciously, individuals still show significant differences in their
likelihood to anthropomorphize which correlate to the volume of gray matter available in
the left temporo-parietal junction, a key area associated with the Mentalizing system.
Motivational Determinants: Effectance & Sociality
Epley and colleagues (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) argued that the key
motivational determinants of anthropomorphism were effectance motivation, or an
individual’s motivation to master her environment by increasing its predictability and
controllability (Harter, 1978), and sociality motivation which refers to humans’
fundamental need to connect socially with other humans. In a study following the original
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proposal of the model, Epley Waytz, Akalis and Cacioppo (2008) conducted two separate
experiments to test each determinant empirically.
The first experiment aimed at exploring how individuals’ sociality motivation can
influence their anthropomorphic attributions. In this experiment, Harvard University
undergraduate students completed a 20-item loneliness scale and were then asked to
consider and rank from most descriptive to least descriptive 14 traits of their pets. As
hypothesized, the participants who reported feeling more lonely ranked anthropomorphic
traits of their pets significantly higher providing support to the argument that chronic
loneliness encourage individuals to create agents for social support (Epley, Waytz, Akalis,
& Cacioppo, 2008, p. 148).
In the second experiment, the authors aimed to test the role of an individual’s
effectance motivation on anthropomorphism. To do so, they had visitors to the Decision
Research Lab at the University of Chicago take a questionnaire on desirability of control
after which they viewed a video clip of two dogs interacting with one another while
exhibiting varying levels of predictability in their behavior. Finally, the participants were
asked to evaluate both dogs on items representing their anthropomorphism: the extent to
which each dog was aware of its emotions, possessed a conscious will, possessed a
personality, and their similarity to other life forms. The results showed that participants
were significantly more likely to anthropomorphize the unpredictable dog, especially if the
participants’ desire for control was high, thus providing additional support to the sociality
determinant of anthropomorphism.
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These results were further supported by Tam (2015) who built on the motivations
explored by Epley and colleagues to test the effectiveness of anthropomorphic persuasive
appeals in the context of environmental persuasion for environment preservation. Their
results matched those found by Epley, Waytz, Akalis, and Cacioppo (Epley, Waytz, Akalis,
& Cacioppo, 2008) with anthropomorphic persuasive appeals being more effective and
motivating more conservation behavior than non-anthropomorphic persuasive appeals
when participants possessed high need for social connection, or effectance. However, the
effect of anthropomorphic appeals reversed for participants with low need for social
connection or effectance with anthropomorphic appeals leading to a decrease in
conservation behavior under those conditions.
Effectance Motivation
The concept of effectance motivation is further developed by Waytz, Morewedge,
Epley, Monteleone, Gao, and Cacioppo (Waytz, et al., 2010) who conducted a series of 5
experiments to show the importance of increasing effectance on increasing the
anthropomorphic attributions. These experiments included 1) asking participants to
describe the computer they typically used and rate it on the extent it appears to have a mind
of its own, or behavior as if it possessed its own beliefs an desires, 2) asking participants
to evaluate devices they were not familiar with, 3) analyzing the brains of participants with
an fMRI as they carried out experiment 2, 4) examining the effects of the predictability of
a robots’ behavior on its anthropomorphization, and 5) exploring if motivating individuals
to explain the behavior of a robot could enhance the effects of the effectance motivation,
and 6) exploring whether anthropomorphizing an agent (dog, robot, alarm clock, or shape)
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could satisfy a person’s need for mastery and control of the environment. The results of the
experiments consistently showed that the more unpredictable the behavior of the
technology being considered, the more it was anthropomorphized and provided fMRI scans
showing increased activation in the Mentalizing network to support the argument that the
technology was indeed being anthropomorphized rather than simply participants using
mind as a metaphor to describe its behavior. The fifth and sixth studies were of interest as
they expand on our prior understanding from the literature. The fifth study showed that
encouraging participants to make accurate predictions increases the effectance motivation
and encourages anthropomorphism, providing a way of controlling this phenomenon. The
6th

experiment

showed

that

only

does

effectance

motivation

encourages

anthropomorphism, but anthropomorphizing a technology satisfies the need for effectance
of the participant.
Sociality Motivation
Other studies have focused instead on expanding the understanding of the Sociality
Motivation. Epley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2008) conducted 3 experiments to
explore the effect of chronic loneliness on anthropomorphism while varying the agent of
interest in each (Gadgets, God, and Animals). Through these studies, the authors noted that
not only are chronic individuals more likely to anthropomorphize others, but inducing
participants to feel lonely by asking them to think about loneliness was enough to increase
their tendency to anthropomorphize. Similar results were also found by Bartz, Tchalova
and Fenerci (Bartz, Tchalova, & Fenerci, 2008) who replicated the results found by Epley,
Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2008), but expanded them in two significant ways. First, the
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study showed that not only can a desire to connect lead to anthropomorphism, but simply
reminding others of their existing social connections was enough to attenuate their
tendency to anthropomorphize. Secondly, the study also measured the role of attachment
style in anthropomorphism, and noted that individuals that showed attachment anxiety (i.e.
intense desire and preoccupation with maintaining a feeling of closeness, as well as a fear
of being abandoned) was a stronger predictor of anthropomorphism than loneliness.
Finally, Wang (2017) also explored the role of chronic loneliness and attachment style on
anthropomorphism in a survey. The results showed that similarly to the previous studies,
both chronic loneliness and a preoccupied attachment style were significant predictors of
anthropomorphism.
Other studies on attachment style showed similar results. Bodford, Kwan, and
Sobota (2017) explored whether individuals with an anxious attachment style would be
more likely to develop both an anxious attachment to their smartphones, and to
anthropomorphize it. After conducting a survey with 262 respondents, they found that
attachment style to other humans was a predictor of both attachment style to the
smartphone and an individual’s anthropomorphic beliefs. Moreover, when they conducted
a mediation analysis, the authors founds that anxious smartphone attachment fully
mediated the relationship between anxious human attachment and anthropomorphic beliefs
suggesting that humans with an anxious attachment style develop similarly anxious
attachments to their smartphones which in turn are what influences their beliefs about the
technology.
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Finally, studies by Neave, Tyson, McInners and Hamilton (2016) as well as by
Norberg, Crone Kwok, and Grisham (2018) have both shown significant associations
between anxious attachment styles and anthropomorphism. Neave and colleagues (2016)
asked participants to complete a questionnaire exploring their attachment style, attachment
to objects, anthropomorphic tendencies, and hoarding behaviors. The results showed
significant

positive effects

of

anxious

and avoidant attachment

styles

and

anthropomorphism on Hoarding Behaviors. A mediation analysis further revealed that
when controlling for the effect of the attachment style, the role of anthropomorphism on
hoarding behaviors disappears, suggesting that it is attachment style which is influencing
both anthropomorphism and, through it, hoarding behaviors rather than anthropomorphic
tendencies being influencing hoarding behaviors themselves. This represents significant
evidence for the relationship between anxious and avoidant attachment styles and
anthropomorphism. Norberg, Crone Kwok, and Grisham (2018) provides further evidence
for this argument as it also showed a significant effect of anxious attachment style on
anthropomorphism, and a significant effect of both factors on excessive buying behaviors,
a proxy of excessive acquisition and hoarding.
4.2.3

The Social Role of Technology: Beliefs & Mental Models
Studies into the role of beliefs and mental models on anthropomorphic attributions

have been carried out since the social perception of technology has been explored (Nass,
Steuer, & Tauber, 1994) (Nass & Moon, 2000). Early on, Marakas and colleagues argued
that the social perception of technology was likely not homogeneous among individuals,
but was bound to show individual variability (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000). Among
the factors that would determine the social perception of technology, they proposed the
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generalized beliefs humans hold about the social role and capabilities of technology would
significantly influence their tendency to perceive the technology as a social agent. They
named this factor the Computing Technology Continuum of Perspective (CP). Johnson,
Marakas, and Palmer carried out two separate studies to test components of this model. In
the first study (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2006), the authors conducted a laboratory
study to empirically test the model first proposed by Marakas and colleagues (Marakas,
Johnson, & Palmer, 2000). The results supported the hypothesis that where the individuals
fell on the Continuum of Perspective’s range as defined by their general beliefs would
significantly influence their tendency to perceive the technology as a social agent.
Moreover, Johnson, Marakas and Palmer (2008) explore the components that compose this
Continuum of Perspective and identified through an empirical examination that the
individual’s beliefs about the intelligence, socialness, locus of control, and specific control
over rights and freedoms of the technology were the key beliefs that affected the social
attribution towards technology.
Around the same time Schectman and Horowitz (2003) explored the role a person
beliefs about the nature of a “partner” they are interacting with (whether it appeared to be
another person, or a computer program) affected how they responded to it. As a result,
participants who believe they were interacting with another person showed more behaviors
associated with establishing an interpersonal relationship such as flattery, connection,
advice, and yielding. While not specifically about anthropomorphism, this study shows that
the beliefs a person held about the system could affect the way they experienced and
responded to it in a significant and measurable way. Additionally, Lemaignan, Fink,
Dillenbourg, and Braboszcz (2014) argued that these mental models were far from static,
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and rather developed throughout the life cycle of the interaction with the mental model a
person holds at the beginning of the interaction going through three phases of development.
These results were supported by Kiesler and Goetz (2002) who developed a technique to
measure the richness and content of people’s mental models of a robot and discovered these
models grew and changed as the interaction progressed.
The beliefs held about other agents has also formed the basis of the Individual
Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (or IDAQ) (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley,
2010), one of the main questionnaires used to explore anthropomorphism and
anthropomorphic tendencies across fields. Bodford, Kwan, and Sobota (Bodford, Kwan, &
Sobota, 2017) relied on the IDAQ questionnaire to explore the impact that attachment style
towards other humans, and towards smartphones would have on the individual differences
in tendencies to anthropomorphize. Our extant literature review shows this to be one of the
most popular methods for measuring anthropomorphism based on the studies found on our
initial query-based search through PubMed and ABI/Informs Collections.

4.3

CONTEXT-RELATED FACTORS INFLUENCING ANTHROPOMORPHISM
The context in which the interaction with technology takes place has also been

shown to have significant effects over anthropomorphism and the social perception of
technology. Studies exploring these factors have focused on the constructs of how the
technology is presented (i.e. framing and priming), the cognitive load the individual is
going through, and the type of interaction taking place. We review the extent of our
knowledge about the influence of these factors below.
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Table 7 Contextual factors Supporting the Anthropomorphism Model
Antecedents
Framing Effects

Priming Effects

Cognitive Load

Representative Work

Reference Hypotheses

(Araujo, 2018) (Pak, Fink,

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,

Price, Bass, & Sturre,

18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 164,

2012)

171

(Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, &

164, 165, 166, 167, 175,

Sturre, 2012) (Tam, 2015)

176, 177, 178,

(Sreejesh & Anusree, 2017) 135, 136, 137, 144, 145,
146

Group Membership (as

(Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt,

155, 156, 158, 159, 160,

priming)

2012)

Interactivity

(Kim & Sundar, 2012) (Go

6, 7, 8,9, 10, 50, 51, 52,

& Sundar, 2019)

53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,
60, 61,
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Table 8 Model of Overarching Context-related Themes
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4.3.1

Influencing Initial Perceptions: Framing & Emotional Priming

As research into the antecedents of anthropomorphism has progressed, researchers
have begun to question whether individuals can be encouraged to perceive technology as a
social agent prior to their initial interaction with it. A study by Riva, Sacchi and Brambilla
(2015) on the use of anthropomorphic agents within the gambling industry explored
whether the humanlike characters in slot machines used in casinos could encourage
potential users to anthropomorphize the machines and increase gambling behaviors and
earnings for the casino, resulting in worse returns for the user. Riva and colleagues
conducted multiple experiments within this study to explore different aspects of the
presentation of the machines, and concluded that presenting these machines with
humanlike terms within an initial description (for example “The slot machines can decide
whether you will win or lose” (Riva, Sacchi, & Brambilla, 2015, p. 319)) was enough to
encourage users to increase gambling behaviors and loose more money due to increases in
its anthropomorphic perception.
Cha and colleagues (Cha, et al., 2020) have also shown the impact that presenting
our technology in multiple ways has over its perception as a social actor. Specifically, the
authors explored how individuals react when their distinctiveness is threatened by a
technology that becomes capable of performing some typically uniquely human
characteristic as represented by the moment when Google’s AlphaGo computer managed
to beat the human Go champion Lee Sedol in Go, a abstract strategy game often considered
too complex for computers (Koch, 2016) (Silver, et al., 2016). To achieve this, Cha and
colleagues conducted multiple experiments in which they primed participants with pictures
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of the AlphaGo against Lee Sedol encounter, or through different explanations of the
encounter varying between framing it as an inter-group comparison, a control condition,
and an inter-individual comparison with the expectation that the framing would make
participants feel their distinctiveness to be threatened due to changes in their selfevaluations and changing intragroup judgments as argued by Schmitt, Silvia and
Branscombe (Schmitt, Silvia, & Branscombe, 2000) based on social identity theory. The
results of the study showed that the priming had the intended effect of making participants
feel threatened which altered their reported factors that represented human uniqueness as
reported first in the IDAQ questionnaire (an indicator of tendency to anthropomorphize),
and later as social creativity through superiority ratings (indicator a human uniqueness).
The results by Riva and Cha provide support that priming the interaction can affect
anthropomorphism both directly as represented by Riva (Riva, Sacchi, & Brambilla, 2015),
or by influencing the tendency to anthropomorphize as shown by Cha (Cha, et al., 2020).
Nevertheless, not all studies have shown positive results. An early study by Bartneck
(Bartneck, 2008) aimed to explore how differing cultures tend to anthropomorphize
technology differently by presenting them with pictures of robots varying in human
likeness. In the study, Bartneck included a sample of pictures of humans as part of the
range since the original data included a highly realistic robot called “Geminoid” that
replicates the appearance of the real human shown. Despite testing the effect of framing
the pictures of the Geminoid by telling participants which one the robot and which the
human, no significant effects were found by the framing. This could be because the
participants did not perceive it to be a relevant factor as they were rating the likeability of
the two by their appearance which didn’t differ much, or they could tell the difference
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without the picture needing to be framed beforehand. Whichever is the reason, the study
provided contradictory results in the understanding the effects of framing and priming on
anthropomorphism.
Finally, Aggarwal and McGill (2012) explored the effects of priming brands that
are typically anthropomorphized by users. The authors argued that priming individuals
with brands that are perceived positively vs negatively can have differing effects over the
individual’s behavior, encouraging to, for example, take the stairs rather than the elevator.
While the priming effects were found to be significant for brands typically
anthropomorphized, the same was not true of non-anthropomorphized brands. While the
study does not provide support for the effects of priming over the tendency to
anthropomorphize, it does show that priming typically anthropomorphized brands can
enhance their social effects suggesting a possible interaction between priming and the
social perception of technology rather than a causal role.
4.3.2

Cognitive Load & Awareness of Nature of Agent
In their theoretical study on the nature of anthropomorphism Urquiza-Haas and

Kotrschal (2015) reasoned that multiple non-conscious and conscious processes affect
human’s tendency to anthropomorphize. Following the iterative reprocessing model by
Cunningham and Zelazo (2007) which argues that both the attitudes towards an stimulus
(e.g. individuals, objects, or in this case anthropomorphize technology) and the evaluations
or current appraisals of said stimulus affect humans response to the stimulus. The model
proposes that early evaluations are more automatic as they depend significantly more on
implicit cognitive mechanisms, while later evaluations become increasingly more detailed
as various cycles of evaluation take place due to the involvement of reflective processes.
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Based on this model, Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal view anthropomorphism as being
affected simultaneously by both implicit non-conscious processes and reflective conscious
processes which leads them to argue that variations in the cognitive load a person is going
through are bound to affect the anthropomorphic process differently depending on how the
anthropomorphic attribution is triggered in the first place.

The authors argue that if anthropomorphism is being triggered by sensory
information (i.e. triggered through Bottom-Up processing), a high cognitive load would
interfere with the suppression of the social network of the brain, that is, a high cognitive
load would hamper with the reflective processes (i.e. inductive or causal reasoning) that
attempt to suppress the automatic tendency to anthropomorphize leading to higher
anthropomorphization. On the other hand, if anthropomorphism is being triggered through
conscious reflective processes such as inductive or causal reasoning (i.e. triggered
through Top-Down processing), a high cognitive load would prevent the those processes
from taking place in the first place and thus deter anthropomorphism, that is, it would
prevent a person from anthropomorphizing an entity through inductive or causal reasoning.
In other words, the authors argue that the origin of the trigger of anthropomorphism will
moderate the relationship between the Cognitive Load and the Attribution of Mind with a
high cognitive load encouraging anthropomorphism when it is activated through nonconscious processes, while suppressing it if it is being triggered though reasoning. This
view seems to be supported by the extant empirical studies available.
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In testing how games that integrate advertising to promote products can lead to
brand recognition, Sreejesh and Anusree (2017) hypothesized that highly interactive
encounters with brand messages within the videos games that required high cognitive
loads, would lead to higher brand attention, recall and recognition. The authors also argued
that these relationships would be moderated by the level of anthropomorphism attributed
to the brand with participants exposed to high brand interactivity, high cognitive demand,
and an anthropomorphic representation of the brand developing higher levels of brand
attention, recall and recognition due to the application of humanlike mental models to the
interaction with the brand as suggested by the construct of Elicited Agent Knowledge
proposed by Epley and colleagues (2007).

To test these arguments, Sreejesh and Anusree conducted an experiment with a
between-subjects design where they asked participants to play a game while varying the
levels of anthropomorphism (high vs low), cognition demand (high vs low) and
interactivity (game interactivity/interactive features vs brand interactivity/message
interactivity vs no interactivity). The results of the study showed that as initially
hypothesized, exposure to highly anthropomorphic brands in conditions of high cognitive
demand and high brand interactivity lead to statistically significant increases in brand
attention, brand recall, and brand recognition and thus the authors conclude that high
cognition demands interact with high anthropomorphic cues resulting in increases in
mindless social attributions. Therefore, this study provides support to the argument that
higher cognitive load increases the tendency to anthropomorphize.
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On a separate study, Lee (2010) explored how the cognitive load a person
undergoes while using it influences the extent that person applies social attributes to
technology. The author argued that since the social response to technology was likely to be
a mindless response to an apparent social stimulus (Nass & Moon, 2000), an increase in
cognitive load would leave less cognitive resources to rationalize the stimulus increasing
the effects of the mindless attribution (Lee E.-J. , 2010, pp. 193-194). To test these
arguments, Lee conducted an experiment where participants would play an interactive
trivia game consisting of 3 parts. The participant would first answer a question, after which
the computer would provide either a generic or a flattering answer that the participant was
told was random. The assignment of the participant was to answer whether the provided
answer was correct or not, after which the trivia moved to the next question. To vary the
cognitive load, a group of participants was asked to also memorize a string of numbers as
they played the trivia. Finally, the social effects were measured as variations in the
tendency to conform to the answers provided by the computer with a higher conformity
rate (i.e. agreeing that the answer provided was correct) being interpreted as an increase in
social conformity. Interestingly, the results showed that participants who were involved in
only one task were more likely to conform to the generic comments, while participants who
were involved in the two tasks showed no statistically significant difference in their
conformity.
A posthoc analysis was carried out to explore whether those individuals showing
higher conformity in the single task scenario were doing so because they possessed
suspicions about the validity of the computer’s output. Specifically, Lee explored whether
the computer comments and the number of tasks affected the perception the perceived

112

likelihood of the computer presented the correct answer and found that those flattered by
the computer thought that the computer was less likely to present the correct answer than
those who received the generic comments thus suggesting that contrary to the expected
results from the mindlessness hypothesis, there were more flattery (i.e. social) effects
in the group with the lower cognitive load.
While the results from Sreejesh and Anusree (2017) and Lee (2010) appear to
contradict each other, looking at anthropomorphism as a tendency that can be initiated
through both conscious and non-conscious processes as suggested Urquiza-Haas and
Kotrschal (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015) could help us explain these results. Whereas
both Sreejesh and Anusree (2017), and Lee (2010) could be argued to have implicitly
encouraged the social perception of technology through an anthropomorphic appearance
and high interactivity in the case of Sreejesh and Anusree, and flattery in the case of Lee,
the fact that Lee asked participants to evaluate the believability of the messages could have
moved the source of anthropomorphism from the implicit effects of flattery, to the rational
evaluation of the truthfulness of the message. The changing source of anthropomorphism
resulting in contradicting results in both studies. This view becomes clearer if we observe
the work of Krcmar and Eden.
Krcmar and Eden (2019) offer strong indications that favor this view of
anthropomorphism possessing both conscious and non-conscious origins at its core that
can encourage the attribution of mental states either independently or in conjunction. The
authors aimed to explore the relative impact of cognitive load and moral salience on the
feelings of aggressions and guilt (i.e. social effects) that a person could feel while playing
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a video game. Similarly to Lee (2010), Krcmar and Eden based their hypotheses on the
dual-process theory of cognitive experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1994) (Epstein & Pacini,
1999), which argues that humans possess two information processing systems representing
an experiential, intuitive, automatic and non-conscious system referred to as “system 1”,
as well as an rational system that is conscious, relatively analytical and intentional referred
to as “system 2”. Following the view that anthropomorphism was a mindless or nonconscious process, Krcmar and Eden argued that that the perceptions of the realism of the
characters (i.e. anthropomorphism) and the environment would increase as the automatic
processes in the brain (system 1) dominated the interactions in the virtual environment over
the reflective processes (system 2). Therefore, they argued that as the cognitive load
increased, the effects of anthropomorphism would be enhanced resulting in larger social
effects in the form of reduced in-game aggression and higher feelings of guilt during
appropriate in-game stimuli. They operationalized this by conducting an experiment in
which participants were asked to play a video game for 5 minutes as they memorized either
2 digits (low cognitive load) or 7 digits and after completing the game filled-in a
questionnaire about their experience.
The results of the study were mixed. While no statistically significant effects were
found for the effects of cognitive load on neither anthropomorphism nor feelings of guilt,
cognitive load led to statistically significant lower in-game aggression. At the same time,
an exploratory analysis of the results indicated that the mean-difference of the effects of
cognitive load on anthropomorphism were on the expected direction in favor of more
anthropomorphism with higher cognitive load, and an analysis of anthropomorphism as a
potential mediator between the cognitive load and the lower in-game aggression using a
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bootstrap technique (Hayes, 2017) (Krcmar & Eden, 2019, p. 8) suggested that
anthropomorphism was a significant negative predictor of aggression and guilt though it
showed no influence of cognitive load on aggression through anthropomorphism. The
authors concluded that anthropomorphism was likely a significant predictor of
aggression and guilt but that it was likely only slightly influenced by the cognitive
load.
Apart from these results, the methodology of the experiment can tell us more about
the nature of anthropomorphism than what the results suggest. A key factor that should
have received more consideration was the video game use, or more specifically the mission
used called “No Russian”. No Russian was one of the most famous missions from the game
“Call of Duty Modern Warfare 2” and it asked players who though were infiltrating a
terrorist group in order to stop it, to participate in a massacre of random civilians in an
airport as part of the terrorist group. According to one of the key developers of the mission,
it was explicitly designed to force players to question their actions in a type of game in
which they would normally move through without much thinking (Senior, 2012). This is
important to explain the results of the study since many players reported to have done just
that, stopping on their tracks and refusing to shoot the civilian avatars just as the
participants in the experiment decrease in aggression (Parsons, 2010). The game showed
immediate non-conscious responses as shown by a developer refusing right away to play
that mission despite being willing to play the rest of the game (Evans-Thirlwell, 2016). But
it also showed anthropomorphism through rationalization as suggested by players
continuing to reject the mission over a decade after it was published (Smith E. , 2017).
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Because of the popularity of the game, it would be feasible to argue that the
experiment was biased because some participants might be familiar with the mission prior
to the experiment. However, Krcmar and Eden controlled for the experience users had
playing video games, so we think that explanation is unlikely. Alternatively, we would
argue that the publicly reported experience of players matches well with the impressions
of the participants. If participants in the experiment had an initial strong anthropomorphic
reaction to what they perceived but followed it through with a rationalization of the
wrongness of participating in a civilian massacre, the experiment might have encouraged
anthropomorphization from both non-conscious and conscious processes. Assuming the
game was a strong enough rational source of anthropomorphism, the cognitive load may
have only switch from one source of anthropomorphism to the next arguably leading to
similar responses from participants with high or low cognitive load.

The role of cognitive load in anthropomorphism remains inconclusive. The nature
of anthropomorphism as a conscious or non-conscious process seems to be the key
determinant in this, though even this question remains under debate (Kim & Sundar, 2012)
with some researchers arguing in favor of it being a form of reasoning (Epley, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2007) while others argue it is a non-conscious response (Nass & Moon, 2000).
We argue the empirical evidence suggests that it is both, and, as Urquiza-Haas and
Kotrschal (2015) proposed, the effects of cognitive load will differ depending on the source
of anthropomorphism.
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4.3.3

Type of Interaction/Relationship
In their model of the Dynamics of anthropomorphism, Lemaignan, Fink,

Dillenbourg, and Braboszcz (2014) propose that the process of anthropomorphization will
varies based on how the interaction with a non-human entity is progressing. The authors
propose that three cognitive phases with distinct implications can be distinguished. First, a
pre-cognitive phase which describes the initial moments when an observer first engages
with the entity which builds upon initial baseline capital or potential for the entity to be
anthropomorphized based on factors such as individual differences and its appearance or
behavior. The second phase is based on building familiarity and it describes how a person
gets familiarized with the entity building upon the initial model. Finally, the adapted phase
of anthropomorphism describes how after some time passes, the mental model used to
perceive the entity becomes stable.

4.4

TECHNOLOGY-RELATED FACTORS: IT CHARACTERISTICS
A significant portion of the studies using anthropomorphism have taken place

within the field of social robotics where humanlike appearance and behavior have long
been among the predominant factors used in designing social robots (Hancock, et al., 2011)
(Schaefer, Chen, Szalma, & Hancock, 2016), though multiple others were gathered from
the fields of scial neuroscience, social psychology and human-computer and predominantly
explored the relevance of multiple factors and characteristics of the technology on the
overall interaction with individuals with appearance and the apparent behavior of the
technology being the 2 most common factors.
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Technology factors appear to revolve around the interaction style of the artificial
agent, its appearance and visual cues, and its apparent behavior and social cues related to
it. At the same time, researchers have explored variations on the perceived characteristics
of the agent such as its personality, and credibility. These behaviors can be separated into
2 categories: it could promote behavioral markers that suggest intention and volition
leading to mental agency rather than plain animism (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017), or it could
demonstrate social cues that there is something “inside” encouraging the perception that it
can feel as shown on Kory-Westlund experiments with children’s in the classroom (KoryWestlund, 2019).
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Figure 6 Model of technology-related overarching themes associated with anthropomorphism.
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4.4.1

The Role of an Agent’s Embodiment & Appearance

A key characteristic that has been under research for the past couple of decades is
whether the embodiment of a technology affects how human perceive it and whether it can
affect humans’ tendency to anthropomorphize and the social presence perceived from the
technology (Deng, Mutlu, & Matarić, 2019). The construct of embodiment refers to more
than the physical body a technology possesses and often includes factors such as
proxemics, oculesics, and gestures used by an artificial agent to enhance communication
(Deng, Mutlu, & Matarić, 2019, p. 2) (Pransky, 2019). Nevertheless, within this section we
limit our scope to the role that the physical body of the technology has over its social
perception as indicated by the extant empirical literature. These studies typically suggest
that the physical embodiment of a technology can have significant effects in encouraging
the social perception of technology as measured through anthropomorphism and social
presence. We discuss three studies that have made significant contributions in our
understanding of the relationship between physical embodiment and the social perception
of technology.
An early study by Lee, Jung, Kim & Kim (2006) explored the role that the
embodiment of a technology (e.g. a social robot or a virtual character) could have on the
feeling of presence the technology evoke and, through it, the effects it had on an
individual’s perception of the technological artifact and the interaction. The authors
conducted two experiments to explore these relationships. In their first experiment,
participants interacted with either a physical “Aibo” social robot or a virtual recreation
depending on their experimental treatment. Participants in both treatments could engaged
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with their respective robot either through physical touch in for the physically embodied
robot, or through mouse clicks in the virtual robot group. Both robots responded to touch
with the same behavior and after 10 minutes, the interaction was stopped and the
participants were asked to rate their general evaluation of the robot, its social attraction,
their evaluation of the interaction, and how other people would evaluate the robot.
The results provided statistically significant support to the researchers hypotheses
with the physically embodied robot being positively related to improvements in all the
factors just mentioned while the robots’ social presence fully mediated the social attraction
to the robot and partially mediated the general evaluation of the robot, their evaluation of
the interaction and their assessment of the public’s evaluation of the robot. This experiment
showed significant effects of embodiment in the social perception of technology, but a
possibility remained that the observed effects were the result of the mode of interaction
rather than the embodiment and therefore the authors carried a second experiment with
limited tactile contact participants could have with the technology so that all observed
effects were the result of the embodiment of the robot.
In this second experiment, participants were exposed to a different social robot
named April that was either physically embodied or virtually recreated similarly to how
Aibo was presented. However, this time participants were explicitly asked not to touch the
robot leaving them as onlookers while both the robot sang depending on the treatment
(physical or virtual). The results showed that physical embodiment without touch was a
significant negative predictor of social presence resulting in the virtual robot having
significantly higher social presence and, through it, the participants reported significantly
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higher general evaluations and social attraction of the robot, as well as significantly higher
evaluations of the interaction with the robot and assessment of others evaluations of the
robot. In both studies, the embodiment of the robot had significant effects on the social
presence and thus social perception of the robot, though the amount of tactile interaction
with the robot seems to alter the direction of this relationship.
Kiesler and colleagues (Kiesler, Powers, Fussell, & Torrey, 2008) extended this
research by exploring whether humans’ would anthropomorphize more a physically
embodied robot more than a software agent, and whether the robot being collocated,
compared a remote robot projected on a screen, would also have a significant effect in
increasing anthropomorphic attributions. In their experiment, participants were exposed
either a physical robot or a virtual agent on a monitor which could be either located in the
room with the participant or projected on a screen for a 2 by 2 factorial design. The
participants were told to discuss health habits with the agents with the robot speaking, and
the participant replying by typing on a keyboard. The robot asked questions on social
desirability and after the experiment, the experimenter reentered the room, asked the
participants to complete a questionnaire and offered them snacks on a bowl.
Supporting the initial hypotheses, participants disclosed less information to the
physical robot than the virtual agent, attributed it more and stronger personality traits, said
it was more lifelike, liked it better, and spent more time with it. All these results were taken
by the authors as indicators that the participants interacted with the robot as more like a
person than an object supporting the argument that participants anthropomorphize
physically embodied agents significantly more than virtual agents.
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Finally, Kwak and colleagues (Kwak, Kim, Kim, Shin, & Cho, 2013) expanded the
results above and conducted to experiments to test how the physical embodiment of a robot
(experiment two) and its level of agency (experiment one) affected individuals tendency to
empathized with the robot. In the experiment testing physical embodiment, the authors
relied on the robot as a mediator for communication with another person and therefore
showed children who were participating in the study a picture of the person they were told
was managing the robot. Then, the children drew a piece of paper to determine whether
they would be the teacher (i.e. torturer) or the assistant-teacher (observer) in a modified
version of Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority using two treatments: a
physical robot or a disembodied robot shown on a screen (Milgram, 1974). Following
Milgram’s approach, the authors made sure the children always selected the teacher piece,
giving them the responsibility of giving an electronic shock to the robot if it answered
question on a learning task incorrectly. After each shock, the robot would show increased
bruising and voiced its suffering. The results showed that participants in the physically
embodied condition reported significantly more empathy towards the embodied robot
supporting the argument that a physical embodiment can increase the social perception
of and attribution of affective states to the technology.
These results consistently support the important role that the embodiment of
technology has on its likelihood of being anthropomorphized though as Lee, Jung, Kim &
Kim (2006) showed the effect seems to change depending on its level of interactivity. As
Sah and Peng (2015, p. 399) argued later on, it seems reasonable to consider that the effects
of the technology’s appearance and physical embodiment lead to priming effects and as
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Levillain and Zibetti (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017, p. 9) proposed whether the technology
fulfills our initial expectations can have major effects on our impressions of it.
However, the fact that virtual agents were also anthropomorphized (though to a
lesser degree in most studies) shows that physical embodiment, while potentially helpful,
is not a necessary factor for anthropomorphism to take place. It is important to know that
while other studies have explored the role of the physical presence of an artificial agent on
anthropomorphic attributions (Kim & Sundar, 2012) (Araujo, 2018), they don’t consider
alternative representations and thus make it difficult to separate whether the observed
effects were the result of the physical presence of an agent rather than a different type of
representation (i.e. avatar or virtual agent) or simply because an agent existed. Therefore,
we excluded these articles from this section.
4.4.1.1 Technology’s Humanlike Appearance
The human likeness of an artificial agent’s appearance, together with its apparent
behavior, has been one of the most studied factors in the social perception of technology
(Fink, 2012, p. 201) (von Zitzewitz, Boesch, Wolf, & Riener, 2013). Researchers have
argued that to encourage mind perception and social attribution, non-human entities ought
to display signs of agency and intentionality through its appearance (Kiesler, Powers,
Fussell, & Torrey, 2008) (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017) which in turn promotes the
application of humanlike mental states on those entities (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007).
Some researchers have gone so far as to develop a typology of signals and cues for HRI
that can encourage whether the appearance will be perceived as more humanlike or
machinelike (Hegel, Gieselmann, Peters, Holthaus, & Wrede, 2011).
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Table 9 Empirical Literature on Human-like Appearance & Anthropomorphism.
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While most of the studies identified above on human likeness and
anthropomorphism either explicitly or implicitly showed significant positive effects
(Hinds, Roberts, & Jones, 2004) (Broadbent, et al., 2013) (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017), a
significant portion continued to provide contradictory results (von der Pütten, Krämera,
Gratch, & Kang, 2010) (Zlotwski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, & Ishiguro, 2017). Out of
these, one study was focused on the relevance of the construct of dehumanization and its
subcomponents to anthropomorphism and thus focused only on a subset of categories for
perception of mind (Zlotwski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, & Ishiguro, 2017), while the
other studies achieved null results. Multiple explanations have been offered to explain the
inconsistency of results.
Sah and Peng (2015) argued that these discrepancies could be the result of how the
artificial agents used were framed. The authors explained that while Lee (2010) managed
the expectations of participants by describing the agent as a mere computer program, Kim
and Sundar (2012) personified the agent by giving it a name raising expectations about its
capabilities in the minds of participants which were not met resulting in a lower overall
social perception of the agent that contradicts Lee’s results despite the similarities in
methodology. This view matches Levillain and Zibetti’s argument that social expectations
are significantly affected by the human likeness of an artificial agent and that a mismatch
between these expectations and the actual behavior of the entity can lead to unintended
effects (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017). By refraining from personifying the agent, Sah and
Peng found significant effects of the visual cues (i.e. pictures of physicians) on both the
public and private self-awareness of participants suggesting some social effects, however
the social perception remain non-significant. The authors argue that this was probably
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because the lack of specification of an interaction entity led participants to see the picture
as a graphical component of the interface rather than the entity with which they were
interacting with and hence the presence of the pictures did not affect whether participants
felt as if they were interacting with a human.
This last argument by Sah and Peng can also help us explain the result from other
conflicting studies found on our search. While most of the studies we identified specified
an entity such as a moving avatar or a robot as the interactant that participants would engage
with, the studies by Sah and Peng (2015), Go and Sundar (2019), and Pak, Fink, Price,
Bass and Sturre (2012) relied on a chatbot displaying a static pictures of a human or an
object to convey variations in the level of human like appearance of their artificial agents.
Following the proposal of Sah and Peng, it is certainly possible that participants perceived
these images as design elements rather than a representation of the virtual embodiment of
the agent participants were interacting with thus negating its usefulness in invocating
human like mental models as proposed by Epley and colleagues (Epley, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2007).
The final two studies with conflicting non-significant results for the role of
appearance were by Bartneck, Reichenbanch and Breemen (2004), and Zlotowski,
Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio and Ishiguro (2017). Neither of these studies showed any of the
limitations discussed above as rather than comparing static images of humans both studies
employed moving robots in their comparison. Bartneck and colleagues compared an
expressive robot called I-CAT to a movie representing the same robot and asked
participants to rate the intensity and other factors of the expressions shown.
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On the other hand, Zlotowski and colleagues compared the Robovie robot, which
possessed both arms and a head but remained otherwise machine-like in appearance, to the
Geminoid robot, a humanoid robot that looks almost indistinguishable from a human.
Differing from Bartneck’s approach, Zlotowski and colleagues asked participants to play
“Acchi muite hoi” (i.e. a game played between two people using their hands akin to rockpaper-scissors) with the robot. Two possible explanations exist for why no significant was
found in these studies.
First, Zlotowski and colleagues (2017) proposed that seems participants engaged in
a long interaction with the robot, any initial impression gained from the appearance of the
robot was probably minimized by the time they had finished playing and only the effects
of the interaction itself remained by the time participants recorded their impressions. This
explanation could also be relevant for Bartneck and colleagues (2004) as the participants
in their study still engaged with the robot for a relatively long period of time. However, the
interaction between participants of Bartneck’s study was much more limited than for the
participants of Zlotowski and therefore we offer an alternative explanation for the nonsignificant results of Bartneck and colleagues study (2004).
Secondly, rather than focusing on the perception of human like appearance and
social perception of the robot, Bartneck’s study (2004) explores the embodiment of the
robot and whether it affect the participant’s recognition of the robot’s emotions. This is
significant because while the physical presence of the robot may vary, both the embodied
and disembodied versions possess the same overall appearance and capabilities.
Additionally, recognizing expressed emotions, while related, is a different process than
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attributing those emotions to the entity and thus many not be a representation of
anthropomorphism. Therefore, asking participants for their perception of different qualities
of the emotions displayed by either an embodied or disembodied robot may neither explore
the influence of the human likeness of its appearance nor its anthropomorphization.
Taking these arguments into consideration, the conflicting results seem to suggest
that for appearance to be effective the participant must recognize the operationalization as
part of the entity they are interacting with, and that a person’s initial impressions from the
appearance can rapidly change as the person continues to engage with the entity.
The extant literature is consistent in showing that the appearance of an agent
increases human’s tendency to make social attributions to that entity. Nevertheless, the
embodiment literature tells us that such embodiment is neither sufficient, nor necessary for
anthropomorphism to take place. Rather, how an artificial agent’s responds to us and
behaves seem to be more critical factors involved in human’s anthropomorphization of
technology (Airenti, 2018) (Sah & Peng, 2015).
4.4.2

Artificial Agents’ Apparent Behavior
The second most common factor under anthropomorphism research has been the

perceived behavior of an artificial agent (Fink, 2012, p. 201). Contrary to research into
embodiment or the human likeness of an agent, research into the behavior of technology
has taken many forms with diverse outcomes (Kim & Sundar, 2012) (Araujo, 2018).
Factors related to how technology engages with users (Go & Sundar, 2019), the qualities
of its apparent behavior (Wang, Lignos, Vatsal, & Scassellati, 2006), and the social cues
that it communicates (Lee, Lee, & Sah, 2019). We discuss these in the sections below.
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Table 10 Literature on Movement/Behavior of an Entity and Anthropomorphism
Representative

Antecedent

DV

Significance

Work
(Chaminade,

Biological

Response Bias

Mixed (Interacted with

Hodgins, &

Movement

Appearance with significant

Kawato, 2007)
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differences between the

Movement

groups a) ellipse and robot
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clown, and jogger. However,
not significant within each
group)

(Eyssel,

Predictabilit

Anthropomorphi

Significant N (low

Kuchenbrandt, &

y of Robot

c Inferences

predictability increased

Bobinger, 2011)

Behavior

tendency to
anthropomorphize)

(Wang, Lignos,

Head

Perceived

SignificantP (with increases

Vatsal, &

movement

Intentionality

in avoidance and unsmooth

Scassellati, 2006)
(Abubshait &
Wiese, 2017)

tracking)
Behavior

Social-Cognitive
Performance;
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2012)

Mindful
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sm; Mindless
Anthropomorphi
sm;
(Bracken, Jeffres,

Feedback

Perception of

& Neuendorf,

Type (Praise Computer as

2004)
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SignificantP

Social Entity

Criticism)
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Paralinguisti Closeness;

Partial Support**

2019)
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Back-

Perception is High)
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Cues;
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Behavioral

Krämera, Gratch, & Realism

Social

SignificantP
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Kang, 2010)
(Miwa & Terai,

Perceived

Influence over

2012)

Behavior

Strategy
Selection
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(Kang & Watt,

Behavioral

Psychological
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2013)

Realism
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(Mara & Appel,

Head

Perceived

SignificantP (head tilts

2015)

Posture

Human likeness

increased the attributed
human-likeness of the robot)

(Sah & Peng, 2015)
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Social
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Anthropomo Perception
rphic Cues
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Social Presence

SignificantP
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Style
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(Anthropom
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sm; Social
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sm; Social

not exposed to

Presence;

anthropomorphic character
with High Interactivity
(Direction not hypothesized)

(Fasola & Mataric,

Relationship Effectiveness;

Exploratory: Suggest

2012)

Building
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positive implications of

Behavior
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(praise and
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discourse)
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Sakr, 2014)

of Artificial
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for Culture;
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experience;
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Perception of

(Heider & Simmel,
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(Salem, Lakatos,
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Assessment of

Assessment of robot

Amirabdollahian, & of Behavior

robot reliability;

reliability -> Significant;

Dautenhahn, 2015)

assessment of

Assessment of robot

robot

trustworthiness ->

trustworthiness;

Significant;

Interaction

Interaction choices -> not

choices;

significant;

willingness to

willingness to cooperate with

cooperate with

robot -> not significant;

robot;

Research into the role of observed behavior on the attribution of mind to technology
and its social perception can be traced back to Heider and Simmel’s original experiment of
apparent behavior (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Heider and Simmel developed a film showing
multiple two-dimensional geometric figures moving around a square and asked participant
to describe what they saw. Participants responded by personifying the figures. They
described stories on how the figures interacted with one another and perceiving movement
as intentional actions. Some described birds engaging with one another, others an enraged
man finding a girl he likes with another man. The study has been accepted as a prime
representation of humans tendency to see the world in terms of intentional actions and
agents (Durayappah-Harrison, 2011) (Goldman J. G., 2013).
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4.4.2.1 Theoretical arguments for the influence of apparent behavior on
anthropomorphism
Levillain and Zibetti (2017) built on the conclusions made by Heider and Simmel
(Heider & Simmel, 1944) as well as other similar studies (Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith,
2000) (Kassim, 1982) (Morris & Peng, 1994) to develop a theoretical framework that
explains how humans perceive movement and which properties of the movement lead to
humans to attribute of mental agency to the entity being observed. The authors argue that
humans can infer agency through three mechanisms.
Firstly, they can infer that a transfer of energy took place when they observed two
moving entities touching each other and then moving away. Secondly, humans tend to
interpret extended movements as an indication that the action took place in order to achieve
a goal (referred to as extended goal-directed actions). Finally, as humans attempt to explain
the context of the actions, they tend to construe a narrative based on social routines or
mental models.
Based on theories of behavior from the field of biology [cites], Levillain and Zibetti
emphasize humans may perceive an entity’s movement as a behavior if 1) the changes in
the environment resulting from said movement appears to be generated by the entity rather
than a result of an external influence or mechanisms, and 2) those changes appear to possess
meaning in the context they took place.
Levillain and Zibetti refer to these objects capable of exhibiting apparent behavior
as behavioral objects and argue that rather than simply being projected human attitudes or
believes, the behavior they exhibit is sufficiently complex to be implicitly considered a
recipient of mental attributes (Gaudiello, Lefort, & Zibetti, 2015). Finally, the authors
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propose that the nature of the apparent behavior can provide behavioral cues suggestive of
different levels of interpretation with the most basic behaviors suggesting whether the
entity may be alive (i.e. animism), going through whether it appears to have intentions (i.e.
Agency), and finally whether it can take into account others goals in its own actions
similarly to how theory of mind functions for humans (i.e. Mental Agency). The range
presented by Levillain and Zibetti is provided below for reference.

Figure 7 Levillain and Zibetti framework of the role of behavioral cues on mental agency
attribution (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017, pg. 14).

139

Empirical Results Supporting the Role of Behavior
Empirical studies on the influence of artificial agents’ behavior on human’s
tendency to anthropomorphize the agent seem to support this view. Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt
and Bobinger (2011) conducted a study to explore the main and interaction effects that the
predictability of an agent’s behavior and the participants’ expectations of having a humanrobot interaction with the agent would have on its anthropomorphization. Participants were
presented with a short silent video clip of the Flobi robot illustrating its movable facial
features. A short text was given to participants to manipulate their perception of the robot’s
predictability which either presented Flobi as a) having different action programs for each
individual action activated by following a random principle that makes it unpredictable
(low predictability), or b) having different action programs that Flobi activates by
following a predefined principle that makes it absolutely predictable.
The results of the study show interaction effects where the robot was significantly
more anthropomorphized when participants expected to interact with it and considered
Flobi to be unpredictable. This matches the arguments made by Levillain and Zibetti that
for a movement to be consider a behavior and have the necessary effect of encouraging the
attribution of agency and mental agency, the entity exhibiting the movement must appear
to be executing it by its own volition.
Kang and Watt (2013), as well as von der Pütten, Astrid, Krämer, Gratch, and Kang
(2010) have further shown the importance of the exhibited behavior being realistic for the
agent to be anthropomorphized. They define realism of behavior as exhibiting behaviors
associated with humans (von der Pütten, Krämera, Gratch, & Kang, 2010, p. 1643) or
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behaviors that exhibits kinetic conformity to what is expected in the context while
remaining socially appropriate (Kang & Watt, 2013, p. 1170). In their study, von der Pütten
and colleagues introduced participants to the equipment to be used, and instructed them
about the interaction partner and the task at hand. The participants sat in front of a screen
that displayed the agent which them proceeded to ask them questions after which the
participants filled out a questionnaire and were debriefed. The construct of behavioral
realism would be operationalized by the use of breathing, eye blinking, and posture shifts
for the low behavioral realism, and by breathing, eye blinking, posture shifts, and two kinds
of head nods to communicate that the agent is paying attention to the participant (refered
to as backchanneling cues).
On the other hand, Kang and Watt asked participants to imagine that they were in
an hypothetical interaction where they would be students interested in knowing if the
interaction partner was a good match to share an apartment and build a potential friendship
with. Participants’ used a laptop with a mock-up mobile phone with avatars displayed on
it and used a hands-free head-set to engage in communication with the potential partner.
The avatar would be represented by a video or animation in the high behavioral realism
treatment, or alternatively a photo or drawing for the low behavioral realism.
Results from von der Pütten and colleagues showed significant positive effects of
behavioral realism on the social perception of the agent as shown by increases in the use
of words by participants in the high behavioral realism treatment, as well as by significantly
higher reported feelings of social presence and person perception. Results from Kang &
Watt were mixed. While the increased behavioral realism lead to higher feelings of Social
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Richness of the Medium (a component of social presence representing the appropriateness
of the medium for social interaction), no significant effects were found for psychological
co-presence (the feeling of being present with another). Taking into account the results
mentioned before on the lack of effect for humanlike appearance when using static images
in a chatbot (Sah & Peng, 2015) (Go & Sundar, 2019) (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre,
2012), it seems reasonable to assume that the lack of significance for social copresence
regardless of the level of behavioral realism may be a result of the participant not
perceiving the avatar as being a component of the entity they are interacting with. This is
especially notable in this experiment as participants communicated with the entity through
a hands-free device rather than from the computer chat box in front of them putting further
psychological distance between the image and the participant’s conceptualization of the
entity.
Additionally, other perceived qualities of the movement appear to be significant.
Chaminade, Hodgins and Kawato (Chaminade, Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007) show that
typical individuals are capable of detecting minute differences in how movements take
place to recognize which are likely to be originating from a biological rather than an
artificial source. After exposing participants to a moving agent whose movements were
designed by either an animator or through motion capture, the authors found that those
exposed to the motioned captured movement would be significantly more likely to report
the movement being biological in nature and would show increased activity in the
mentalizing network of the brain suggesting that the participants were anthropomorphizing
the artificial agent. Therefore, it seems that participants can easily detect minor social cues
that signal the nature of the agent.
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4.4.2.2 Artificial Agent’s Exhibited Social Cues
One of the key arguments in Nass and colleagues original conceptualization of the
perception of computers as social actors is that minimal social cues were sufficient to
encourage individuals to perceive technology as a social agent (Nass C. , Steuer, Tauber,
& Reeder, 1993) (Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995) (Fogg & Nass, 1997).
However, the nature of the phenomenon has proven to be considerably more complex than
initially thought with multiple researchers exploring the existence and nature of individual
differences in the social perception of technology emerging from a multitude of factors
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) (Urquiza-Haas &
Kotrschal, 2015) (Airenti, 2018). Therefore, researchers have chosen to explore whether
the types of social cues exhibited by an agent can have a significant effect over the social
perception of said agent.
From a purely theoretical point of view, some researchers have argued that social
cues can enhance the likelihood of an entity being anthropomorphized but are neither
necessary nor sufficient for mental and affective states to be ascribe to the entity
(Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Gabriella, 2015) (Airenti, 2018). In particular,
Airenti (Airenti, 2018) argues that since individuals can anthropomorphize entities on a
multitude of different scenarios while objectifying the same entities in others, the social
cues the entities exhibit can only serve to enhance the likelihood of engaging with them
but are neither necessary nor sufficient for attribution of mental and affective states to take
place. In this way, Airenti (Airenti, 2018, p. 8) proposes that anthropomorphism represents
a means to engage with an entity, biological or not, which is rooted in an individual’s
attempt to establish a relation with the entity by dealing with it as if it were an interlocutor.
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Xu and Lombard (2016) chose a different approach to explain the role of these
social cues on the social perception of technology. Seeing that the extant literature
displayed a variety of different media types being used in CASA research with each relying
on different types of social cues to encourage the anthropomorphic process, Xu and
Lombard saw it appropriate to expand the CASA paradigm beyond traditional computers
to also explain how other technologies, including tablets and smartphones, can use social
cues to promote its social perception. The authors choose to rename this expanded
conceptualization as the Media are Social Actors (MASA) paradigm and emphasized that
to better understand the intricacies of this attribution of different technologies, we must
improve our understanding of how the different social cues it display can encourage the
anthropomorphization process of a given technology. Specifically, the authors argue for
the importance of considering the role of both primary and secondary social cues separately
to better explain and predict how users will respond to new technological developments.
Xu and Lombard defined primary social cues as those that are sufficient but not
necessary to evoke social responses to media because of human’s bias towards other
humanlike or animal-like characteristics. They argued that this included factors such as an
entities shape and face as individuals will be sensitive to technology with human-like
appearance, as well as key characteristics typical of human interaction like the technology’s
eye gaze, its perceived voice, and the non-verbal gestures it exhibits (such as the
positioning of body parts), and the level of responsiveness or interactivity the technology
displays.
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On the other hand, they propose secondary social cues as encompassing those
social cues that are neither sufficient nor necessary to evoke social responses. These are
argued to play a smaller role in human’s perception of others as social agents and thus are
less likely to bring forth humanlike or animal like mental models. Xu and Lombard propose
these to include factors such as the size of the entity, the language it uses, the way it
communicates through text if relevant, the sounds it emits, the movements it displays, as
well as other human-related characteristics such as abstract concepts like companionship,
personality, identity, among others.
Whether the social cues evoked by technology’s appearance and behavior can be
sufficient to cause the anthropomorphization of technology remains under debate. Our
observation of the role of the human likeness of the appearance and physical presence of a
technology seem to suggest that neither is necessary or sufficient to ensure
anthropomorphism though their effect remain significant and positive (Lee E.-J. , 2010)
(Khan P. J., et al., 2012) (Broadbent, et al., 2013). While these studies seem to weaken Xu
and Lombard’s argument (Xu & Lombard, 2016, p. 10) that the appearance and shape of
the technology constitutes primary cues that are sufficient for the social perception of
technology, the results could be explained by different primary cues having separate effects
on the perception of technology. For example, Abubshait and Wiese (Abubshait & Wiese,
2017) have shown that the appearance and behavior of a technology can operate in isolation
causing distinct effects over the interaction with the appearance having stronger effects
over the attitudes towards the technology and the apparent behavior of the technology
having stronger effects over the perceived performance. We explore the role of major types
of cues in the following pages.
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Figure 8 Primary and secondary social cues leading to anthropomorphic attributions based
on Xu and Lombard (2017).

4.4.3

The Role of Agents’ Responsiveness & Interactivity
One of the earliest primary social cues to be explored under the CASA paradigm

was that of the technology’s level of interactivity (Burgoon, et al., 2000). Burgoon and
colleagues conducted a series of studies as part of a program of research into humancomputer interaction that included exploring how different components of interactivity
affect the anthropomorphic perception of technology and, through it, altered its perceived
credibility, understanding, and influence (Burgoon, et al., 2000, p. 554).
Table 11 Representative Work for the Role of Responsiveness & Interactivity
Representative
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Dependent Variable

Significance
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Social

2019)
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Homophily;
Perceived
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Perceived Dialogue;

In exploring the role of interactivity, Burgoon and colleagues (Burgoon, et al.,
2000) asked participants to play a desert survival game with either a male confederate or a
computer. The experiment varied between five modes of interaction (text-only, text and
voice, text, voice and picture, finally a text, voice and lip-synced animation, and finally a
voice and lip-synched animation condition) which allowed the experimenters to measure
both the effect of the mode of interaction and the richness of the interaction as measured
by the quantity of modes of interaction. The experiment also offered a minimally
contingent condition where the partner’s answers did not reflect consideration for the
participant’s answers and a highly contingent face to face interaction characterized for the
responses being contingent or dependent on the past interactions with the participant.
Results varied by the component of interaction.
First, interaction richness represented by the quantity of modalities present in a
condition had no significant effects on the influence of the agent over the participant or on
the understanding of the information presented. Interaction richness achieved mixed
results with significant positive effects only in a sub-component of credibility by
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showing significant positive effects on the perception of the partner as being more
dominant when using speech and text compared to text only interaction.
Secondly, variations in modality of the interaction showed no significant
differences between interactions with text to interactions without text. Other comparisons
of modality were not presented during this study and thus it provides no further insights
into the importance of modality type on the social perception of technology.
Finally, the contingency of the interaction showed no significant effects over the
influence of the partner agent and a technical error cause loss of information on the
effects on the understanding of the information provided. Nevertheless, the results showed
some significant effects of higher contingency over the credibility of the partner
though it was limited to the subcomponent of perceived expertise rather than on factors
related to its competence, dominance, trust, task-partner attraction or sociability (Burgoon,
et al., 2000, p. 555) (Burgoon, et al., 2000, p. 566).
While anthropomorphism was not measured directly as part of the experiment it
was explicitly assumed to be the root cause behind the expected effects of the level of
interactivity on credibility, understanding and the influence of the agent. Therefore, the
results provide some indirect support to the argument that interactions that are contingent
on past engagements, meaning that evolve in response to past interactions, as well as those
that are rich are likely to increase the chances of anthropomorphizing the technology while
the mode of interaction appears to have no effects over it.
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Research into the effects of interactivity continued in later years when Kim and
Sundar (2012) conducted an experiment where participants were asked to browse a
sunscreen company’s website and give their reaction to new products. The website either
showed a humanlike character or showed no character at all, and would vary between low
interactivity and high interactivity as operationalized through higher number of
modality tools on the screen such as the presentation order of information akin to what
Burgoon and colleagues referred to as Interactivity Richness. The results of the study
favor the positive effects of higher interactivity on the social perception of technology with
the higher levels

of

interactivity

leading

to

significantly

higher

mindless

anthropomorphic attributions as shown by ratings of the appropriateness of humanlike
adjectives to describe the website (i.e. attractive, exciting, pleasant, etc.). No significant
differences in mindful anthropomorphism were discovered as operationalized by
participants responses to being asked whether the website was human-like or machine-like,
life-like or artificial, among other anthropomorphic ranges. These results match the
hypothesized positive effects of level of interactivity on the anthropomorphic perception
of technology. The lack of differences on mindful anthropomorphism were expected by the
authors based on the argument that participants would consciously refuse their
anthropomorphic perception when explicitly confronted with them. Additionally,
participants also reported significantly higher levels of social presence under the higher
interactivity condition when the human like character was not present though it turned not
significant when the character was present thus providing some additional albeit partial
support to the initial argument.
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Later on, Sreejesh and Anusree conducted a study to explore how cognition demand
and the mode of interactivity would interact with brand anthropomorphism to affect a
user’s perception of the brand (Sreejesh & Anusree, 2017). The authors conducted an
experiment in which they asked participants to play a video game. Conditions were created
for varying the level of apparent anthropomorphism (appearance), cognition demand and
mode of interactivity. The mode of interaction varied between game interactivity where
the participant could alter aspects of the game itself (such as background settings, skipping
stages, and choosing a language), and brand interactivity where participants could
interact with various aspects of the brand displayed (such as choosing it design and
choosing brand elements like its logo and preferred color). The results showed a clear
interaction between the anthropomorphic appearance of the brand, the cognitive load of the
participant, and the mode of interaction that led to higher brand recall, attention, and
recognition which the authors recognized as mindless social responses. While these results
showed no direct evidence, it does suggest that the mode of interaction plays a role in
anthropomorphism though it may be as a moderator for other factors.
Finally, Go and Sundar expanded on past results and explored how the level of
interactivity of a chatbot influenced the perceived social presence evoke by the agent
leading to multiple social effects (Go & Sundar, 2019). Go and Sundar asked participants
to choose the best digital camera to purchase as a birthday gift for a friend based on predefined preferences by navigating on a pseudo-website and interacting with a chatbot. The
level of interactivity was operationalized as variations in the contingency of the
interaction with a low contingency scenario where the chat-bot would not acknowledge
the participant’s responses and a high contingency scenario where the chat-bot responses
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reflected consideration to the comments by the participants such as acknowledging what
the participant asked for by rephrasing it back to the participant (Go & Sundar, 2019, p.
308). The results showed a significant positive effect of increased contingency on the
participant’s perception of social presence evoked by the agent when it displayed increased
contingent behavior providing additional direct support to the argument made by Burgoon
and colleagues (Burgoon, et al., 2000) that the interaction contingency was a significant
factor in anthropomorphizing the technology.
These results suggest that while variations in the level of interactivity are effective
in inducing social actor effects, not all interactivity appears to be created equal. Variations
in the mode of interactivity had mixed effects with the results by Burgoon and colleagues
(Burgoon, et al., 2000) contradicting the results shown by Sreejesh and Anusree (2017),
while interaction richness and contingency consistently showed positive significant effects
over the perception of technology as a social actor (Burgoon, et al., 2000) (Kim & Sundar,
2012) (Go & Sundar, 2019).
4.4.4

Discourse, Gestures, and non-verbal Communication
Apart from the mode, richness, and contingency of an interaction maintained by a

technology other factors related to how it communicates have also been examined as
potential enablers of anthropomorphism. These factors have been shown to significantly
change the user’s perception of the technology through variations in the content of the
discourse (Nass & Sundar, 1994), the style in which it is presented (Salem, Ziadee, & Sakr,
2014), and the perception of the non-verbal cues that accompany each interaction
(Abubshait & Wiese, 2017) (Wang, Lignos, Vatsal, & Scassellati, 2006).
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Table 12 – Studies on the role of non-verbal communication on Anthropomorphism.
Representative

Antecedent

Dependent Variable

Significance

Praise;

Perception of Agent
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(Nass, Moon,

Type of
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(Lee E.-J. ,

Flattering

Evaluation of Computer; Social

2010)

Feedback;
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Significant
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(Fasola &

Relational

Perceived Value of Interaction;

Mataric, 2012)

Status;

Enjoyableness of Interaction;

(Salem, Ziadee,

Politeness

Anthropomorphism2

& Sakr, 2014)

Level

Significant1

Exploratory
Study1P
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(Araujo, 2018)

Anthropomorp

Mindful Anthropomorphism;

Mindful &

hic Cues

Mindless Anthropomorphism;

Mindless:

(Language

Social Presence;

SignificantP;

Style, Name)

Social
Presence: No
Support

1 Implied relationship; 2 Anthropomorphism measured as inverse of
Dehumanization based on Eyssel, & Kuchenbrandt (2011).
4.4.4.1 A Technology’s Discourse & Anthropomorphic Perceptions
The importance of an artificial agent’s discourse to whether it is perceive as a social
agent or not has been the focus of research since the early studies by Nass and colleagues
that built up to become the Computer Are Social Actors paradigm (CASA) (Nass &
Sundar, 1994). In these studies Nass and colleagues showed through multiple experiments
that computers that engage in discourse with their users can encourage the users to perceive
them as agents with human like qualities which in turn lead the users to engage with them
in interactions reminiscent of human to human interactions despite their better knowledge
that the computer was not alive (Nass & Sundar, 1994) (Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, &
Dryer, 1995). Such effects have included the perception of personalities on the agent (Nass,
Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995) (Kiesler & Goetz, 2002), the elicitation of users’
biases (Nass & Sundar, 1994, p. 76) and changing attitudes and mental models towards the
technology

(Fogg

&

Nass,

1997)

which

while

not

specifically

measuring

anthropomorphism, imply significant positive effects of the technology’s discourse on the
social perception of the technology.
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Other studies on the role of discourse point towards the same conclusion. Fasola
and Mataric (Fasola & Mataric, 2012) conducted two exploratory studies in which they
asked participants to interact with a robot exercise coach in one phase where the robot
showed no relational discourse, and one phase with the robot using praise and relational
discourse to promote increased exercise. The use of praise and relational discourse
increased how much exercise they conducted and led to higher preferences for the robot
both suggesting significant social effects of the style of discourse. Additionally, Araujo
(2018) asked participants to interact with a chatbot as if they were in Facebook messenger
and varied the language style between informal language (i.e. using cues like Hello and
Good Bye) and formal robot-like language (i.e. using language based cues such as the
phrases “start” and “quit”). Araujo used different measures for conscious and nonconscious perceptions of anthropomorphism and his data showed that the language style of
the artificial agent let to significantly higher levels of both. Finally, both Lee (Lee E.-J. ,
2010), and Salem and colleagues (Salem, Ziadee, & Sakr, 2014) achieved similar results
by either varying level of flattery or politeness of a robot respectively. While these studies
show a consistent story on the effects of discourse, the study by Lee shows significant
interaction effects between the personality type and the flattery exhibited by a robot
resulting in participants becoming suspicious of the flattery and low rational individuals
(as opposed to highly rational individuals) doubting their choices which suggests social
conformity effects and therefore that the while significant, the effects of discourse can be
both positive or negative depending on the context at hand.
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4.4.4.2 Gestures, Body Language, & Anthropomorphism
The gestures and body language exhibited by an artificial agent show a different
story. An early study by Wang, Lignos, Vatsal, and Scassellati (2006) examined how the
perception of a robot would be affected by obvious and non-obvious differences in the
behavior of the robot during an interaction. The researchers expected that changes in the
non-verbal behavior of the robot as operationalized by whether and how it follows
participants with its head would result in significant differences in its social perception and
conducted an experiment to test this. Participants in the experiment interacted with a robot
called “Nico” and were exposed to one of four conditions: 1) a robot that looked straight
ahead and showed no movement in its head, 2) a robot that smoothly followed any human
that pass in front of it with its face, 3) a robot that would track humans with its head by
would show small oscillatory movements of the head as it tracks the person, or 4) a robot
that would look away from humans. In a series of questionnaires filled in directly after the
interaction, participants who interacted with the robot were significantly more likely to
report it as being anthropomorphic than a control group who did not interact with it but
also filled in the questionnaires.
The results of the study showed low scores on measures of positive affect,
contingency, and enjoyableness on the no tracking condition, while the smooth tracking
condition showed significantly higher scores. Nevertheless, the unsmooth tracking
condition as well as the avoidance condition showed significantly higher scores than the
other conditions in all measures of positive affect, contingency and enjoyableness and
participants reported it as being more intentional. Researchers argued that the variation of
the avoidance condition was likely the result of participants perceiving the avoidance
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behavior as the artificial agent playing a game with them. Regardless, the non-verbal
behavior of tracking or avoiding the participant let to significantly higher social effects
than the straight looking robot implying a higher level of social perception and
anthropomorphism.
Figure 9 Literature on the role of body language on Anthropomorphism.
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This is supported by studies by Mara and Appel (2015), and Xu (2018). Mara and

Appel expanded on the role of non-verbal behavior by exploring the role that head posture
(i.e. tilting the head sideward rather than upright position) plays on the perceived
experience of human-robot-interaction. The authors conducted two experiments with
similar procedures but different degrees of tilt of a robot’s head, as well as different
dependent variables. In both experiments, each participant rated an image of a robot. Mara
and Appel chose three different robots of varying appearances that represented the
prevalent types of robots at the time, and edited the pictures to change the degree of tilt of
their heads (i.e. varying by 10 degrees each picture starting with 20 degrees tilt to the left
and ending with 20 degrees tilt to the right on the first experiment, and limiting to only 20
degrees to the left, upright, and 20 degrees to the right on the second experiment).
Participants were exposed to a single image and rated their perception of the robot
in terms of Human likeness, eeriness, spine-tingling effect, attractiveness and
dominance in the first experiment, and interpersonal warmth and perceived cuteness of the
robot in the second experiment. Results showed that participants rated tilt heads
significantly more human-like than an upright head posture. The other variables
showed mixed results with cuteness also being significantly affected by head tilts in a
positive way, but no effect being found for other variables that would suggest the social
perception of the technology like dominance and interpersonal warmth (personality), and
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attractiveness of the robot (social effect). Similar to the results discussed in the section on
humanlike appearance, these trends could be the result of using static images which offer
lower perceived social presence. Furthermore, this suggests that showing a tilt in a picture
may be less effective in encouraging the social perception of technology than interacting
with an actual moving robot that suggests intentionality by reacting to the user as was the
case for Wang and colleagues (Wang, Lignos, Vatsal, & Scassellati, 2006).

On the other hand, Xu (Xu, 2018) explored how the gestural movements that
robot’s exhibits affect users’ perception of the robot. The author compared the effects of a
robots’ gestural movements as well as its voice by conducting an experiment in which a
robot would introduce itself to participants and explain both its basic functionalities and its
past experiences with other humans. The experiment possessed four condition with two
levels of voice and two levels of gestural movement for a 2 by 2 factorial design. After
being exposed to one of the conditions, participants would fill a questionnaire with
demographic information, perceived social presence, perceived social attraction, and
intention to use in the future. The results showed that the robot displaying highly gestural
movements was rated significantly higher in likeability than the robot with non-gestural
movements and participants reported to be significantly more motivated to have future
interactions with the robot suggesting some social effects due to the gestural movements,
though the level of social presence was not significantly different for the highly gestural
robot than for the non-gestural robot.
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4.4.4.3 Voice, Tone, and Pitch: Verbal Paralinguistic Cues & Anthropomorphism
As technologies have progressed, multiple researchers have wondered if the arrival
of new more humanlike modes of interactions such as voice controls and verbal responses
have the potential of redefining how we perceive technology (Nass & Brave, 2005). Initial
studies by Nass and colleagues look at this question from the point of view of flattery in
textual responses in computer screens (Fogg & Nass, 1997), as well as from minimal verbal
cues in their exhibited voices (Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997) (Nass & Brave, 2005).
However, the effects of the presence of a voice in an interaction have not been consistent
and multiple researchers have gone so far as to argue that the mere presence of a voice is
not enough for anthropomorphism to take place (Schroeder & Epley, 2016) and we must
rather pay attention to other paralinguistic cues associated with the voice to make better
predictions of how users will respond to it (Hoenen, Lübke, & Pause, 2016) (KoryWestlund, et al., 2017).
Figure 10 Role of Verbal paralinguistic cues on anthropomorphism.
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Lee conducted one of the early studies in the role of the humanness of a
technology’s exhibited voice on an user and social responses to it including exploring
whether it could lead to social conformity effects (Lee E.-J. , 2010). In his experiment, he
asked participants to play an interactive trivia game with a computer where after the
participant gave an answer the computer would provide a supposedly random answer to
the question presented and the participant had to guess whether the computer was providing
the correct response or not and submit the answer to the question accordingly. The results
showed an interaction effect where participants that were categorized as a low rational
would be significantly more willing to switch their answers in response to the computer’s
feedback being made with a humanlike voice when compared to the synthetic voice
suggesting social conformity effects taking place in the experiment for this group.
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Nevertheless, participants considered as high rational or experiential would not show these
effects. Lee explained this effect by arguing that high experiential individuals were less
likely to switch their answers because presumable they trusted their initial gut feeling and
thus were less willing to give up their initial picks. Despite no direct evaluation of
anthropomorphism or social presence, the presence of social conformity strongly
suggests that the reliance on human voices had significant positive effects over the
social perception of the agent.
Xu conducted a similar study exploring whether primary cues were more likely
than secondary cues in evoking users’ attachment for a robot (Xu, 2018). Xu compared the
effects of a robot’s gestural movement and human or synthetic voices on the social
perception of the agent, the user’s perceive attraction to the robot, and the intention to use
it in the future. Xu ran an experiment where participants were led to a table with a robot
called Alpha which would proceed to make a self-introduction providing information about
where it was made, its name and basic functions followed by introduction of what it could
do, and its experience communicating with humans. Four conditions were setup with 2x2
factorial design composed of two levels of voice (human voice vs synthetic voice) and two
levels of gestural movements (gestures vs non-gestural movements). Finally, participants
were asked to fill in a questionnaire with their demographic information and measures of
social presence, perceived social attraction, and the intention of future use. The results of
the study were not significant for main effects of voice on the social presence of the
robot suggesting no significant difference was present between the synthetic and human
voices. However, further analysis of the results suggested that the effect of the nature of
the voice on the participant was moderated by their prior experience with robots with
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those who had no prior experience with robots perceiving the robot with human voice as
possessing significantly higher social presence, while those with prior experience with
robots perceiving the robot with human voice as significantly less present than the synthetic
voice. The author argues that the prior experience interacting with robots likely led
participants to favor robots that showed consistency between its appearance and voice
resulting in the observed effects.
Finally, Schroeder and Epley conduct a series of experiments to explore how verbal
cues could affect the perception of mental experiences in a person affecting the likelihood
of mistaking a person for a machine, or a machine for a person (Schroeder & Epley, 2016).
To achieve this, they conducted a series of four experiments comparing the humanizing
effects of voice vs pure text compared to those of human visual cues. In all experiments, a
script was presented and participants were tasked with identifying whether it was created
by a human or a machine regardless of how it was presented (i.e. in text, read out loud by
a person, etc.). The authors hypothesized that the paralinguistic cues presented in the voice,
rather than the voice itself, would increase the likelihood that participants would regard the
script as being created by a human and each experiment represented a step towards testing
their hypothesis.
In the first experiment, the authors created two videotapes where they expressed
both positive and negative emotional experiences from their life. Participants were asked
to judge whether the creator of the speech and not its presenter was a human or a computer,
and were separated into conditions with the script being presented through voice or no
voice (i.e. audio vs text vs audiovisual vs subtitled video of human without sound while
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watching speaker conditions) and with varying valance (discussion of a positive vs
negative emotional experience). To control for the potential effect that any human like cue
may lead observers to judge the script as being man made, the authors also added a human
vs no human present condition in the form of a video of a human reciting the script based
on the argument that if the voice, rather than any human cue, was leading to the assessment
that the script was human made, significant effects would be seem under the voice
condition but not under the human presence condition. Neither the valence of the script nor
the presence of the human lead to significant effects on the judgement of the script creator.
Regarding the presentation of the script, as hypothesized, the text and the subtitle video
showed no significant differences while the audio of the human reciting the script led to
significantly higher judgements that the script creator was a human supporting the
argument that removing voice from a human-generated speech can lead humans to
perceive it as being made by a machine.
The second experiment followed a similar procedure to experiment one, but aims
to explore whether adding voice to a machine generated speech rather than taking voice
from a human generated speech could lead users to perceive judge the creator of the speech
to be human. To achieve this, the authors relied on a script created by the “Postmodernism
Generator” application which creates realistic looking random text with appropriate
grammar (Bulhak, 1996). This experiment had four types of stimuli including pure audio,
video with voice and human present, text, and video of human with subtitles. Similarly, to
the first experiment, adding voice to the script increased the tendency to
anthropomorphize the script making it more likely that participants would judge its
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creator to be a human. No significant differences were noted between the other
experimental conditions.
The third experiment aimed to controlled for potential confounding effects of
adding voice to a computer made script or removing voice from a human made speech. To
achieve this, a human generated both a spoken speech and a written stimulus ensuring both
conditions possess the same type of source. To avoid problems due to variations in
semantics from the speech and the written script, participants were also asked to evaluate
a transcription of the speech. This experiment took a more practical approach with the
voice condition showing a speaker representing a job candidate presenting an elevator pitch
to encourage a company to hire them and the written (text) condition being operationalized
as a letter to a prospective employer. Just like in the prior experiments, the participants
evaluated whether the creator of the speech was a human or a machine. The results match
the prior two experiments, with the participants exposed to the speech (voice) being
significantly more likely to attribute the script’s origin to a human.
Finally, the fourth experiment aimed to distinguish the specific factor within the
voice that led to the observed effects in the previous three studies. To achieve this,
Schroeder and Epley manipulated the paralinguistic cues conveyed by a voice including
characteristics such as its volume, pitch, and rate of speech in order to test whether these
cues mediated the effect of voice over the judgement of the creator of the script.
Participants were exposed to an actor reading a statement in a mindful voice (i.e. being
expressive and evoking emotions), an actor reading a statement in a mindless voice (i.e. a
monotone voice) or read the original essay themselves. The results showed that the reading
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the text and listening to the speech with a mindless (monotone) voice showed no significant
differences. At the same time, listening to the speech with the mindful voice led to
significantly higher tendencies to attribute the speech creation to a human rather than a
machine.
While Lee (Lee E.-J. , 2010) suggested that the use of voice by a technology was a
significant factor in its social perception and Xu (Xu, 2018) showed mixed results with a
robot’s voice only showing significant positive effects on social presence when moderated
by the users’ prior experience with robots, Schroeder and Epley take the analysis a step
further (Schroeder & Epley, 2016). Schroeder and Epley’s first three experiments show
clearly that the results implied by Lee are consistent and applicable towards other types of
agents, and they also make it evident that the paralinguistic cues expressed in the speech
rather than the presence of absence of a voice, were the cause of higher tendencies to
anthropomorphize artificial agents.
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CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENCES OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM
The consequences of the social perception of technology have been under research
since the early studies on the Computer Are Social Actors (CASA) paradigm conducted by
Nass and colleagues and its importance has only grown due to the advances in artificial
intelligence that enable technology to exhibit apparent autonomy and intentionality (Lee,
Kim, Lee, & Shin, 2015). While Nass and colleagues’ original conceptualization argued
that responses to technology exhibiting social characteristics would be equal to the
response humans have when interacting with other humans (Nass & Moon, 2000), the
extant literature suggest how people interact with these technologies is a much more
complex phenomenon than first believed (Severson & Woodard, Imagining Others' Minds:
The Positive Relation Between Children's Role Play and Anthropomorphism, 2018).
Studies have shown variations in the effects of these technologies when compared to how
humans interact with other humans including changes in the interaction taking place
depending on the source of anthropomorphic cues (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017), variations
in the size and direction of social effects depending on contextual factors (Burgoon, et al.,
2000) (Lee E.-J. , 2010) (Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2018), as well as unexpected consequences
that differ from how humans interact with other humans that surface when they are exposed
to varying levels of cognitive load or their expectations are mismanaged leading to
cognitive dissonance effects that changes the reaction to the technology (Urquiza-Haas &
Kotrschal, 2015).
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Nevertheless, the social effects first reported by Nass and colleagues remain
supported with multiple studies showing how the anthropomorphization of technology can
lead to the perception of personalities evoking from it (Kiesler & Goetz, 2002) (Mayer &
Panek, 2016), biases sprouting from simple social cues (Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999), and
slight changes in behavior being recorded from the participants regardless of their
understanding of the nature of the technology (Mou & Xu, 2017).
The consequences explored in the extant literature have taken multiple forms
representing the approaches that researchers from multiple fields have taken to explore the
phenomenon. In order to be comprehensive, we expanded the original set of identified
articles that explicitly relied on anthropomorphism in testing their hypotheses to also
include studies implied, and/or explicitly based their assumptions on anthropomorphism or
the social perception of technology. As a result, we have aggregated the results of the extant
literature, and developed multiple models showing how each area of an interaction is
affected by anthropomorphic attributions. These representations are presented below in
their corresponding subsections corresponding to the identified overarching themes which
include: 1) effects over the user (the self), 2) effects over the perception of other agents
(including the artificial agent itself and other human agents who may be using the
technology as a form of mediated communication), 3) effects over the users’ perception of
the interaction, and 4) effects over the actual and perceived performance of the user and
the technology. These themes represent different components of the interaction between a
human and an artificial agent that are affected by the anthropomorphic attribution as shown
below.
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Figure 11 Components of an Interaction affected by anthropomorphism.

5.1

EFFECTS OVER THE PERCEPTION OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND OTHERS
How individuals’ perception of a technology changes as they anthropomorphize it

has been a critical component of the social perception of technology for the past several
decades. Studies on this area tend to focus on either effects on the perception of the
technology itself as an artificial agent (Kiesler & Goetz, 2002) or the effects over the
perception of another entity that is either interacting through the technology (Kwak, Kim,
Kim, Shin, & Cho, 2013) or represented by the agent itself (Sreejesh & Anusree, 2017)
such as an individual or organization. These effects have typically been associated with
factors related to the adoption and usage of technology, its credibility and trustworthiness,
and its perceived similarity with the user also referred to as homophily (Rocca &
McCroskey, 1999).
5.1.1

Attitudes Toward Artificial Agents
Initial studies in the social perception of technology showed how minimal verbal

cues such as changes in the style of communication or the voice used by a computer can
alter the personality users of the technology perceive (Kiesler & Goetz, 2002) and these
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alterations can in turn change the users’ preference for the technology (Mayer & Panek,
2016). Multiple studies have expanded on these findings by testing the role that
anthropomorphism plays on individuals’ attitudes towards interaction with, using, or
adopting a technology.
5.1.1.1 Theory of Planned Behavior & Social Cognitive Theory
A key study on this topic is that of Maartje de Graaft, Ben Allouch, and Jan van
Dijk (2019) who developed a model of the acceptance of domestic social robots by relying
on an analysis of the extant literature on adoption of social robots through the lens of the
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) by developed by Icek Ajzen (Ajzen, 1985) (Ajzen, The
Theory of Planned Behavior, 1991). The TPB argues that individuals’ actions and behavior
are predominantly determined by their intention to conduct said actions and behaviors. This
intention is in turn determined by each individual’s positive and negative attitudes and
evaluations towards performing the behavior, their perception of others’ expectations and
acceptability surrounding performing the behavior, and their capacity to carry out the
behavior which is also referred to as the individual’s behavioral control (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993).
The theory of planned behavior has been one of the most influential psychological
theories in various fields used to explain numerous types of behavior owing to its high
explanatory power and parsimony (Manstead & Parker, 1995) (Taylor & Todd, 1995). In
their study, de Graaft and colleagues argued that the TPB could be used effectively to
explain the results found on the extant literature on adoption of social robots, however,
they recognized that the theory’s focus on cognitive processes was at the detriment of
affective processes which were typically studied in the field of human-robot interaction
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such as enjoyment, attractiveness and anthropomorphism (Bagozzi, Lee, & Van Loo,
2001). Because of this, the authors expanded the attitudes construct of the TPB to include
both Utilitarian and Hedonic (i.e. in relation to influencing a person’s pleasures and pains)
attitudes with anthropomorphism being considered an important hedonic attitude. The
model was further expanded through the use of the Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) by
Albert Bandura (Bandura, 1986) (Bandura, 1999) (LaRose & Easting, 2004) to support the
expected effects of control beliefs in the form of an individual’s self-efficacy on the
utilitarian and hedonic attitudes as well as on the intention to use the robot.
The authors tested their model through an online survey with two parts. The first
part collected demographic and trait measures related to the individual’s control beliefs
(i.e. measures of personal innovativeness and anxiety towards interacting with robots),
while the second part collected qualitative data on how individuals conceptualized robots,
presented a definition by the authors on what social robots and domestic robots were, and
presented participants with statements on the factors included in the model based on a 7point Likert and a semantic differential scale. While the authors did not specify how they
operationalized the construct of anthropomorphism within the hedonic attitudes construct,
they included measures of both animacy and social presence which has been used by other
researchers for as a proxy for anthropomorphism (Airenti, 2018) (Nowak & Biocca, 2003).
The survey revealed mixed results of hedonic attitudes influence over participants’
Intention to use the robot as well as over the utilitarian attitudes held towards it (i.e.
perceived ease of use, usefulness, and adaptability). These results included:
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-

Significant effects of the expected enjoyment resulting from having the
social robot at home as well as expected low sociability of the robot on the
participants intention to use it.

-

Significant effects of the expectations of enjoyment of having the social robot
at home, and the expectation of the robot as being more sociable but offer
low companionship on an increase in the perceived adaptability of the robot to
the participants’ needs (utilitarian attitude).

While these results implicitly support the argument that the social perception of the
technology can affect both the perceived utilitarian value of the robot (i.e. ease of use,
usefulness and adaptability) and the intention to use it as suggested by other authors (Go
& Sundar, 2019) (Lee, Lee, & Sah, 2019), the factors of animacy and social presence
achieved no significance. This is despite these factors being more closely related to the
social perception of technology through anthropomorphism. Three possible explanations
for the apparent contradiction could be gathered from these results.
The first potential explanation would be that anthropomorphism has indirect
rather than direct effects over attitudes towards technology and intention use it. In such
an scenario, the effects of anthropomorphism would be limited to the extent that it influence
other important predictors of the key dependent variables just mentioned such as a person’s
perceived social norms, and control beliefs as suggested by the significant effects found by
de Graaf and colleagues (2019) (i.e. effects over enjoyment, expectations of sociability,
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and companionship). Nevertheless, such a conclusion would contradict the results of other
students

which

empirically

show

the

significant

direct

positive

effects

of

anthropomorphism over the users’ attitudes toward the technology (Araujo, 2018), its
adoption (Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 2012), and the intention to use it (Chandler & Schwarz,
2010) (Sundar, Jung, Waddell, & Kim, 2017).
Secondly, the conceptualization of anthropomorphism as an attitude mirrors the
research on individual differences (see section 4.2 for more information on this) rather than
anthropomorphism itself. Considering anthropomorphism as an attitude is equivalent to
considering an individual psychological factor which contradicts the conceptualization
used more recently on the extant literature of anthropomorphism as an attribution or
perception of an external entity (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) (Airenti, 2018).
Moreover, while the measurements used for animacy and presence have been used
effectively to measure anthropomorphism in other studies (Bartneck, Kulic, & Croft, 2009)
(Biocca, Harms, & Burgoon, 2003), these studies did conceptualize anthropomorphism as
an attribution and operationalized the measurement accordingly. Therefore, there is an
incongruency

between

the

operationalization

and

the

conceptualization

of

anthropomorphism in the study which could be impacting the overall results.
Thirdly, the methodology of the study may be affecting the results in a couple of
different ways. First, asking the participants directly about their thoughts on social robots
calls forth a conscious top-down perception of expected social interactions (Urquiza-Haas
& Kotrschal, 2015). If anthropomorphism has been achieved through a non-conscious
perception, Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal suggest it can lead participants to a cognitive
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dissonance state in which they overcompensate their initial impulses increasing the
likelihood

they

will

respond

with

low

anthropomorphism

scores

despite

anthropomorphism actually taking place. Secondly, while de Graaf and colleagues
presented participants with a definition of what social robots were, their survey lacked an
agent that could be anthropomorphized. This leads participant’s to depend entirely on their
own mental model of social robots as a reference likely resulting in low scores of perceived
social presence, animacy and anthropomorphism since there is no physical or virtual agent
to anthropomorphize that could lead to a perception of “being there with another” (Nowak
& Biocca, 2003) (Bartneck, Kulic, & Croft, 2009).
Other studies using similar methodologies have achieved significant results by
relying on priming and framing effects from an introductory message prior to participant’s
starting the survey. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that the lack of such an introductory
message or an agent to anthropomorphize could be the reason for the lack of significance
in de Graaf’s study.
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Table 13 Consequences of Anthropomorphism on Perceptions of Technology.
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No Significance

Bonnin, 2016)

likeness

Perceived Usefulness; Perceived

on Acceptance;

Ease of Use; Use Intention;
(Araujo, 2018)

Social

Attitudes Toward Company;

Attitudes toward

Presence;

Customer Satisfaction; Emotional

company -> not

Mindful

Connection with Company;

supported;

Anthropomorp

customer

hism;

satisfaction -> not

Mindless

supported;

Anthropomorp

Emotional

hism;

connection ->
significant;

(Go & Sundar,

Social

Attitudes; Behavioral Intention to

Attitudes ->

2019)

Presence;

Return to Website;

Significant;

Perceived

Behavioral

Homophily
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(proxy);

Intention ->

Perceive

Significant;

Contingency
(proxy);
Perceived
Dialogue
(proxy);
(Abubshait &

Human-like

Attitudes (Judgement of Mind);

Implied: Both

Wiese, 2017)

Appearance;

Social Cognitive Performance;

Appearance and

Behavior;

Behavior had
positive effects on
attitudes and
performance,
though the effects
varied in strength
by the source;
While no
distinction, it does
provide support to
a lower extent;

(Salem, Ziadee,

Politeness

Perception of Robot; HRI

& Sakr, 2014)

Strategy

Experience; Politeness;
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(verbal

Competency; Extroversion;

Behavior);

Warmth; Psychological Closeness;
Assessment of Task Performance;
Perception of Task Effectiveness;

(Eyssel &

Perceived

Contact Intentions; Design

Contact Intentions

Kuchenbrandt,

Homophily;

Preference;

-> Significant;

2012)

Mind

Design Preference

Attribution;

-> Significant;

(Kim &

Social

Information Credibility

SignificantP1(Imp

Sundar, 2012)

Presence;

Judgement;

lied from

Mindful

Mindless

Anthropomorp

Anthropomorphis

hism;

m through

Mindless

Interactivity);

Anthropomorp
hism;
(Wu &

Valence;

Preferred Interaction Partner;

Kraemer, 2017)
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Significant;

(Bracken,

Direction of

Perceived Ability to Complete

Perceived ability

Jeffres, &

Feedback

Tasks; Intrinsic Motivation;

to complete tasks

Neuendorf,

(Criticism vs

Recall; Perceived Intelligence;

-> Not supported;

2004)

Praise as

Perceived Niceness;

intrinsic

Proxy);

motivation -> not
supported; recall > not supported;
perceived
intelligence -> not
supported;
perceived
niceness ->
Significant;

(Nowak &

Androgyny of

Credibility of Avatar; Credibility

Human-likeness

Rauh, 2008)

Avatar;

of Participant; Androgyny

of Appearance on

Humanlike

Perception of Participant;

Credibility ->

Appearance of

Significant;

Avatar;
(Gong, 2008)

Human-

Social Judgement of Technology;

Social Judgement

likeness of

Homophily; Social Influence;

-> Significant;

Appearance;

Competence; Trustworthiness;

Homophily ->
Significant; Social
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Influence ->
Significant;
Competence
-> Mixed
(significant for
most levels of
Human likeness
except medium to
high level);
Trustworthiness > Significant;
(Miwa & Terai,

Partner’s

Participant’s Strategy Selection;

2012)

Perceived

Impressions About Partner;

Partial Support;

Behavior;
Participant’s
Strategy
Selection;
(Kang & Watt,

Anthropomorp

Interactant Satisfaction with

Anthropomorphis

2013)

hism of

Computer;

m of Avatar ->

Avatar;

Significant;

Presence of

Presence of

Avatar;
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Avatar -> Partial
Support;

(Kiesler &

Robot

Richness of Mental Model of

Goetz, Mental

Exhibited

Robot;

Models and

Personality

Cooperation

(Caring vs

with Robotic

Serious);

Significant;

Assistants,
2002)
(de Graaf,

Represented

Utilitarian Attitudes; Use Intention

Allouch, &

as Hedonic

Dijk, 2019)

Attitudes

(Chandler &

Priming about

Intention to Replace Technology;

Schwarz, 2010)

nature of car;

Importance of Quality in

Mixed Results;

Significant;

Replacement Decision Decreased;
(Sundar, Jung,

(Implied)

Robot Use Intention;

Waddell, &

social role;

controlling for

Kim, 2017)

robot

Task Type and

personality;

Significant when

Personality;
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(Xu, 2018)

Robot gestural

Likeability; Motivation for Future

Likeability ->

movement;

Interaction;

significant; use
intention ->
Significant;

(Pak, Fink,

Human like

Expressed Trust; Exhibited Trust

Expressed Trust -

Price, Bass, &

Appearance;

Behavior; Decision Accuracy;

> Partial

Task Time; Confidence in

(significant only

Answer;

for young age

Sturre, 2012)

group);
Behavioral Trust > Significant;

While the work of de Graaf and colleagues represent the most comprehensive and
ambitious model of social robot adoption that we are aware of, its limitations in terms of
the conceptualization and measurement of anthropomorphism discussed above merit a
deeper exploration of its hypothesized relationships as found in the extant literature.
5.1.1.2 Expanding on Attitudes, Perceptions, Adoption & Usage of Technology

Studies focused on anthropomorphism and the changing perceptions and attitudes
towards artificial agents have consistently shown that human-like qualities expressed by
technology can lead to elaborate positive mental models of artificial agents (Kiesler &
Goetz, 2002) as well as to significant improvements over the user’s impressions and
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evaluations of the artificial agent as a partner (Bracken, Jeffres, & Neuendorf, 2004) (Miwa
& Terai, 2012). Research into the effects of anthropomorphism on the perception of
technology continued with other studies showing how users could perceive the technology
as possessing a personality and, through it affect the users’ preferences towards the robot
(Mayer & Panek, 2016) (Wu & Kraemer, 2017).
Seeing the lack of consistency in cues used to promote anthropomorphism in prior
literature, Abubshait and Wiese decided to explore whether the nature of the cue used could
lead to independent effects on a person’s attitudes toward a robot and on their performance,
and whether an interaction effect was present (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017). To explore this
question, the authors conducted a two by two ANOVA with appearance functioning as a
within factor, the exhibited behavior of the robot being a between subjects factor, and
taking a measurement of the attitudes towards the robot before the interaction and after the
interaction with the difference being used as the dependent variable of attitudes towards
the technology. The study also explored the behavioral social response to the technology
in the form of the socio-cognitive performance operationalized by whether the participant
followed the gaze of the artificial agent. Results showed that while both the appearance
and exhibited behavior of the agent let to statistically significant changes in both sociocognitive performance and attitudes towards the robot, the effects were apparently
independent of each other with the effect size on each dependent variable differing with
appearance mostly affecting attitudes and exhibited behavior affecting socio-cognitive
performance.
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Similar results were achieved by Michael Hart (2013) on his dissertation on
anthropomorphic appeals where he explored their effectiveness and the role that contextual
and individual factors played on its effects over users’ attitudes. Hart conducted an online
panel and through a series of three experiments tested the effects of anthropomorphic
appeals.
In the first experiment, participants were asked to fill a series of measures on
loneliness and were presented with a series of three text-based print advertisements
including two filler ads and one treatment condition. Afterwards, subjects were distracted
for several minutes with an unrelated task and once completed were presented with the
brand name of the treatment advertisement and asked to recall the related advertisements
and complete measurements on its effectiveness. The results showed no significant
influence of anthropomorphism on the attitude towards the brand or ad, but instead it
significantly influenced the recall of related advertisements and increased the participants’
purchase intention.
The second experiment expands on the first by exploring how users’ respond to
multiple anthropomorphic appeals rather than just one. This experiment followed the same
procedure as the first with the exception that three different treatment advertisements were
presented rather than just one. Similar results were found as in the first experiment with
anthropomorphism appeals showing no significant main effects over neither the attitudes
towards the brand or the attitude towards the advertisement. No-significant direct effects
were found for anthropomorphic appeals on intention to purchase the product, but the
effects dissipated when evaluating the attitudes effects as a mediator in the relationship and
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controlling for the focus predictor of anthropomorphic appeals. When controlling for the
product knowledge, showed significant negative effects of anthropomorphic appeals on the
attitudes toward the product when knowledge about the product was high. No other
significant effects were found for anthropomorphic appeals.
The third experiment explored whether higher salience of the entity to be
anthropomorphized may be necessary to achieve the significant attitudinal changes
reported elsewhere in the literature on anthropomorphism. The study followed the same
procedure as the second experiment participants were only exposed to one ad. Hart
attempted to increase the salience of the ad by providing visual elements depicting a
drawing or a photograph of the product. The drawn image included a humanlike mouth and
eyes in the anthropomorphism appeal condition and normal features in the nonanthropomorphism condition. The photograph depicted the product being watched by
paparazzi while on a red carpet in the anthropomorphic condition or a normal relevant
context for the non-anthropomorphic condition.
Results from this third study found significant main effects for anthropomorphic
appeals on both the attitudes towards the brand and the attitude towards the brand
represented by the ad. When exploring the relationship between anthropomorphic appeals
and purchase intention, anthropomorphic appeals showed non-significant direct effects on
the purchase intention. Since both attitudes towards the brand and the ad showed significant
effects on the purchase intention, the author tested for indirect effects of anthropomorphic
appeals on purchase intention through both attitudes towards the brand and towards the ad.
This test revealed significant effects resulting in the author concluding that the relationship
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between anthropomorphic appeals and purchase intention was fully mediated by the
attitudes towards the brand and ad.
The work of Hart (Hart, 2013) provides support to the hypothesis that
anthropomorphism has significant effects over the attitudes towards both the artificial agent
being anthropomorphized and also other entities that it represents. More importantly, it
shows that this relationship is contingent on the salience of the entity with a higher salience
increasing the presence of the entity (i.e. social contact) and the likelihood of it being
anthropomorphized (Hart, 2013, p. 62) reflecting our conclusions from section 4.3.1 above.
Other studies by Araujo (Araujo, 2018) as well as Go and Sundar (Go & Sundar, 2019)
suggest a lack of significant effects from anthropomorphism on the attitudes towards both
the artificial agent or the entity represented by it could potentially be explained by Hart’s
findings. While Araujo (Hart, 2013) failed to find significant effects, his operationalization
of the agent to be anthropomorphized was entirely dependent on text which could implied
a low level of salience resulting in the non-significant results on attitudes towards the agent
or the company it represented (This is further discussed under section 4.4.1.1 on the role
of embodiment). On the other hand, Go and Sundar (2019) suffered with some of the same
limitations leading to no significant main effects of anthropomorphic cues on the attitudes
towards the agent or the website it supported despite displaying a human’s photograph as
part of the chatbot. Nevertheless, their study did find indirect results when considering the
social presence, perceived homophily and perception of being involved in a dialogue.
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While these results suggest that anthropomorphizing a technology possesses
significant positive direct effects over the users attitudes towards a technology, the results
on factors related to users intention discussed above remain inconsistent and thus are
further discussed in section 5.3 on Impact on Intentions, Trust, and Perceived/Actual
Performance.
5.1.2

Moral Agency & Accountability/Responsibility
The question of whether technology can be perceived as possessing agency and

responsibility has also been explored in the literature. Gray, Gray and Wegner (Gray, Gray,
& Wegner, 2007) conducted an exploratory study exploring what it means to perceive a
mind in others by conducting a survey in which participants rated pairwise comparisons of
different agents in one of eighteen mental capacities (e.g. “capacity to feel pain”) and one
of six personal judgments (e.g. “which character do you like more?”). The results of the
study suggested that people tended to categorize agents differently along two main factors:
the agents’ capacity to act or agency (including factors such as self-control, morality,
emotion recognition, planning among others), and its capacity to feel or “Experience”(e.g.
hunger, pain, pleasure, among others). The study demonstrated that individuals tend to
perceive some cognitive capacities from robots and rate then as being highly capable of
acting on their own (i.e. possess high agency) but were less capable of experiencing things.
These results suggest that all forms of entities can be perceive as possessing mental
capabilities, but these capabilities can vary based on individuals’ perception about the
entity.
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The study by Gray, Gray, and Wegner (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) formed the
basis for a series of studies in which Gray and colleagues explored the relationship between
perceptions of mind of agents and the moral attributions made on them. In particular, Gray
and Wegner (2009) expanded on the previously mentioned study to argue that not only
individuals perceive mind along two factors, but how an agent is perceived along those
factors can determine whether an agent is perceived as an actor capable of inflicting good
or evil upon others, or an agent on which said good or evil is inflicted.
To test their argument, Gray and Wegner conducted a series of seven studies with
multiple phases in which participants completed surveys or completed questionnaires with
priming messages in which hypothetical characters were presented or described with
various levels of capacity to act on their own accord (agency) or feel (experience) and were
positioned in hypothetical scenarios that were the target did something “bad” or something
“good”. The authors found support for the theory of moral typecasting where agents were
perceived as being either moral actors (high agency and low experience) that were less
vulnerable to having good or evil done upon them, or moral patients (low agency, high
experience) that were less capable of performing the good or evil upon others. While this
study focused on human to human interactions it was a direct expansion of the arguments
and findings by Gray, Gray, and Wegner and were argued to remain valid for all types of
agents discussed there (2007, p. 506).
A following study by Gray, Young, and Waytz (2012) expanded on this research
stream by arguing that the mind perception described by Gray, Gray and Wegner (Gray,
Gray, & Wegner, 2007) was at the core of the results on the moral judgement towards
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others found by Gray and Wegner (2009). Gray, Young and Waytz (2012) explored
multiple views of morality in the extant literature to propose that mind perception on a
variety of agents including humans, animals, robots, and supernatural entities could lead to
perceptions of moral violations that vary along the lines of whether an agent was perceived
as intentional and suffering (2012, p. 103). This conceptual piece develops a series of
propositions on how the moral dyad of perceived intention and suffering could compel and
constrain moral judgements towards agents regardless of their nature.

Figure 12 Illustration of Moral Typecasting presented by Gray, Young, and Waytz (Gray,
Young, & Waytz, 2012).

The results found by Gray and colleagues were supported in the extant literature
with key theoretical studies elaborating on how components of agency in the form of
perceived autonomy, intention, and responsibility can lead to the perception of artificial
agents as moral agents (Sullins, 2006), and other related studies providing empirical
support for the propositions within the context of human to human interaction (Moretto,
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Walsh, & Haggard, 2011). Within the field of human robot interaction (HRI), these results
have been supported by the work of Khan and colleagues (Khan P. J., et al., 2012) which
explores whether individuals would find morally accountable a robot committing a mistake
that harms the individual. In the study, participants were led to interact with a “Robovie”
robot for 15 minutes after which Robovie would “judge” the participants performance in a
game and determine whether the participant won a $20 prize. In the study, Robovie was
programmed to incorrectly determine the participant as failing the game and thus prevented
them from earning the $20 prize. Participants were interviewed about how they perceived
the robot.

The results showed that participants attributed cognitive and affective states to the
robot as well as social attributes. Moreover, 65 percent of the participants attributed some
level of moral accountability to Robovie. Statistical analysis of the responses indicated that
Robovie was found significantly less accountable than a hypothetical human would, but
more accountable than a vending machine thus providing additional support to the
argument that anthropomorphism leads to artificial agents being perceived as moral agents.
Furthermore, Gray and Wegner (2012) have built on these arguments and shown
that how an artificial agent is attributed mind can have significant effects on how it is
perceived. Specifically, the authors posited that feelings of uncanniness (Mori, The
Uncanny Valley, 1970) (Mori, MacDorman, & Kageki, 2012) individuals sometimes feel
when

confronted with human-looking artificial agents arises when humans ascribe
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experience (i.e. capacity to feel and sense) to them rather than agency (i.e. capacity to act).
To test this hypothesis, the authors conducted three experiments.
In the first experiment, participants were saw a video of either humanlike robot or
a mechanical robot and rated both their feelings of unease towards it, and their attributions
of agency and experience. The results suggested that the perceptions of experience
mediated the relationships between the appearance of the robot and the feelings of
uncanniness.
The second experiment explored whether the unease feelings were limited to the
appearance of the machine, or whether they could be disconnected from it. Participants
were given a questionnaire that described a supercomputer in different ways depending on
the condition. The control condition describe the supercomputer to participants as “like a
normal computer, but much more powerful”, while the with-experience condition
described it as “[able to feel] hunger, fear and other emotions” (2012, p. 127). Participants
rated their feelings of unease in each condition as well as rated the supercomputer in terms
of the perceived agency and experience.
As hypothesized by the authors, the results showed a link between the ratings of
experience and uncanniness but not between ratings of agency and uncanniness providing
support to the hypothesis that the uncanny effects were related to attribution of experience
to machines rather than to its appearance. Finally, in a third experiment, Gray and Wegner
explored how participants perceived other humans that have lost mental capacity resulting
in either a reduced agency or experience and whether the participants felt an increase in
uneasiness. Participants saw descriptions of a man and his mental capacities with the
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control condition describing the man as “quite normal”, the reduced agency condition
describing him as “unable to ‘plan or make goals,’ or ‘do things a normal person can do’”,
and the reduced experience condition describing him as “unable to ‘feel pain, pleasure or
fear or otherwise experience what a normal person can experience’” (2012, p. 128).
Participants rated their affective reactions similarly to how they did in experiment one. The
results of the study showed that a person with reduced experience led participants to feel
unease similar to how they had done on prior studies for the low experience machine, while
the same effect was not reported for the control condition or the reduced agency condition.
The research stream conducted by Gray and colleagues shows that
anthropomorphizing artificial agents (as conceptualized in the form of perceiving mind in
them) can lead to a perception that the artificial agent itself possesses both a capacity to act
(agency) and a capacity to feel (experience) depending on related factors such as how it
was introduced. These perceptions can lead individuals to perceive the artificial agent as a
moral agent capable of doing good or bad upon others while possessing little vulnerability
to good or evil being done upon it, or a moral patient with a low capacity to inflict good or
evil on others but a being highly receptive to good or evil being done on it. Moreover,
whether mind is attributed to artificial agents through increased agency or increased
experience, also seem to affect the overall perception of an individual about it with artificial
agents showing high experience but low agency possessing an increased likelihood that
individuals will feel uneasy about interacting with it.
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The results reported by Gray and Wegner (Gray & Wegner, 2012) call for caution
in how we develop artificial agents that appear to feel in order to prevent negative
interactions with users; however, other studies have shown that highly experiential
artificial agents can also lead to improvements in the perception of the agent (Khan P. H.,
et al., 2012) (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (Kory-Westlund, Relational AI: Creating longterm interpersonal interaction, rapport, and relationships with social robots, 2019). Khan
and colleagues explored the nature of relationships formed between children and early
social robots (Khan P. H., et al., 2012). In their study, children between the ages of 9 and
15 interacted with the humanoid robot “Robovie” in 15-minute sessions. The sessions
ended with the researcher interrupting a game between the children and Robovie at the start
of Robovie’s turn to put Robovie away into a closet while the robot protested that it was
not fair, that it was afraid of the dark and that it did not want to be put away into the closet.
A post facto interview showed how all children though it was alright to put a broom into
the closet but only a minority though it was alright to put Robovie there. During the
interview, the children described Robovie as a social entity with intelligence and feelings
that was deserved fair treatment and argued it should not be harmed psychologically. While
the study did not directly evaluate the attribution of mind as described by Gray and
colleagues (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), the descriptions by the children match appear
to position Robovie as an agent with high experience and position it as a moral patient per
Gray and Wegners’ Moral Typecasting hypothesis (Gray & Wegner, 2009) (Gray, Young,
& Waytz, 2012). Therefore, the study provides support for the argument that
anthropomorphizing an artificial agent can lead individuals to perceived it as a moral agent
and, moreover, that perceiving the artificial agent as a possessing high experience can also
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lead to significant positive effects over the individuals evaluations of the technology.
Finally, in order to facilitate the evaluation of the perceptions of social machines, Banks
(Banks, 2019) developed a and tested a Perceived Moral Agency (PMA) scale for the
purpose of measuring how individuals perceive other entities as moral agents including
both other humans and machines.
To develop the scale, Banks conducted an extensive review of the literature
including philosophical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives on morality as well as
popular and futuristic perspectives on machine morality to generate a pool of 84 candidate
items for the scale. A subject matter expert was asked to review the selection for content
validity, “applicability across agent types, inclusivity of perspectives on morality, and
attention to moral functioning” the pool was reduced to 49 items (Banks, 2019, p. 365).
The reduced pool was presented to participants through an online survey that directed them
to one of five conditions varying in type of agent including an avatar, a chatbot, a
physically-embodied humanoid robot, a physically embodied non-humanoid robot in the
form of a voice assistant, or a human. Participants were presented with a short vide of the
agent speaking a script which remained the same regardless of condition except to describe
the type of agent the speaker was. Participants then completed the item pool and were asked
to complete items for perceived anthropomorphism, measures of criterion validity, an
interpersonal trust scale, and a social attraction scale. The results suggested a set of 10
items surrounding two factors (morality and dependency) were sufficient to measure the
PMA, and showed that anthropomorphism tended to vary among different agent types
though not in a scale from low to high starting with a chatbot, passing through a personal
assistant, an agent, a robot and finally human as expected.
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The 10 item and 2 factor scale were validated through an online survey where
participants judged others’ personalities. The participants assigned to one of four
conditions depicting a robot (high or low morality, and high or low dependency) or a
neutral human control condition. Participants saw an identical condition of a Nao robot
holding a child’s hand with the robot described as being called Ray and “[spending] the
days helping children to be more comfortable in learning situations” (Banks, 2019, p. 366).
The results of the survey suggested that the questionnaire possessed both construct validity
when compared with other heuristic assessments of the agent’s “good/bad status”, and
criterion validity when assessed for factors associated with other agent’s perception and
behavioral intentions (Banks, 2019, p. 367).
The extant literature seems to consistently point towards anthropomorphism
significantly influencing the perception of agency and moral agency on an artificial agent
(Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). It also suggests, that these perceptions can significantly
alter other attributes of the perceived agent (Gray & Wegner, 2012), with poorly designed
agents leading to eerie feelings on the part of the users (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012) and
well-designed agents leading to the formation of simple relationships (Khan P. H., et al.,
2012) (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (Kory-Westlund, Relational AI: Creating long-term
interpersonal interaction, rapport, and relationships with social robots, 2019). These studies
suggest that while anthropomorphizing an artificial agent leads to changes in how an
individual would perceived it, whether the perception of the agent becomes more positive
or negative seems to be moderated by other factors related to the technology such as the
social role that we place it in (Kory-Westlund, 2019).
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5.2

EFFECTS OVER SELF PERCEPTIONS, EVALUATIONS, & BEHAVIOR
The effects of anthropomorphism have been shown to go beyond changing the

perception individuals hold about a particular artificial agent, and instead have been shown
to also affect the individuals’ interacting with the agents (Chambon & Haggard, 2012)
(Neave, Jackson, Saxton, & Hönekopp, 2015). The reported effects have range from both
positive and negative behavioral changes (Mou & Xu, 2017) (Timpano & Shaw, 2013)
(Riva, Sacchi, & Brambilla, 2015) to alterations in the self-perceptions and evaluations
individual hold about themselves (Bartneck, Bleeker, Bun, Fens, & Riet, 2010) (Sah &
Peng, 2015). These effects have been shown to take place both automatically as well as
after individuals reflect about the nature of the artificial agent, with stronger believes that
the agent is humanlike being associated with individuals more frequently displaying
behaviors typically associated with building interpersonal relationships with others
(Schechtman & Horowitz, 2003). Therefore, it becomes important for both researchers and
practitioners to understand how technology choices can affect its users’ behaviors and selfperceptions to fully understand the implications of anthropomorphism.
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Figure 13 Effects of Anthropomorphism over the Self
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5.2.1

Anthropomorphism and the Changing Behaviors of Individuals
The effects of anthropomorphism over the individuals’ behavior have been reported

to vary significantly. Among the studies describing the positive effects of
anthropomorphism was that of Mou and Xu (Mou & Xu, 2017) who explored whether
individuals vary in terms of the style of communication, level of control over the
engagement, and willingness to disclose information over an interaction exhibited when
interacting with an artificial agent compared to how an interaction with a human friend. In
their study, Mou and Xu relied on the CASA paradigm to develop hypotheses on how the
initial interaction between a user and an inherently social technology could take place.
5.2.1.1 Exhibited personality traits, self-disclosures, and level of control
The authors hypothesized that since encountering an AI would be equivalent to
encountering a non-judgmental listener, users would vary in the personality traits, level of
control (i.e. exhibited behavior associated with taking control of the direction of the
conversation) and self-disclosure tendencies that they exhibit when interacting with an
artificial agent compared to when interacting with a human or when asked for self-reports
(Mou & Xu, 2017, p. 434). To explore these hypotheses, Mou and Xu gathered a snowball
sample of individuals (referred t as volunteers in the study) who had recently engaged with
an openly available chatbot from Microsoft called “Little Ice” in the WeChat messenger
application and collected recorded transcripts of their initial interaction with Little Ice as
well as transcripts of their interaction with a human friend. The transcripts were then
provided to two hundred and seventy-seven participants to review and evaluate the
transcripts in terms of the personalities and communication attributes exhibited by the
volunteers.
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The results of Mou and Xu’s work suggests that individuals exhibit different
personality traits as well as variations in their disclosure levels. Specifically, individuals
tended to be more open, agreeable, extroverted, conscientious, and self-disclosing in their
interactions towards human friends. Interestingly, the level of control exhibited by
participants appeared to not be significantly different between the two interaction types,
though the exhibited level of control remained significantly different from self-rated levels
of control in both cases. Therefore, the work of Mou and Xu suggests that while individuals
may respond socially to technology, the interaction style exhibited when interacting with
artificial agents can still differ from that used when interacting with other humans.
Mou and Xu’s hypothesis only tested significant differences without explicit
consideration for the direction of the relationships. Nevertheless, the authors had originally
argued that since artificial agents were likely to be perceived as less judgmental
individuals, it was reasonable to assume users would be more willing to disclose more
information, while feeling more confident about the interaction and taking control of it thus
increasing their exhibited controlling behavior (Mou & Xu, 2017, p. 434). The results seem
to oppose this argument since the direction of self-disclosure behavior was in the opposite
direction and no significant difference was found on the level of control. Nevertheless,
exploratory results found by Sah and Peng (2015) offer a potential explanation.
In their study, Sah and Peng (2015) explored the role of anthropomorphic cues on
social perceptions, self-awareness, and information disclosure. While not initially
hypothesized, they also tested for the indirect effects of the anthropomorphic cues on the
individual’s disclosure of information through changes in the levels of both private and
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public self-awareness (i.e. self-awareness referring to the inner state in which individuals
focus their attention on themselves (Duval & Wicklund, 1972)). Private self-awareness
referring to an individual placing attention on the covert or hidden (e.g. beliefs, thoughts)
aspects of him/herself, while public self-awareness describes an individual focus on overt
or observable aspects (e.g. public self) of him/herself (Sah & Peng, 2015, p. 394) (Froming,
Walker, & Lopyan, 1982).
Part of the results of the study showed that anthropomorphized artificial agents in
the form of a chatbot that communicated in a humanlike way possessed significant positive
indirect effects on the on the level of public self-awareness of the participant which in turn
cause the participants to significantly decrease the information they would disclose.
Therefore, these results provide both empirical support for the direction of the relationship
initially proposed by Mou and Xu despite Mou and Xu’s own results which suggested a
relationship in the opposite direction, while also presenting potential mechanism to explain
the discrepancy in results. Specifically, Sah and Peng shows that results similar to those of
Mou and Xu can be found if the chatbot was not anthropomorphized, which could be the
case for Little Ice (chatbot explored by Mou and Xu) since we don’t have much information
on how it worked and Mou and Xu did not measured anthropomorphism itself, or the
behavior of the chatbot may have triggered changes in the level of self-awareness of the
participant thus altering the direction of the relationship as shown in Sah and Peng’s study.
Nevertheless, since the exact nature of the results presented by Mou and Xu cannot be
inferred correctly due to the lack of measurement of anthropomorphism, further studies are
needed to explain the relationship.
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5.2.1.2 Anthropomorphism and its Negative Consequences through Hoarding &
Gambling
Other researchers have focused on the potential negative effects of
anthropomorphism over individuals’ behavior. Taking into consideration the generally
accepted view that excessive attachment was associated with hoarding (Frost & Hartl,
1996), Timpano and Shaw (2013) conducted the first study that tested whether
anthropomorphism and could lead to increased attachment to objects and therefore be
associated with increased hoarding. Hoarding was described as an, that is increased
persistent difficulty in discarding possessions resulting in clutter accumulating in living
spaces and a corresponding increase in distress (Mataix-Cols, Fernandez de la Cruz, Nakao,
& Pertusa, 2011).
To test their hypotheses, Timpano and Shaw conducted a survey asking participants
for self-reports of hoarding symptoms (Frost, Steketee, & Grisham, Measurement of
compusive hoarding: Saving inventory-revised, 2004) (Frost, et al., 1998), saving
cognitions which refers to the attitudes and beliefs about hoarding (Steketee, O., & Kyrios,
2003), anthropomorphism measured through the IDAQ questionnaire which measures
anthropomorphic tendencies (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), and a questionnaire on
emotional attachment to objects (Grisham, et al., 2009). The results indicated significant
positive effects of anthropomorphism on hoarding behaviors even after controlling for
depression and anxiety scores. Interestingly, anthropomorphic tendencies were not
correlated with emotional attachment to objects. Anthropomorphic tendencies were not
found to significantly affect hoarding cognitions, though the scores remained close to
significance and thus reported as marginally significant.
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Neave and colleagues (2015) built on top of the work of Timpano and Shaw (2013)
to explore how anthropomorphism affected hoarding by developing and testing a new
measure of anthropomorphism with assessments more relevant to the beliefs and behaviors
related to anthropomorphism. The IDAQ questionnaire (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010)
used by Timpano and Shaw before explicitly relied on measures constructs that rely on
reflection and high-level deductive reasoning as a form of anthropomorphic tendency.
Neave and colleagues present the construct of Consciousness as an example of this, and
argue that measuring it as explicit questions on whether an entity possessed consciousness,
the IDAQ questionnaire may not be able to tap into intuitive thoughts (Neave, Jackson,
Saxton, & Hönekopp, 2015, p. 215). Similarly to Timpano and Shaw (2013), the authors
differentiated between hoarding behaviors which refers to the the extent individuals hoard
possessions and hoarding cognition which refers to how the individuals feel about their
possessions.
To test the predictive capability of their Anthropomorphic measure and how it
affected hoarding behaviors and cognitions, Neave and colleagues (2015) conducted a
survey with the corresponding measurements. The results showed that both measures of
anthropomorphism were significantly positively correlated with increases in hoarding
behaviors and cognitions. Running a regression analysis with both measures of
anthropomorphism showed that the new anthropomorphic questionnaire remained
significantly positively related to the hoarding behaviors and cognitions but the significant
effects of the IDAQ questionnaire became non-significant. Additionally, adding the IDAQ
questionnaire to a model measuring anthropomorphism with the Neave and colleagues’
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instrument led to marginal increases in predictive power from R2 of .31 to 0.34. These
results support Timpano and Shaw conclusions that anthropomorphism was likely a
significant predictor hoarding.
Since the earlier studies of Timpano and Shaw (2013) and Neave and colleagues
(Neave, Jackson, Saxton, & Hönekopp, 2015) argued that anthropomorphism was affecting
the hoarding behaviors of an individual by increasing the emotional connection individuals
felt towards the objects leading to excessive attachment, Neave and colleagues ran a second
study to explore the relationship between anthropomorphic tendencies, object attachment,
attachment style, hoarding severity and hoarding behaviors (Neave, Tyson, McInnes, &
Hamilton, 2016). Participants to the study completed questionnaires for the constructs of
interests which indicated strong positive correlations between the measures of object
attachment, attachment style and anthropomorphism with the measures of hoarding
behaviors and cognitions. Nevertheless, when running a regression with all factors of
interests and hoarding behaviors and cognitions as dependent variables, the significant
effects of anthropomorphism become non-significant while the attachment style explains
most of the variation.
Neave and colleagues (Neave, Tyson, McInnes, & Hamilton, 2016) argued that
these results may be due to both attachment style and anthropomorphism explaining the
same kinds of behaviors. Since this study as well as Neave and colleagues (Neave, Jackson,
Saxton, & Hönekopp, 2015) and Timpano and Shaw (2013) relied on a survey
methodology with self-reports measures, time precedence between variables was not
considered. Considering that the measures of attachment style and anthropomorphism were
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also correlated, it seems reasonable to consider that one variable may be mediating the
effect of the other on hoarding behaviors and cognition.
Other behavior changes have been reported in the literature as well. Riva and
colleagues (Riva, Sacchi, & Brambilla, 2015) reported on how promoting the
anthropomorphic perceptions of gambling machines significantly increased both
individuals tendency to gamble, as well as the amount they were willing to gamble. On the
other hand, Tam (2015) described how presenting participants with anthropomorphic
representations of nature while appealing for the participant to carry out conservation
behavior such as recycling, reusing things, saving water, or using energy efficient devices
significantly increased their reported intention to carry out these conservation behaviors
compared to doing the same appeal without the anthropomorphic characteristics. The
extant literature includes multiple more studies exploring how behavior can be affected by
anthropomorphic perceptions, however we will discuss this on the section reporting on
changes in the interaction since they are framed from the point of view of social effects
promoted by an interaction with a social agent rather than being centered on the changing
behavior (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017).
5.2.2

Changing Self-Evaluations & the Sense of Self
Besides affecting individuals’ behaviors, anthropomorphism has also been shown

to affect individuals’ self-evaluations and self-perceptions as shown by the effects of
anthropomorphism on an individual’s self-awareness reported by Sah and Peng and
discussed above (Sah & Peng, 2015). Other significant effects explored have included
feelings of embarrassment as reported by Bartneck and colleagues (Bartneck, Bleeker,
Bun, Fens, & Riet, 2010) as well as changes to sense of agency and ownership during an
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interaction (Obhi & Hall, 2011) (Böffel & Müsseler, 2018) (Limerick, Coyle, & Moore,
2014) (Grynszpan, et al., 2019).
As we discussed above in section 4.1.2, the extant literature has shown that
anthropomorphizing an entity results in an ascription of agency to it and can result in an
increased tendency to perceive it as a moral agent (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) (Gray,
Young, & Waytz, 2012). Following this view of technology as a potential agentic entity,
Obhi and Hall conducted what, to the extent of our knowledge, constitutes the first attempt
to explore how an individual’s sense of agency changes as they engaged in a joint task with
a computer (Obhi & Hall, 2011).
The argument that a joint action with a computer could impact the users perceived
agency was developed as an extension to a prior study by the same authors (Obhi & Hall,
Sense of agency and intentional binding in joint action, 2011) that proposed that when two
individuals engage alongside each other in a collaborative joint action, their subjective
experience of agency could be altered their reported subjective feelings of agency become
independent from their experimentally demonstrated sense of agency as reported through
intentional binding effects (see section 2.2.2.1 for a discussion on the intentional binding
measure) transforming their perceived “I” agency into what the authors call a “we” agency
(Obhi & Hall, Sense of agency and intentional binding in joint action, 2011, p. 661).
Following these results from a human to human interaction, the authors decided to
test whether the same effects could be achieved when an human interacts with a computer
in a joint action task (Obhi & Hall, Sense of Agency in Joint Action: Influence of Human
and Computer Co-actors, 2011). To test this hypothesis, Obhi and Hall set up an experiment
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with two conditions. In the human to human condition, the authors asked a participant and
a confederate pretending to be a participant to sit side by side with a curtain blocking them
from seeing each other. Then, the participants engaged in a series of conditions testing their
perceptions of agency. In the human to computer condition, the same procedures were
followed with the exception that rather than relying on a confederate, the participants were
told they would be interacting with a computer that possessed software that would take the
role of the other participant. The results of the study showed that similarly to their previous
study, participants in the human joint action reported a decreased judgement of their agency
when the action was initiated by the partner, but demonstrated a significant and
indistinguishable intentional binding to that reported when their initiated the action
suggesting the presence of a perceived joint agency or we-agency. On the human to
computer condition however, the results showed no significant intentional binding effects
suggesting that engagement with a computer in a joint task failed to lead to a jointagency effect. Furthermore, the authors hypothesized that the reported effect were likely
the result of individuals forming a we-agency based on their comprehension of the other
agent’s intentions as being similar to their own which suggest that anthropomorphizing the
technology could bring forth those effects seen in joint-tasks with other humans.
Despite Obhi and Hall’s initial results, authors have increasingly argued that jointagency effects are possible recent studies have argued that the joint agency effects can be
achieved when humans interact with more human like technology such as social robots.
Building on these results, Barlas (Barlas, 2019) explored how the sense of agency in a
human is affected when interacting with other humans and how it compared with an
interaction with humanoid robots with varying levels of autonomy. Participants in Barlas
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experiment were asked to perform either free key presses when they chose to do so, to
perform the key press when instructed by either a human or a humanoid robot (the NAO
robot by Softbank was used for this purpose). Regardless of the condition, auditory and
visual stimuli would be given to the participant shortly after the key press and the
intentional binding effects were estimated based on the participants perceptions of the time
interval between the action and the event as discussed above in the section on intentional
binding. Alternatively, participants could also hear a sound that would indicate another
sound which would then be followed by a separate sound shortly thereafter and binding
effects would be calculated for this case as well. The results showed that both humans and
humanoid robots were capable of provoking similar binding effects on the sense of agency
of the participant.
Moreover, Ciardo and colleagues (Ciardo, Tommaso, Beyer, & Wykowska, 2018)
explored how individuals sense of agency in a given task may decrease when interacting
with embodied artificial agents in a similar way as it does when interacting with other
humans. In the experiment, participants were exposed to one of two conditions. In the first
condition, participants were entirely capable of taking a costly loss of points to prevent a
balloon from exploding, while in the second condition both the participant and a “Cozmo”
robot (a type of social robot widely available in the market) were both charged with
preventing the balloon from exploding representing a joint condition. In the experiment,
participants needed to sacrifice points to prevent the balloon from exploding. The more
time participants waited, the less points they would lose, but if the balloon exploded, they
would lose a significantly larger amount of points. Additionally, if Cozmo stopped the
balloon from exploding, the participant would not lose any points. The results of the
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experiment showed that when the participants stopped the balloon from exploding, they
reported significantly lower sense of agency in the joint condition than in the individual
condition regardless of the amount of points lost suggesting that a joint interaction with an
artificial agent can decreased the perceived agency over an interaction by a user in a similar
way that an interaction with another human can.
Later on, Grynzpan and colleagues decided to explore the initial relationship
explored by Obhi and Hall (2011) to test whether the reported effects could be replicated
through bottom-up processes rather than the top-down processes used by Obhi and Hall in
the form of a priming effect where the researchers told participants the partner was a
computer performing tapping actions in the joint task (Grynszpan, et al., 2019). Grynzpan
and colleagues operationalized their technology as a non-human like robot that provided
haptic feedback to the finger of the participant to suggest kinesthetic feedback to the
participant (i.e. haptic feedback on the handle of the participant). The results of Grynzpan
and colleagues resembled those of Obhi and Hall (2011) with participants in a joint task
with a human reporting joint agency effects while participants in the robot condition had
no such effects and displayed a significant reduction in their sense of agency.
While Obhi and Hall as well as Grynzpan failed to find joint-agency effects in
interactions between humans and computers, it is important to note the type of agent they
used. In Obhi and Hall operationalization, the joint task was carried out between a human
and a computer that the participant was told possessed software that enabled it to carry out
the tasks of initiating actions. There was no perceivable agent that through its appearance
or apparent behavior could evoke an attribution of mind in the participant. Additionally,
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the description of the computer as possessing software that allowed it to initiate the actions
that would otherwise have been carried out by a human partner offered little to no content
that

could

encourage

the

anthropomorphization of the

computer. Grynzpan

operationalization suffered from the same issues. In their study, the participants engaged
with a robot that exhibited no human like appearance and whose behavior was limited to
providing haptic feedback to the participant if it began an action before the participant did.
Neither case allowed for any form of mind perception which arguably explains the results
as suggested by the conceptualization of mind attribution of Gray, Gray and Wegner (Gray,
Gray, & Wegner, 2007) (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012).
Joint agency, also known as We-agency, represents a significant new construct that
we still do not know much about (McEneaney, 2009) (McEneaney, 2013) (Moore & Obhi,
2012). Nevertheless, it promises to lead to significant effects in human to human interaction
from both practical and theoretical perspectives (Pacherie, 2012) (Admoni & Scassellati,
2012) (Salmela & Nagatsu, 2017). While not much research exists regarding how it takes
place in interactions between humans and artificial agents, the findings of Ciardo and
colleagues (Ciardo, Tommaso, Beyer, & Wykowska, 2018) as well as Barlas (Barlas,
2019) strongly suggest that anthropomorphism is the core element needed to enable its
effects within the context of humans cooperation with autonomous and relational
technologies (Bolt, Poncelet, Schultz, & Loehr, 2016).
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5.3

IMPACT ON INTENTIONS, TRUST, AND PERCEIVED/ACTUAL PERFORMANCE

Figure 14 Consequences over Intentions, Usage, and Performance.
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5.3.1

Artificial Agents Acceptance and Intention to Use and Replace
The works of de Graaf and colleagues (2019), as well as Hart (2013) discussed

under section 4.1.12 on “attitudes towards technology” go beyond exploring the effects of
anthropomorphism on attitude to also explore how it affects users’ intention to adopt and
use technology. While de Graaf and colleague’s study hinted at the role of the social
perception of technology through significant effects found on the “expected level of
sociality”, it failed to find significance on factors more closely related to
anthropomorphism such as animism and social presence. On the other hand, Hart’s study
not only found that anthropomorphism’s effects over the attitudes towards the technology
were contingent on the level of salience of the artificial agent introduced to participants,
but it also found that through this relationship anthropomorphism had significant indirect
effects over the intention to purchase the artificial agent. These two studies combined seem
to suggest that while anthropomorphism may not directly influence user’s intention to
engage with an artificial agent, its effects over the users’ attitudes support its indirect
influence over the users’ intention. Other studies have further explored the relationship
between the anthropomorphic perception of technology and various forms of users’
intentions.
Following prior literature on anthropomorphic characters used within the field of
marketing, Goudey and Bonnin (2016) explored the role that the human-like appearance
of an artificial agent would have on others’ acceptance of the agent and their intention to
use it. The authors conduced online interviews with adult women with children and jobs
and asked them about their willingness to use the robot at their home in a situation where
the robot would interact with their children. The participants were presented with a picture
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of one of three possible robots as operationalizations of the artificial agents that varied in
the level of human likeness of their appearance. Their results showed no significant main
effects of the human likeness on the users’ acceptance of the technology. However, after
controlling for the users’ level of prior experience using their smartphones, the effects of
anthropomorphic appearance of the robots turned significant with users with high
experience reporting stronger intentions to use the artificial agent, and users with low or
no experience using smartphones reporting significantly lower intentions to use the agents.
Taking this into consideration, Goudey and Bonnin (2016) suggest that anthropomorphism
does have a significant direct effect over a users’ intention to use a technology, but such
effect appears to be moderated by individual factors such as the user’s prior experience
with technology.
While none of the studies in our literature have explicitly explored the nature of the
contrasting results based on different levels of prior experience reported by Goudey and
Bonnin (2016), Zlotowski, Proudfoot, Yogeeswaran and Bartneck (2015) offer a potential
explanation from a purely theoretical basis. In their study of the opportunities and
challenges of anthropomorphism in human-robot interaction, Zlotowski and colleagues
argue that low levels of familiarity with the technology will lead to increased perceptions
of unpredictability in the mind of users which will be reflected as increased negative
attitudes towards the technology. Moreover, the authors argue that as individuals become
familiarized with the technology, their negative attitudes will diminish accordingly.
An important limitation of the relevance of the results presented by Goudey and
Bonnin is their conceptualization of anthropomorphism as a “[physical] resemblance to
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human beings” (Goudey & Bonnin, 2016, p. 4) (Ambroise & Valette-Florence, 2010)
(Keeley, 2004). While this conceptualization differs from the conceptualization of
anthropomorphism as an attribution of mental states, the operationalization used by the
authors matched that used by other studies more fitting conceptualizations of
anthropomorphism thus minimizing our concerns about the relevance of these findings
within our context (Bartneck, Kulic, & Croft, 2009) (Bartneck, Kanda, Mubin, & Mahmud,
2009).
Other studies have achieved similar results. Eyssel and Kuchenbrandt (2012)
explored the users’ intention to adopt a humanoid robot based on users’ perception of the
robot as an in-group as opposed to an out-group. Participants in the study were presented
with a picture of a robot on a screen and asked to fill a questionnaire they were told would
help developers improve the design of the robot. The authors varied the perceived group
membership of the robot by altering the reported nationality of the robot as well as its name
to either resemble or differ from the nationality of the participant. Robots presented as
being in-group were anthropomorphized significantly more, while participants also
reported significantly higher intentions to contact the robot as operationalized in the form
of increased willingness to live with the robot and to talk with it (Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt,
2012, p. 727). While the study provides no evidence of causation, the results provide some
support for the existence of a relationship between the level of anthropomorphism of the
robot and the users’ contact intention with it which is also implicitly supported by other
researchers exploring the social perception of technology and users’ intention to use it
(Sundar, Jung, Waddell, & Kim, 2017) (Wu & Kraemer, 2017) (Xu, 2018) (Go & Sundar,
2019).
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Chandler and Schwarz (2010) extended these findings by studying the role of the
anthropomorphic perception of a vehicle on the users’ intention to replace it. The authors
conducted two experiments. In the first experiment, they asked participants to complete an
online study supposedly aimed at exploring “what people think about their cars” (2010, p.
140) while the level of anthropomorphism varied through variations of the framing of the
study. Participants described the vehicle in their own words and rated the likelihood that
they would replace it before leaving college. The results showed significant differences
between the anthropomorphic and the non-anthropomorphic conditions with participants
within the anthropomorphic being significantly more likely to describe the vehicle using
humanlike language (i.e. interpersonal emotions such as love, or personality) while
participants in the non-anthropomorphic condition described it more in terms of its quality.
Additionally, participants in the object condition became less willing to replace their
vehicle as their description of the vehicle became more positive, however the same
relationship was not significant for the anthropomorphic condition. Moreover, participants
in the anthropomorphic condition reported significantly lower willingness to replace their
vehicles than those in the object condition.
In their second experiment, Chandler and Schwarz (2010) aimed to explore
whether features valued in interpersonal relationships would affect participants
replacement intentions when they anthropomorphize the vehicle. The experiment followed
a two by three factorial design with the color label (i.e. warm or cold) and a priming
message (anthropomorphic, object, or no-prime control) as conditions. The warm or cold
condition was operationalized by asking participants to select the color of their own car
from a list of nine common car colors described by either a warm name like “summer blue”
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or a cold name such as “blizzard blue” (Chandler & Schwarz, 2010, p. 141), while the
priming manipulation used was the same as in the first study. Similarly, to experiment one,
participants in the anthropomorphic condition reported lower replacement intentions and
displayed no relationship between product quality and their replacement intention.
Moreover, participants in the warm color reported lower replacement intentions than those
in the cold condition, but only if they were also part of the anthropomorphic condition
rather than the object condition.
The two studies together show an interesting pattern. Participants in the object
condition altered their replacement intention based on their perception of the quality of the
vehicle but not based on how warm it was, while participants in the anthropomorphic
condition were not affected by the quality of the vehicle and would rather see their
replacement intentions change based on how warm they perceive the vehicle to be. This
strongly suggest a significant change in the nature of the interaction, with object-like
relationships between humans and machines being affected by traditional quality-related
factors and anthropomorphic relationships between them being affected by interpersonal
factors typical of human-to-human relationships. Furthermore, the authors point out that
the study has the additional benefit of showing that anthropomorphism can be induced
without the need to add anthropomorphic features (i.e. humanlike appearance or behavior)
to the entity to be anthropomorphize (Chandler & Schwarz, 2010, p. 143).
5.3.2

Credibility, Performance and Satisfaction with the Interaction
Multiple researchers have explored the relationship between anthropomorphism

and the trust placed on an artificial agent. Results for the most part suggest strong
significant positive effects of anthropomorphism on credibility and trust (Gong, 2008),
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though some non-significant or inconsistent results have also been reported (Pak, Fink,
Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012) (Kim & Sundar, 2012).
An early study by Gong (2008) explored the question of the relationship between
anthropomorphism and trustworthiness by exploring how variations in the level of human
likeness of the appearance of an artificial agent affected the trust individuals had on a
recommendation the agent made for how the participant could solve a dilemma.
Specifically, Gong asked participants to read a scenario on a computer detailing a dilemma
in which the participant had to choose between a risky but rewarding alternative, or a safer
option that would bring a less significant reward. After this, participants were presented
with a face with varying levels of anthropomorphism which recommended a choice. The
results suggested that both the trust participants felt for the recommended choice was
significantly positively affected by the level of anthropomorphism of the agent’s face, with
a higher level of anthropomorphism leading to higher trust in the choice. Additional studies
have been carried since which provide additional support to the findings of Gong (2008).
For instance, Pak and colleagues (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012) explored the trust
participants felt towards a chatbot with varying degrees of anthropomorphism and showed
that when anthropomorphizing a chatbot users become significantly more likely to display
behaviors corresponding to trusting the chatbot; a tendency that remained even when
participants expressed to perceive little to no difference in trust towards the agent when
asked. Salem and colleagues (Salem, Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, & Dautenhahn, 2015)
took the relationship a step further in an experiment and tested whether a robot making a
mistake that impeded participants from receiving a monetary reward would significantly
affect the trust felt towards the robot. The results of Salem and colleagues showed that even
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though participants reported a decrease in the reliability of the robot, their exhibited
behavior remained consistent with possessing high trust towards the artificial agents.
Nevertheless, not all studies exploring anthropomorphism and trust showed
significant positive effects. Kim and Sunder explored the effects of the presence or absence
of an agent and its level of interactivity on the perceived social presence of the agent,
anthropomorphism and the perceived credibility of the agent’s displayed information (Kim
& Sundar, 2012). In their study, participants interacted with an agent on a computer that
varied between different levels of interactivity depending on the condition the participants
were involved in. The results suggested that varying the level of interactivity led to both
significantly higher levels of anthropomorphism and credibility. While correlated, the
effects of anthropomorphism on the credibility of the agent was not measured and, instead,
the authors explored the effects of social presence on the credibility finding no effects in
that relationship. The lack of significant effects found for social presence on information
credibility point towards a lack of effect of the social perception of technology on
credibility. Nevertheless, despite the use of social presence as a proxy for
anthropomorphism in prior literature, social presence and anthropomorphism are different
constructs and therefore the relationship between anthropomorphism and credibility should
have been explored. After all, the level of interactivity could have both direct and indirect
effects on credibility through the anthropomorphic perception.
Despite their limitations, these studies suggest that there is a significant positive
relationship between anthropomorphism and the level of trust or credibility humans have
on a particular artificial agent which limit the impact of it failures on our perceptions of the
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technology (Salem, Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, & Dautenhahn, 2015), and changing the
proportion of times humans agree with artificial agents or agree to look at alternatives
(what was referred to as “Behavioral Trust” by Pak and colleagues) (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass,
& Sturre, 2012).
5.3.2.1 Anthropomorphism, performance, and satisfaction with Interactions
Both actual and perceived performance have been key factors explored in the extant
literature since the original work of Nass and colleagues. The earliest experiment that we
identified showing evidence of changing performance was that of Fogg and Nass (1997)
who conducted a laboratory experiment to determine the extent that humans would be
susceptible to flattery effects from an artificial agent and whether the extent of influence
would be similar to that of flattery coming from other humans. While the study did not
measure anthropomorphism, it was one of the original stream of research into the CASA
paradigm that posited individuals would perceived computers as social actors and therefore
it implies that its conclusions are relevant for our analysis. Participants in the study engaged
with a computer in a guessing game, after which the computer provided feedback to the
participants. The feedback could be sincere representing the actual performance of the
participant, insincere in which case the participant was told the feedback they would
receive would be entirely independent of their performance, or it could be generic.
The results showed that praise from a computer, whether it was sincere or not,
would lead to participants perceiving the interaction as being more enjoyable, their
performance as being better than those who received a generic feedback. This suggest that
anthropomorphized agents such as the computer used in Fogg and Nass study, can improve
the perceived performance of an individual though it does not clarify if the
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anthropomorphization of the agent is enough for such effects to take place, or whether they
take place indirectly through other factors such as the flattery used in the study as an
independent variable.
Contradictory effects were reported by Lee (Lee E.-J. , 2010) when relying on
flattery effects as a representation of social responses to computers to explore how the
human likeness of the technology could impact individuals’ evaluations of a computer. The
authors posited that not only participants would evaluate their performance more positively
when the computer provided then with flattering feedback, but the effect would be
significantly higher when the computer showed a human like character to represent itself
rather than pure text. The results indicated that flattery effects took place, though they were
moderated by the level of rationality of the individual. In a second experiment to test
whether the cognitive load would affect the effects, the study revealed that individuals who
interacted with the agent with a human like appearance were suspicious of the computer’s
claims and significantly increased the likelihood they would dismiss them. These negative
effects however disappeared as the cognitive load increased.
Wiese and her students (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017) (Hertz & Wiese, 2017) (Hertz
& Wiese, 2018) explored this phenomenon in a more direct way than the preceding studies
in their stream of research. Rather than relying on flattery as a proxy for the
anthropomorphic perception of technology, Wiese and colleagues relied on welldocumented physiological responses that humans exhibit when interacting with other
humans such as gaze following (i.e. socio-cognitive behavior). In the first experiment in
the series, Abubshait and Wiese (2017) demonstrated how inducing mind perception by

221

increasing the human likeness of the appearance of an agent, or by increasing the reliability
of the behavior of the agent leads to significant yet independent increases in socio-cognitive
performance (gaze following) and in the attitudes towards the agent.
Parallel to this study, Hertz and Wiese (2017) explored whether still images of
increasing human likeness could lead to social facilitation effects. The results suggested
that despite other research showing social facilitation effects taking part in human’s
interactions with artificial agents, still images were not enough of a stimulus to encourage
such effects on participants. To expand on this study, Hertz and Wiese (2018) moved on to
explore whether other social effects such as social conformity could take place when
interacting with more engaging artificial agents. The results of the study showed that when
participants engaged with a group of computers, robots, or other humans to complete a
social and analytical task social conformity would take place. Participants exhibited similar
levels of conformity for analytical tasks in all types of agents, while conformity in social
tasks increased as the agent became more human like. This suggest that social conformity
effects were taking place for all types of tasks, but the effect was moderated by the match
between task type and the human likeness of the of agent.
The studies by Wiese and colleagues demonstrate that anthropomorphic technology
is capable of promoting social effects over individuals that can in turn lead to changes in
performance providing support to the results of other studies including measures of
performance and discussed in separate sections of this dissertation (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass,
& Sturre, 2012) (Gong, 2008) (Hall & Henningsen, 2008) (Fasola & Mataric, 2012). While
there is a paucity of research focused on the implementation of anthropomorphic agents to
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improve performance within the IS field, some researchers have begun to build on this
topic. In the intersection of human-robot interaction and education, Kory-Westlund,
Cynthia Breazeal and colleagues have conducted a series of studies showing how
anthropomorphic agents can be used in classrooms to improve children performance and
satisfaction in their classes (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (Kory-Westlund, 2019).
In one of the key studies in the series (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017), Kory-Westlund
posited that the results of prior research into the effectiveness of social robots in education
was dependent on the children’s capability to relate to the robots as “interactive, social
beings” (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017, p. 2), a view supported by prior studies (Saerbeck,
Schut, Bartneck, & Janse, 2010). Taking this view into consideration, Kory-Westlund and
colleagues decided to explore whether increasing the expressiveness of a robot could
significantly affect the learning experience of children within the context of a classroom as
is well regarded to be the case when a human reads to children with an active voice rather
than a monotone voice (Cremin, Flewitt, Mardell, & Swann, 2016).
For the study, the authors invited preschool children that were 5 years old on
average to engage in a reading task with the robot. The robot would then narrate the story
using gestures (which remained constant regardless of condition) and either an active
dialogic voice (expressive robot) or a flat voice. While the children reported to like and
learn the same with both robots, there were significant differences in both conditions.
Children engaged with the active robot appeared to be more concentrated and engaged
based on their facial expressions, when repeating the story told by the robot were
significantly more likely to emulate its behavior, and took longer times to tell the stories.
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At the same time, the children engaged with the expressive robot were more likely to
correctly identify the vocabulary in the expressive robot condition than the flat-voice robot
condition suggesting improvements in their overall performance. While focused on
children in a classroom environment, the results of Kory-Westlund’s study suggest that
anthropomorphic robots can build on social effects to induce improvements in performance
in humans that interact with them, whether they are aware of it or not making
anthropomorphic a significant element of human’s relationship with and use of technology
in productivity tasks.

5.4

ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND ITS EFFECTS OVER THE INTERACTION
One key area where the social perception of technology alters seems to be the

perception of the interaction and the social effects it arouses in individuals. Early studies
showed how anthropomorphizing artificial agents make them more persuasive leading to
higher likelihoods of individuals conforming to their suggestions (Fogg & Nass, 1997)
(Ogawa, Bartneck, & Sakamoto, 2009). Nevertheless, the effects seem to go beyond
persuasion as some authors have reported multiple social effects such as social pressures
(Xu & Lombard, 2017), normative and informational social influence (Vollmer, Read,
Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018), group polarization effects (i.e. homophily) (Eyssel &
Kuchenbrandt, 2012), as well as social facilitation and social loafing effects (Park &
Catrambone, 2007) (Hall & Henningsen, 2008).
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Moreover, interactions with artificial agents have been reported to show different
components of empathy development as well as the formation of relationships with other
agents. These findings suggest that while individuals remain aware of the nature of these
agents, the social effects persist leading to interactions that resemble human to human
interactions to a great extent.

225

Figure 15 Consequences over the Interaction
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5.4.1

Social Effects, Influence, and Pressures
Interactions with anthropomorphic agents have been shown to lead to individuals

being influenced from a vast array of social effects. Early studies by Nass and colleagues
showed how perceiving a computer as a social agent led to both increases in its
persuasiveness (Fogg & Nass, 1997) (Fogg B. J., 2002) and homophily effects with the
corresponding dissimilar evaluation of agents perceived to be in-group, against agents
perceived to be part of the outgroup (Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 2012) (Go & Sundar, 2019).
Table 14 Type of social influence from anthropomorphism reported in the literature.
Type of Social

Sample Related Article

Influence
Persuasiveness

(Fogg & Nass, 1997) (Fogg B. J., 2002) (Ogawa, Bartneck, &
Sakamoto, 2009) (Lee E.-J. , 2010) (Patel, 2015)

Conformity

(Xu & Lombard, 2017)
(Hertz & Wiese, 2018)
(Gong, 2008)

Normative Social

(Vollmer, Read, Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018)

Influence
Informational

(Vollmer, Read, Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018)

Social Influence
Homophily: group

(Xu & Lombard, 2017)

polarization

(Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 2012)
(Go & Sundar, 2019)
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(Gong, 2008)
(Häring, Kuchenbrandt, & André, 2014)
Social Facilitation

(Park & Catrambone, 2007) (Hall & Henningsen, 2008) (Riether, Hegel,
Wrede, & Horstmann, 2012)

Expanding on these studies, Vollmer, Read, Trippas, and Belpaeme (2018)
explored whether social robots were able to exert peer pressure effects on individuals in
the form of normative and informational social conformity. Informational conformity
refers to the participants tendency to conform to others’ responses as they rely on them as
a source of information to information their own answers in a uncertain scenario. On the
other hand, normative conformity refers to the tendency individuals have to conform to
others’ answers because of social pressures when the correct responses are clear.
To explore their research question, the authors asked children and adults to
participate in a variation of an Asch paradigm methodology which places real participants
in a group of confederates of the researchers that the participant believes are other real
participants and see whether they conform to the groups tendency to respond in a way the
participant clearly believes is incorrect (Asch, 1956). Vollmer and colleagues personalized
their implementation of the Asch paradigm by including multiple social robots to compose
the majority group rather than rely on confederates, which would in turn give them the
capability to test whether those robots could stir up conformity effects. The study was
carried out in two experiments.
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In the first experiment, adults participated in the Asch paradigm experiment with
social robots as the other agents rather than confederates of the researchers. The results
showed no significant difference in the accuracy of the answers of the participants between
the control condition and the experimental condition suggesting that normative effects were
not achieved on the adults.
The second experiment aimed to explore whether children would be susceptible to
the social effects of the robots. The authors argued that since children were more
susceptible to social effects, testing the paradigm on them would reveal whether humans
were not influenced at all by social robots, or adults simply resisted the conformity effects.
The results of this second experiment saw children’s accuracy in their answers drop when
pressured by social robots in the experimental condition compared to their performance on
the control condition suggesting that they were being affected by the normative conformity
effects of the group of robots. Between the two experiments, Vollmer and colleagues
concluded that while artificial agents can exert normative effects on individuals, these
effects can be overridden as shown in the experiment with adults.
The results of Vollmer and colleagues work has been supported in the extant
literature with Hertz and Wiese (2018) showing that social robots exert informational
conformity on adults regardless of the appearance of the robot, while normative conformity
would take place as a function of the degree of human likeness of the agent with higher
levels of human likeness leading to stronger normative conformity effects. Additionally,
while Hertz and Wiese (Hertz & Wiese, 2017) indicated that mere images of agents of
varying degrees of human likeness were not enough to promote social facilitation effects,

229

other studies have shown that the presence of robots (Riether, Hegel, Wrede, & Horstmann,
2012) and virtual avatars (Park & Catrambone, 2007) of higher degrees of engagement
than a picture are sufficient for those effect to manifest (Woods, Dautenhahn, & Kaouri,
2005).
5.4.2

Empathizing with Artificial Agents
Social interactions with anthropomorphic agents have also been shown to be

capable of promoting the development of empathy towards artificial agents. Research
within this area has explore topics surrounding whether individuals can identify and
attribute emotions to those agents (Lee, Baek, & Ju, 2018), relate to the perceived emotions,
and promote prosocial behavior in the individual (Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2018).
One of the early studies on this topic was conducted by Riek, Rabinowitch, and
Chakrabarti (2009) explored how the level of human likeness in appearance of a robot
influences the empathy individuals’ feel towards it. Participants viewed a film featuring
one of five robots with as it was abused by humans who shouted, pushed and ordered it to
do embarrassing things. Afterwards, participants rated the robot in terms of how sorry they
felt for it and whether they would choose to save it. The results showed that individuals
felt more empathy towards robots as its human likeness increased.
While Riek and colleagues (Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson,
2009) provided a basis to support the relationship between anthropomorphism and empathy
towards artificial agents, Zaki and Ochsner (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012) argue that when
dealing with empathy, it becomes necessary to distinguish between it’s the multiple
processes that together come to produce the empathic state (Watt, 2005). These include
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mind reading or perspective taking in reference to a person’s ability to reason and make
inferences about the mental states of others, affect matching or experience sharing which
refers to a person’s tendency to resonate with and ‘feel’ the emotions of others, and
empathic motivation also known as prosocial concern in reference to a person’s
motivation to help others as a result of ring to the having reasoned about what others
experience or resonating with their emotions (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012, p. 676).

Figure 16 Recreation of Figure 1 of "Three major facets of empathy" by Zaki and Ochsner
(2012) page 676.

Affective
Congruence

Perspective
Taking (i.e. Mind
Reading/ToM)

Prosocial
Motivation

Based on this view, it seems reasonable to argue that the results presented by Riek
and colleagues (Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson, 2009) refer to both, a
form of affect matching, and a proxy for prosocial behavior (Lieberman M. D., 2013, p.
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152) since the experiment measured whether individuals felt sorry for the robot and
whether they would hypothetically help it if they could respectively.
Interestingly, since anthropomorphism is defined as an attribution of cognitive and
affective states to a non-human entity (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), and the
mechanisms through which it is studied rely heavily on the research into theory of mind
(Abubshait & Wiese, 2017), it seems reasonable to consider that anthropomorphizing a
technology by definition is closely related to taking the perspective of an “other” entity
encouraging an individual to start the process of empathizing with the technology as an
artificial agent (Airenti, 2015) (Airenti, The Development of Anthropomorphism in
Interaction: Intersubjectivity, Imagination, and Theory of Mind, 2018). Additionally, Lee,
Baek and Ju (2018) as well as McDonell and colleagues (McDonell, Jorg, Mchugh, Newell,
& O'Sullivan, 2009) provide further examples of how different individuals can perceive
emotions from these technologies with ease through anthropomorphic designs or variations
in body shape respectively.
Furthermore, Obaid, Kuchenbrandt and Bartneck (Obaid, Kuchenbrandt, &
Bartneck, 2014) propose how relying on yawn contagion can be used as a measured of the
empathy felt towards artificial agents in the form of “sharing someone’s emotional
reactions” (Obaid, Kuchenbrandt, & Bartneck, 2014, p. 260), which clearly represents a
form of affect matching based on the definition above by Zaki and Ochsner (2012). Obaid
and colleagues based this proposition on prior literature showcasing the relationship
between empathy between humans and the likelihood of a Yawn spreading among them as
it relates to social bonding and emotional closeness (Norsia & Palagi, 2011). While the
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authors did not provide evidence for their proposition, the same idea was later further
developed and tested by Lehmann and Broz with significant results showing in their
preliminary data (Lehmann & Broz, 2018).
More recently, Tahiroglu and Taylor (2018) explored the relationship between
social understanding, anthropomorphism and prosocial attitudes hypothesizing that
anthropomorphic tendencies in the form of the IDAQ measurement (Waytz, Cacioppo, &
Epley, 2010) would be significantly and positively correlated with prosocial behaviors and
empathy. The authors conducted a survey where they asked participants to answer
questionnaires for each construct of interest. Results indicated no correlation between the
IDAQ measurements and the self-reported prosocial attitudes. While at first appearing to
contract the past literature, it becomes important to assess what the authors measured.
First, the IDAQ questionnaire measures anthropomorphic tendencies rather than
anthropomorphism itself. That is, it measures the individual differences in tendency to
anthropomorphize an agent all else being equal, and it does so only from a from a reasoning
point of view where anthropomorphism can happen both consciousness (i.e. through
reasoning) or non-consciously. Additionally, the prosocial attitudes represent individual
tendencies to engage in prosocial behavior all else equal (Caprara, Steca, Zelli, & Capanna,
2005). Once more, the measurement used does not represent an actual instance of an
empathic state leading to motivation to help, but rather it reflects on individual’s
differences in tendency to be motivated to help all else equal. Therefore, the study
measured whether a correlation existed between individual differences in likelihood to
anthropomorphize (i.e. perceive cognitive and affective states in non-humans), and
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individual differences in likelihood to help in dire situations (i.e. prosocial motivation).
While the arguments described before support the idea of a correlation existing between
anthropomorphizing an entity and possessing prosocial motivation towards it, this is an
entirely different problem than whether a correlation exist in tendencies for
anthropomorphism and prosocial attitudes.
There appears to be a paucity of research into the relationship between prosocial
behavior and anthropomorphism from our point of view. This problem appears to be
exacerbated by a lack of consideration of the context of an interaction when studying
empathic processes as shown by Tahiroglu and Taylor (2018) and further argued by Clark
and colleagues (Clark, Boothby, Clark-Polner, & Reis, 2015). Clark and colleagues argue
that since the relational context of an interaction guides the antecedents, consequences and
frequency of prosocial behavior, a lack of consideration for the context of an interaction
would lead researchers to miss one of its central components.
Other studies that have explored the role of prosocial behavior include Larsen and
colleagues (Larsen, Lee, & Ganea, 2018) work on story telling with anthropomorphic
characters, and both Darling and colleagues (Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015) and
Barneck and colleagues (Bartneck, Verbunt, Mubin, & Al Mahmud, 2007) work on
empathy towards robots and willingness to harm them.
Larsen and colleagues explored whether presenting children with stories of
anthropomorphic agents in the form of human like animal characters would lead to an
increase in altruistic behavior. The results showed that rather than the character being
human like in appearance, it was the realism of the stories what significantly affected the
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likelihood of altruistic behavior increasing. Since the concept of anthropomorphism is
focused on the attribution of cognitive and affective states rather than the appearance of
the entity, we believe this study provides some support for the link between
anthropomorphism and prosocial behavior rather than evidence against it.
The works of Bartneck and colleagues (Bartneck, Verbunt, Mubin, & Al Mahmud,
2007) as well as Darling and colleagues (Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015) present us
with instances of actual prosocial behavior taking place when interacting with robots.
While neither study explicitly tested for anthropomorphism, Bartneck and colleagues
explored whether individuals’ willingness to destroy a robot would change as they perceive
the robot as possessing increasing levels of intelligence (i.e. an example of cognitive
states). Darling and colleagues on the other hand explored whether individuals’ willingness
to harm a robot would change as they bonded with it through storytelling and increasingly
projected life-like attributes on it (i.e. increased affective states). These studies show that
individuals would decrease their willingness to harm the robot as they bonded with it and
attributed intelligence and affective traits to it thus suggesting that increasing the
anthropomorphization of the robots led to higher prosocial behaviors.
Table 15 Role of anthropomorphism in evoking empathy from an artificial agent.
Empathic Process

Representative Work

Perspective Taking (Mind Reading)

(Lee, Baek, & Ju, 2018)
(McDonell, Jorg, Mchugh, Newell, &
O'Sullivan, 2009)
(Kwak, Kim, Kim, Shin, & Cho, 2013)
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(Böffel & Müsseler, 2018)
Affect Matching

(Obaid, Kuchenbrandt, & Bartneck, 2014)
(Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, &
Robinson, 2009)
(Lehmann & Broz, 2018)

Prosocial Motivation

(Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2018)
(Larsen, Lee, & Ganea, 2018)
(Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015)
(Bartneck,

Verbunt,

Mubin,

&

Al

Mahmud, 2007)
(Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, &
Robinson, 2009)
(Traeger, Sebo, Jung, Scassellati, &
Christakis, 2020)

5.4.3

Building Relationships with Artificial Agents
As suggested by the previous section, anthropomorphizing an agent appears to lead

to the formation of bonds between humans and the artificial agents which can lead to
significant changes in the interaction (Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015) (Bartneck,
Verbunt, Mubin, & Al Mahmud, 2007). Multiple other studies in the extant literature have
shown explicit or implicit evidence of these bonding effects and the changing nature of the
interaction between the agents involved such as the attribution of social roles and
responsibilities to artificial agents (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (Kory-Westlund,
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Relational AI: Creating long-term interpersonal interaction, rapport, and relationships with
social robots, 2019).
Multiple studies have investigated the process through which interpersonal
relationships with artificial agents are developed. Lemaignan and colleagues (Lemaignan,
Fink, Dillenbourg, & Braboszcz, 2014) developed a conceptual study in which they argued
that anthropomorphism would developed through three phases starting with an initial
interaction characterized by non-conscious initial perception of the other entity. After some
observation, an individual would go into a second phase where behavioral and cognitive
models of the entity are developed. Finally, after a model is created, an individual will enter
a third and final stage where they engage in a purposeful context-relevant interaction with
the entity and reshapes the behavioral and mental models of the entity. Evidence for the
development of an initial mental model and its role in forming a relationships with the
entity has been presented by Pitsch and Koch (2010).
Pitsch and Koch (2010) investigated recordings from a previous study in which
infants from 3 to 8 years of age played with a robot and conducted an Ethnomethodological
Conversation Analysis (EM/CA) to explore how they perceived and formed mental models
of the robots as well as how they stablished coordinated sequences of actions where the
children fed the robot Pleo in a manner resembling the purposeful interactions discussed
by Lemaignan and colleagues (Lemaignan, Fink, Dillenbourg, & Braboszcz, 2014). The
results of the study show a process through which children developed mental models of the
robot through a series of interactions progressively altering their mental models from an
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object, to an animate object, to a animate object capable of multiple engagement and back
to an object with multiple functions.
Fussell, Kesler, Setlock and Yew expanded the literature of how relationships are
formed by demonstrating that on-going interactions with an artificial agent can enhanced
the anthropomorphic mental model that participants hold of that agent solidifying their
relationships, a finding supported by research on the use of paralinguistic cues and backchanneling cues to strengthen the relationships with the artificial agents (Lee, Lee, & Sah,
2019) (Friedman, Kahn, & Hagman, 2003). A stream of research on this area has been
undertaken by Kory-Westlund and Cynthia Breazeal of the MIT Media Lab based on
research on how social robots can be deployed in classrooms in order to help young
students (Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019) (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (KoryWestlund, Relational AI: Creating long-term interpersonal interaction, rapport, and
relationships with social robots, 2019).
Kory and colleagues (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) became interested in whether
social robots could help children expand their vocabulary through active and dialogic book
reading exercises. Specifically, the authors decided to explore whether varying the level of
expressivity of a robot as it read a book and conversed with the children would affect the
effectiveness of the active reading session. The experiment possessed two conditions: one
with an expressive robot that spoke with variations in intonation and emotion, and a flatvoice condition in which the robot spoke with a monotone voice reminiscence of a text-tospeech engine with low variations in intonation. Regardless of the condition, the robot
narrated the book’s story with active reading techniques and using key target vocabulary
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words that children were meant to learn. Afterwards, children were tested on the new
vocabulary and asked to retell the story. The results show that despite children reporting
enjoying and learning similarly in both scenarios, those exposed to the expressive robot
were more focused, remember more words, and were significantly more likely to imitated
the robot when retelling their stories while spending more time telling them. These results
suggest that increasing the expressiveness of the robot improve the overall quality of the
interaction.
Expanding on the previous study, Kory-Westlund and Breazeal (2019) explored
how speech entrainment, that is the tendency to mimic the behavior of others in an
interaction, when interacting with children as well as the presentation of a backstory for
the robot affects the relationship between the robot and the children. To explore these
relationships, the authors conducted an experiment with a two by two between subjects
design with varying levels of entrainment (entrainment present vs no entrainment) and
varying levels of backstory (introduced a backstory or excluded the backstory). Similarly
to the previous study (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017), the robot told children a story using
some vocabulary that was new to the children and then asked them to retell the story.
Children exposed to the entrainment showed significantly more positive emotions and
fewer negative ones, while children exposed to the backstory were significantly more likely
to accept the robot possessed poor hearing abilities indicating the formation of a stronger
relationship. Moreover, children exposed to both the entrainment and backstory conditions
were more likely to use some of the new words introduced by the robot and use some of
the same phrases the robot had used before. Based on these results, it seems clear that both
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speech entrainment and giving the robot a backstory can significantly improve the quality
of the interaction and lead to higher rapport and learning.
These studies suggest that relationship building behaviors exhibited by technology
are effective in improving the interaction between humans and artificial agents in a similar
manner as they do in interactions between humans. While individual differences exist, the
extant literature shows that forming relationships with these agents is possible and can
enable key social effects such as the development of rapport and social influence, and the
ascription of roles to artificial agents (Kory-Westlund, Relational AI: Creating long-term
interpersonal interaction, rapport, and relationships with social robots, 2019) (Kim, Cho,
Ahn, & Sung, 2019) (Kory-Westlund, Relational AI: Creating long-term interpersonal
interaction, rapport, and relationships with social robots, 2019).
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Throughout this dissertation we have conducted a critical analysis of the results of the
extant research into anthropomorphism and the social perception of technology and used it
to form a model based of the factors influencing the anthropomorphic attribution and its
consequences. Since not all studies agree in their results , operationalization of the
construct and theoretical definition (Powers & Kiesler, 2006) (Kim & Sundar, 2012), we
consider it pertinent to reexamine these views on anthropomorphism through the lenses of
the critical analysis conducted above.

6.1

VIEWS ON ANTHROPOMORPHISM

6.1.1

Anthropomorphism as a form of irrational thinking in the young
Multiple researchers have explored the nature of anthropomorphism throughout the

years. Possibly the oldest and most influential conceptualization of anthropomorphism
comes from the work of Piaget as he explored the differences in reasoning style seen
between children and adults (The Child's Conception of the World, 1929). Through this
work, Piaget came into instances of animism and anthropomorphism from multiple
children who described objects’ behaviors in human like terms. While he often referred
these instances as animism or the tendency to perceive an entity as being alive and
intentional, Piaget’s records indicate multiple instances referring to cognitive and affective
state attributions that represent anthropomorphism rather than animism. In one such
description, a child explains that the sun “goes away” during bad weather “because it
doesn’t want to be rained on” (Piaget, 1929, p. 187) thus providing an entity, the sun, with
an affective state and consequently representing anthropomorphism. Following these
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descriptions, Piaget concluded that animism and anthropomorphism were forms of
irrational thinking that children expressed but were ultimately eliminated once they reached
adulthood.
Despite the importance of Piaget’s work towards the development of the theory of
cognitive development (Piaget, The origins of intelligence in children, 1936), his
conceptualization appears to be contested by the extant literature.
Firstly, while an individual’s age has been shown to lead to significantly differences
responses to anthropomorphic technology suggesting it plays a role in whether
anthropomorphism takes place or not (Vollmer, Read, Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018), the
literature shows multiple studies in which individuals anthropomorphize a technology
regardless of their particular age (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012).
Secondly, argument that it represented irrational form of thinking came forth from
his view that the children were developing and holding incorrect beliefs about the entities
argued. In his work, Piaget explicitly asked children of multiple ages about their beliefs
with questions such as “can the sum feel anything? […] why not?” (Piaget, 1929, p. 186)
which he came to view as the children’s incorrect beliefs. However, whether these
responses represent actual beliefs is under debate. In reviewing Piaget’s views on
anthropomorphism, Airenti (2018) notes that asking children questions in this form when
they had never considered these views, leads them to look for a potential solution to the
question which they end up expressing as if it was a belief. Moreover, recent research
strongly suggest that anthropomorphism can take place both through rational and conscious
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though (i.e. top-down processing) or in a non-conscious form (bottom-up processing)
further diminishing Piaget’s conceptualization (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015).

Proposition 1: Age will affect an individual’s likelihood to anthropomorphize an
entity only to the extent that it can influence other related factors (indirect effects only).

Proposition 2: Anthropomorphism is not limited to conscious, rational though and
instead can emerge from non-conscious processes.

6.1.2

Anthropomorphism as a form of perception
A different conceptualization of anthropomorphism was provided by Guthrie who

argued that anthropomorphism represented a form of perception of an entity (Guthrie S. ,
1995). For Guthrie, anthropomorphism is a rational process through which individuals
respond to uncertainties due to perceptual ambiguities, applying human like mental models
to them because of our familiarity with and ease of access of these models. While Guthrie’s
view of anthropomorphism may find some support as shown in studies relying on the
comparable construct of elicited agent knowledge from Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo’s
three factor theory of anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), multiple
studies show that anthropomorphism goes far beyond an initial response to an unknown,
and can instead developed into full interpersonal relationships (Kory-Westlund, 2019).
Moreover, recognizing human appearances or behaviors in a non-human entity is not
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enough to attribute cognitive or affective states such as intentions to the entity as
demonstrated by researchers’ failure to elicit anthropomorphism in studies relying on static
images alone as discussed in sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 (Sah & Peng, 2015) (Go & Sundar,
2019) (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012).

Proposition 3: Mere perception of humanlike characteristics is not enough to elicit
Anthropomorphism attributions.

6.1.3

Anthropomorphism as an automatic process

The next theory developed to explain the social perception of technology is the
CASA paradigm by Nass and colleagues (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994) (Nass & Moon,
2000). From the point of view of the authors, individuals would homogenously perceive
computers and other media solutions as social actors and interact with them accordingly.
Nass and colleagues initially rejected anthropomorphism as a potential explanation of the
social perception of technology since they consider it to represent a sincere belief that the
computer possessed human traits and characteristics and “should be understood in human
terms or should be treated as a person” (Nass & Moon, 2000, p. 82). The authors argued
instead for the concept of “Ethopoeia” which they described as “a direct response to an
entity as human while knowing that the entity does not warrant human treatment or
attribution” (Nass & Moon, 2000, p. 94). In essence, Nass and colleagues argued that the
social perception of technology was a non-conscious process that caused individuals to
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attribute human like qualities to the computer despite their better knowledge, which is more
in line with what we are discussing as anthropomorphism than their original
conceptualization.
Nass view can be understood as similar yet opposite to Piaget’s view. Whereas both
described anthropomorphism as an incorrect attribution, Piaget view it as a form of
conscious irrational though, while Nass and colleagues saw it as an automatic nonconscious response. Because of this, Nass argumentation appears to suffer from the
opposite flaw to Piaget with multiple studies showing anthropomorphism taking place
through inductive reason as suggested by Epley and colleagues three factor theory of
anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) and other studies relying on it.
Additionally, Nass view that anthropomorphism, or to be more precise, the social
perception of technology, is an homogeneous process has been challenge multiple times
with research showing vast ways in which individuals possess differences in their
tendencies to anthropomorphize technology (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Culley
& Madhavan, 2013) (Wang W. , 2017).

Proposition 4: Anthropomorphism is not limited to non-conscious, automatic
responses and instead can emerge from conscious inductive processes.
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6.1.4

Anthropomorphic Inductions and Anthropomorphic Interactions
Two of the most recent perspectives on anthropomorphism come from Urquiza-

Haas and Krotschal (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015) and from Airenti (Airenti, 2018)
both of which recognize the multifaceted nature of anthropomorphism.
Urquiza-Haas and Kortschal argued that when anthropomorphizing an entity,
individuals rely on the same cognitive mechanisms used when they interact with other
humans as suggested by social neuroscience research (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998)
(Martin & Weisberg, 2003). Based on this perspective, the authors argued that
anthropomorphism could emerge from both bottom-up or top-down mental processes. In
their view, these bottom-up processes would be characterized by non-conscious and
automatic responses to non-human agents resulting from automatic neurological
mechanisms of motor matching, agency detection and social cognition that indicate
animacy, agency, and intentionality. On the other hand, top-down processes would be
characterized by those reflective processes such as induction and causal reasoning that lead
individuals to ascribe non-human entities with human like qualities (Urquiza-Haas &
Kotrschal, 2015, p. 170).
Airenti (2018) agrees with Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal’s (2015) conceptualization,
however, she considers that it is important to explicitly distinguish between
anthropomorphic beliefs and an anthropomorphic interaction. Airenti argues that
anthropomorphism is a basic human attitude that emerges when humans engage with a
non-human entity in a modality typically reserved for human interlocutors such as when
an individual attempts to influence another to gain their cooperation. By doing so, she
argues that a person establishes a relation with the non-human agent leading to attributions

246

of intentionality and other social perceptions characteristic of anthropomorphism (2018, p.
8). From this point of view, she argues that an individual’s beliefs become immaterial to
the emergence of an anthropomorphic interaction except to the extent that these beliefs can
motivate the individual to initiate such an interaction in the first place.
Airenti’s built her rejection of the view of anthropomorphism as a set of beliefs
based on the observations that if we consider anthropomorphism as a belief it becomes
unfeasible to explain why non-human entities are anthropomorphized even when an
individual is aware it does not possess a mental life (Kim & Sundar, 2012), why an entity
can be anthropomorphized in one interaction only to be treated as an object in the next one,
why there is no consistency in the entities that are anthropomorphized (Kim & Sundar,
2012) (Araujo, 2018), and why individual’s tendency to anthropomorphized has been
shown to vary based on affective states of the individual rather than what a person knows
about the entity (Letheren, Kuhn, Lings, & Pope, 2016) (Airenti, 2018, p. 10). In Airenti’s
view, these limitations of anthropomorphism as a belief could be explained if we consider
it a form of interaction with non-conscious components that is only affected by an
individual’s belief to the extent these beliefs can impact other relevant factors. In such an
scenario, an individual’s awareness of the lack of inner life of an entity wouldn’t affect
whether it is anthropomorphized, the entity would be anthropomorphized only in those
interactions it is placed in the role of an interactant, an entity could be anthropomorphized
irrespective of its characteristics, and we would expect individuals’ to vary in their
tendency to anthropomorphized based on affective factors other than their beliefs about the
entity.
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Airenti’s argument remain compelling and demonstrate that anthropomorphism
cannot be based entirely on beliefs about an agent. Nevertheless, these arguments provide
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that anthropomorphism is entirely rooted in the nonconscious mechanisms surrounding the mode of interaction with the agent. Considering
anthropomorphism as having distinct potential origins from both top-down and bottom-up
processes, as argued by Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal’s (2015), means that we can explain
the four arguments against anthropomorphism presented by Airenti through the lens of
bottom-up processes (i.e. automatic non-conscious processes) while still allowing beliefs
and mental models about the non-human entity to encourage anthropomorphism.
Following this view, we would have to consider that anthropomorphic attributions reached
from bottom-up and top-down mental processes necessarily possess different
characteristics and implications or otherwise we wouldn’t observe the arguments made by
Airenti. The extant literature provides support for this expanded view. For example, the
studies on individual differences (see section 4.2.3 on this document) demonstrate that the
role of beliefs and mental model in increasing humans’ tendencies to anthropomorphize a
technology (Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) and, while not being necessary for an
anthropomorphic attribution to take place, the characteristics of a technology have been
shown to be capable of significantly increasing the tendency to anthropomorphize it as
discussed in section 4.4 of this document (Lee, Lee, & Sah, 2019) (Lee E.-J. , 2010) (Gong,
2008).
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It is also important to recognize that while these arguments suggest
anthropomorphism can emerge from both conscious and non-conscious processes,
Airenti’s conceptualization doesn’t reject the potential influence of mental models and
beliefs and instead argues the influence of these factors would be limited to indirect effects
to the extent that they can motivate an individual to engage in a communicative interaction
with the non-human entity. Therefore, the key difference between Airenti’s (2018) and
Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal’s (2015) conceptualization lays in whether the effects of a
person’s beliefs are indirect or direct respectively.
As we have discussed before in section 4.2.3 on the role of beliefs and mental
models, multiple researchers have explored the relationship between individual’s beliefs
and their tendency to anthropomorphize and shown significant positive effects (Marakas,
Johnson, & Palmer, 2000) (Schechtman & Horowitz, 2003)

with beliefs about the

intelligence, socialness, locus of control, and controls over rights and freedoms of the
technology being the most significant (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2008). Nevertheless,
the possibility remains that these effects are observed not because the beliefs directly lead
to anthropomorphism, but instead because they encourage individuals to engage in a
communicative interaction with the technology. Therefore, we propose that:

Proposition 5: Anthropomorphism achieved through bottom-up non-conscious
mechanisms (e.g. rationalization or induction) and anthropomorphism achieve through
conscious top-down mechanisms (e.g. belief systems or mental models) can possess a)
different characteristics and b) different effects.
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And we also consider it necessary to further expand our understanding of the nature
of the effects of beliefs about the technology on our perception of the technology as a social
agent.

RQ1: Why do beliefs and mental models about an artificial agent affect humans’
perception of the agent as a social being?

6.1.5

Anthropomorphic Motivators & Mind Perception
Other notable theories include Epley and colleagues three factor theory of

anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), and Gray, Gray, and Wegner’s
theory of mind perception (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Epley and colleagues’ view
focuses on the psychological determinants of anthropomorphism arguing that an
individuals’ desire to understand an entity’s behavior combines with their desire to
establish social connections with others to promote the anthropomorphization of the entity
specially in circumstances where human like referent knowledge is readily available. These
arguments appear to receive vast support from the extant literature as discussed in the
individual differences section above (see section 4.2.2).

Proposition 6a: An individual’s desire to understand the behavior of an entity
increases the likelihood of perceiving it as a social agent.
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Proposition 6b: An individual’s desire to establish social connections with others
increases the likelihood of perceiving an artificial agent as a social agent.

The mind attribution theory of Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) argues that people
perceive different characteristics of mind in different types of agents along the lines of
increased agency or apparent capacity to act on its own volition, and increased experience
or capacity to feel. As we have discussed under the sections on perceived moral agency
and accountability (see section 4.1.2) this theory has received vast support from empirical
research strengthening the argument that the key factors that lead humans to the attribution
of mind are the perception that an entity is either capable of acting or feeling or both (Gray
& Wegner, 2009) (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012).

Proposition 7a: the social perception of technology results from the perception that
an entity can act on its own volition.

Proposition 7b: the social perception of technology results from the perception that
an entity possesses a subjective experience.
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The extant empirical literature seems to support some of the key elements of each
outstanding theory of anthropomorphism and the social perception of technology, giving
us in the process a baseline through which we can further define what it means to
anthropomorphize an entity. So far, this brief critique of the existing theories suggests a
view of anthropomorphism as:

•

A phenomenon resulting from an interaction with an entity which emerges
from both automatic and rational psychological mechanisms due to the
perception of agency or subjective experience in an entity, and which is
promoted by an individual’s desire to connect and explain the behavior of
others.

Additionally, taking into account the similarity reported by Urquiza-Haas and
Kotrschal (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015) between the mental mechanisms used by
humans to perceive mind in others (i.e. mindreading) and those used to anthropomorphize
technology it seems reasonable to consider anthropomorphism to be a special case of
mindreading in which the target is an object or other non-human entity rather than an actual
human. Following this view, some significant implications arise.
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Firstly, the view of anthropomorphism as a special case of mind reading used in
interactions with non-living entities does explain the major weaknesses of each of the
previously presented theories of anthropomorphism, while also providing us with an
framework from which to continue exploring the phenomenon empirically. Specifically, it
gives us a theoretical basis to explore the mechanisms that lead to mind-reading and
empathy and how they relate to anthropomorphism. We will expand on this in the next
section.
Secondly, this perspective of anthropomorphism represents a unique form of
interaction. A form of interaction in which an entity breaks the boundary between what is
perceived to be alive and conscious and what is perceived not to be. Prior to our current
technological advances, the only instances in which humans encountered this type of
interaction was through pretend play, religion and occasional descriptions of objects or
natural phenomena (Guthrie S. E., 1993) (Airenti, 2015).

The current availability of technological artifacts such as voice assistants and
chatbots are transforming anthropomorphic interactions into a widespread phenomenon
relevant to the everyday life of organizations. Moreover, as advances in AI and social
robotics continue, it is expected that the autonomy of technology as well as its capacity to
express and respond to emotions will improve significantly potentially leading to
significantly more anthropomorphic interactions as the boundaries between objects and
subjects continue to blur (Gray & Wegner, 2012).
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Over the next two sections we will expand on what our critique of the literature on
anthropomorphism means for how we understand human computer interaction and explore
its potential implications in the development of Behavioral AI, and Relational AI.

6.2

THE NATURE OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM
Our analysis of the literature supports the view that anthropomorphism represents

a special case of mindreading as argued by Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (2015). This
support has been shown from the perspective of both behavioral and neuroscience research
focused on exploring the mechanisms underlying the anthropomorphic attribution and
other antecedents.
Behavioral research has documented cases of both conscious and non-conscious
anthropomorphic attributions taking place (Cullen, Kanai, Bahrami, & Rees, 2014) (Epley,
Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008), as well as significant increases in tendency to
anthropomorphize when either agency or social cues suggestive of experience are
presented to participants (Schroeder & Epley, 2016) (Lee, Lee, & Sah, 2019).
On a neurological basis, mechanisms associated with theory of mind (i.e. attribution
of cognitive and affective states in other humans) have also been shown to be activated
when anthropomorphizing an entity, and factors suggestive of agency (such as the
observation of biological looking movement) have been associated with encourage
automatic attributions of cognitive and affective states to non-human entities through
similar perceptual mechanisms as to those activated when interacting with other humans
(Hoenen, Lübke, & Pause, 2016) (Spunt, Ellsworth, & Adolphs, 2017).
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In addition to the research mentioned above, studies on the consequences of
anthropomorphism can also help us understand what it means to anthropomorphize an
entity including how and why humans do it. For example, while previous theories could
explain some effects such as changes in how individuals perceive the technology (see
section 5.1 for a discussion on this topic), these theories appear to be insufficient to explain
other reported effects such as changes in an individual’s sense of self and agency when
cooperating with an artificial agent (Ciardo, Tommaso, Beyer, & Wykowska, 2018)
(Grynszpan, et al., 2019), the capability of anthropomorphized technology to influence
users through social pressures and conformity effects (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017)
(Vollmer, Read, Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018), or even the development of bonds with and
empathy towards artificial agents (Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson,
2009) (Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2018).
The significance of these effects becomes more evident when we compare our
current understanding of the role of technology in an interaction to the results of the studies
exploring the social influence of anthropomorphic entities.

6.3

CHANGING IDENTITIES AND THE SENSE OF SELF THROUGH AGENTS

Within the field of Information Systems, technology has often been considered a
neutral entity capable of aiding users in carrying out a user’s actions effectively, with its
influence depending on how it is used as it alternates between constraining and facilitating
humans actions (Orlikowski, 1992, p. 410) (Hirschheim, 1986) (Marakas, Johnson, &
Palmer, 2000). Recently, researchers have become interested in how different technologies
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can alter an individual’s sense of self and own identity. Based on a combination of Identity
theory and Social Identity Theory, researchers have argued that these changes can lead to
changes in key factors that are widely studied in the field such as the individuals’ beliefs,
intentions and behaviors, and their overall performance.
Two prominent views on this topic are those of Carter and Grover’s IT Identity
(2015), as well as that of You and Robert robot identification and emotional attachment
(2018). In the next pages, we will briefly introduce their views, and present an alternative
way in which anthropomorphizing a technology can also result in significant changes in an
individuals’ sense of self and identity albeit through different mechanisms.

Table 16 Effect of modality on the type of influence technology exerted.
Modality

Type of

Nature of Influence

Influence
A

Technology
Neutral Tool

as Technology influences an individual’s behavior to the
extent that it enables or constrains a user’s actions
(Orlikowski, 1992)

B

Technology

as Technology influences individual by becoming part of

Extension of Self their own identity (Carter & Grover, 2015)
C

Technology as a Technology evokes homophily effects on an individual
reminder
Team

of as it acts as a referenced of a team the person is involved
with (You & Robert Jr., 2018)

Membership
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D

Technology as an Technology evokes social influence effects itself,
Agent

enabling to generate both team membership effects and
shared agency effects

6.3.1

Technology as an extension of the self

In their seminal article, Carter and Grover recently proposed the concept of IT
Identity as an important construct influencing how individuals’ self-perceptions change as
they use technology. The authors argued that as an individuals’ reliance on a particular
technology increases, they integrate the capabilities it enables into their own set of
perceived resources leading to the development of an extended sense of self that, in turn,
results in significant changes in behavior (Carter & Grover, 2015, p. 932).

Carter and Grover based their conceptualization on a combination of both identity
theories (McCall & Simmons, 1978) (Stryker, 1980) (Burke & Reitzes, 1991) and theories
of material identity (Dittmar, 2011) and argued that it is “reflected in an individual’s
feelings of relatedness, emotional energy and dependence when thinking of themselves in
relation to a particular IT” (Carter & Grover, 2015, p. 945).
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6.3.2

Technology as a reminder of group membership

The conceptualization of IT Identity provided by Carter and Grover was further
tested and expanded by You and Robert in their study on how identification and emotional
attachment with robots can improve team’s performance (You & Robert Jr., 2018). Within
the context of a team working with an embodied robot, You and Robert explored how the
team’s emotional attachment to its own robots affects the teams’ performance and viability,
and whether the robot and team identification can increase emotional attachment to the
robots. Where Carter and Grover saw a technology’s capabilities as potentially being
integrated in the self-concept of an individual, You and Robert proposed that a
technological artifact could also influence the identity of the individual through sensemaking (Weick, 1995) (Huettermann, Doering, & Boerner, 2016). Through sense-making,
individuals establish connection with other team members and starts seeing themselves as
members of the team developing emotional preferences for others that are perceived to also
be part of the team as oppose to outsiders (i.e. homophily or in-group and out-group
effects).
You and Robert (2018) argued that the connection with “in-groups” rather than
“outgroups” creates an emotional bond that can extent to objects that remind the individual
of their membership in the team. Therefore, the authors posited that an embodied robot
specifically, or a technological artifact in general, can lead individuals to perceive in-group
effects to the extent that they remind the individuals of their membership in the team (You
& Robert Jr., 2018, p. 384).
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In their study, You and Robert tested both forms of identification (i.e. technology
as an extension of self, and technology as a reminder of the group membership)
demonstrating that it lead to significant effects over the emotional attachment felt towards
an EPA robot both independently as well as jointly, which in turn led to improvements in
the teams’ performance and viability.
6.3.3

Technology as a Perceived Agent
While the work of Carter and Grover and You and Robert provide us with two ways

in which Information Technology usage can influence an individuals’ sense of self and
identity, anthropomorphism provide us with yet another approach (Carter & Grover, 2015)
(You & Robert Jr., 2018). The extant literature suggests that by anthropomorphizing a
technology, individuals ascribe mind to it, and through this mechanism they give it the
capability of evoking team membership effects (i.e. homophily) on the individual in turn
leading to the establishment of bonds between the person and the technology (Norsia &
Palagi, 2011) (Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015), the recognition of emotions and feelings
on it (Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson, 2009), and it can finally lead to
the desire to assist the technology through prosocial behavior (Bartneck, Verbunt, Mubin,
& Al Mahmud, 2007) (Traeger, Sebo, Jung, Scassellati, & Christakis, 2020).
In this way, anthropomorphism enables the creation of real relationships between
the individual and the robot, leading to social identity effects emanating from the
technology as the individual bonds and identifies with the technology on its own right
rather than reminisce about teams they belong to (You & Robert Jr., 2018). These
anthropomorphism-enabled relationships have also been shown to lead to other team
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effects such as the formation of joint-agency in tasks as discussed in section 5.2.2 (Barlas,
2019) (Ciardo, Tommaso, Beyer, & Wykowska, 2018) (Grynszpan, et al., 2019).
All three of these approaches function by influencing the formation of an
individual’s identity, however significant differences exist between them. Carter and
Grover’s conceptualization points towards the technology capabilities being incorporated
by its users (Carter & Grover, 2015) rather than the technology pointing to any form of
social influence as is the case for You and Robert’s argument (You & Robert Jr., 2018)
and for anthropomorphism, both of which depend on the technology evoking social effects
on the individual’s identity based on social identity theory. Moreover, the key difference
between You and Robert’s argument and anthropomorphism lays in the source of the social
influence. While You and Robert’s view the technology as a reminder for individuals of a
group membership similar to how a flag or uniform may remind a person of their
membership in a larger group, the anthropomorphic view sees the technology as an agent
capable of evoking those social effects that result in the formation of teams by itself.
This emergence of social effects from the technology itself can be observed in the
literature where cases of team membership (i.e. homophily) effects are perceived despite
the technology not being associated with any team the participant in the study may
recognize (Vollmer, Read, Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018) (Kory-Westlund, 2019). This is
further exemplified when examining the nature of the experiments conducted so far.
Multiple experiments demonstrated the capability of anthropomorphized technology to
exert social influence over users. Vollmer and colleagues (Vollmer, Read, Trippas, &
Belpaeme, 2018) showed how exposing a child to a group of robot, and asking them to
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answer a simple question while the robots answered erroneously (i.e. Ash paradigm)
increased their tendency to conform to the answers of the robot. Xu and Lombard (Xu &
Lombard, Persuasive computing: Feeling peer pressure from multiple computer agents,
2017) on the other hand demonstrated how sharing a color with computer agents led to
group identification effects. While the work of You and Robert may appear to be similar,
it is important to note that in their study participants had prior experience as a group and
their interactions with the robot merely remind them of their group membership through
material identity effects. This is not a possibility in neither Vollmer’s nor Xu and
Lombard’s work, after all participants had no prior experience with the artificial agents or
a group that could be reflected upon the robots the participant interacted with.
In this sense, the social pressures felt by participants in the anthropomorphism
studies had to originate from somewhere other than a prior group affiliation of participants
such as form the artificial agent itself. Moreover, studies on bonding and relationship
building with artificial agents have strengthen this view by demonstrating that as a robot
exhibits more behavior oriented to building relationships, participants emotional bonding
with the agent increases as does their performance (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (KoryWestlund & Breazeal, 2019).

Proposition 8: Anthropomorphizing technology leads to the perception of social
pressures emanating from the anthropomorphized technology.
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Combining our arguments with the current literature suggest that technology can:

•

Be viewed as a neutral object, in which case it influences interactions by either
constraining or facilitating individuals’ actions as the technology is used
(Orlikowski, 1992).

•

Be perceived as an extension of the self in which case individuals perceive the
technology’s capabilities as being their own changing their behavior (IT
becomes incorporated into the self) (Carter & Grover, 2015).

•

Be a projection of a social group the individual is affiliated to resulting in the
groups social effects being exerted through the technology (IT becomes a
projection of the teams’ influence on the self) (You & Robert Jr., 2018).

•

Be perceived as an independent agent in which case the technology exerts its
own social influence (IT as an independent agent).

Nevertheless, the extant literature suggests that these social effects can vary
significantly. Specifically, the effects observed appear to be closely dependent on the
characteristics of the artificial agent indicative of its inner life in the form of a capacity to
act and feel (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), and on the underlying mechanisms through
which the agent was first anthropomorphized (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015). In the
following section we will discuss these factors in more detail.
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6.3.4

Guiding the Social Effects of Anthropomorphic Agents

Our analysis of the extant literature suggests that how we interact with an artificial
agent is largely dependent on how we anthropomorphized it in the first place. Research in
social neuroscience and social psychology indicates that how an agent is
anthropomorphized largely depends on the combination of the factors related to attribution
of mind, namely perceived capacity to act and perceived capacity to experience (Gray,
Gray, & Wegner, 2007), as well as whether the anthropomorphization of the agent had a
non-conscious origin or was the result of rational consideration (Urquiza-Haas &
Kotrschal, 2015). These considerations lead us to propose a four factors model of
anthropomorphism that guides how it will affect the users’ future interactions with the
technology.
Figure 17 Factors affecting the way individuals interact with an anthropomorphized agent.
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6.3.5

Mind Attribution & Anthropomorphism: Relational and Behavioral AI

The first consideration that guides how we interact with artificial agents is how we
attribute a mind to it. The stream of research of Gray and Wegner proposes that the
attribution of mind to other beings goes along two dimensions: the entity’s apparent agency
and its apparent capacity to feel or experience (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). The stream
of research of Gray and Wegner has shown that humans rely on these dimensions to
evaluate other agents attributing them with different characteristics and leading significant
changes in how they are evaluated in terms of perceived responsibility based on how
capable of either experience or agency they perceive the entity to be (Gray & Wegner,
2009).

Figure 18 The perceived agency and experience attributed to different types of agents in
Gray, Gray, and Wegner’s (2007).
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Within the realm of information technology, a similar pattern has been described
with the stream of research of Kory-Westlund and Cynthia Breazeal (Kory-Westlund, et
al., 2017), as well as the work of Levillain and Zibetti (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017) providing
insights into how changes in the level of apparent experience and agency respectively,
affect how users interact with artificial agents.
Figure 19 A two-factor model of artificial agent's mind attribution based on Gray, Gray,
and Wegner’s (2007) work.

An autonomous robot representing a highly agentic technology, a Jibo robot
represents a highly experiential technology, and an hypothethical Strong AI represents the
intersection of a highly agentic and experiential technology equivalent to a human being.
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6.3.5.1 Perceiving Mental Agency: Behavioral Objects

In their research, Levillain and Zibetti (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017) introduced the
notion of behavioral objects, objects whose behavior became expressive on its own right
without being influenced by exogenous factors such as the object’s appearance. Levillain
and Zibetti identified three elements typically relied on to distinguish between a simple
movement, and an apparent behavior regardless of intentionality or agency. These include:

-

The existence of a transformation (i.e. a change of state) resulting

from the behavior that leads to a change in the world (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017,
p. 10).

-

The behavior of an entity is associated with a functional

organization that hold together to form an entity which is associated with the
behavior (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017, p. 11).

-

The behavior reflects a relationship between the entity and its

environment with either spontaneous or externally-initiated activities causing
them (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017, p. 11).
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Combining these factors, Levillain and Zibetti argue behavioral objects appear to
generate transformations themselves rather than because of external factors and whose
transformation appear to have meaning within the context of the environment. As such,
they defined behavioral objects as objects that appear to produce cues indicative of internal
states and a disposition to interact with the environment (Levillain & Zibetti, 2017, p. 11).

Levillain and Zibetti proposed a framework explaining how and why the
interpretation given to the behavior of these objects can lead to attributions of mental states
as its perceived complexity increases. Specifically, they argued that:

-

A behavioral object is likely to be perceived as animated if its behavior appears
to be consistent and capable of spontaneous changes in direction or activation
of motion. This is supported by studies discussed in section.

-

It will be assessed as possessing agency if its behavior appears to react
contingent to changes in the environment and capable of adjusting its trajectory
to achieve or reach apparent functional goals.

-

Finally, it will be perceived as possessing mental agency if is behavior reacts
consistently to other agent’s goals, including the display of apparent attempts
to engage in an interaction with the other agents.
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Levillain and Zibetti’s argues that the apparent capacity to coordinate its behaviors
with other entities at higher levels of complexity is viewed by individuals as a potential
indicator of an ability to infer mental states in others, and while the individual may know
that the object doesn’t possess such inner life, the effects can be strong enough to endure
(Levillain & Zibetti, 2017, p. 15). The extant literature seems to support this view with
other studies showing how simple movement can be interpreted as being animated or
human-like (Chaminade, Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007), contingent behavior being associated
with increases in agency perception (von der Pütten, Krämera, Gratch, & Kang, 2010, p.
1643) (Kang & Watt, 2013), and behavior that that’s into consideration other agents being
associated with cognitive state attributions (Wang, Lignos, Vatsal, & Scassellati, 2006)
(Schroeder & Epley, 2016) (Xu, 2018) as discussed under the artificial agents’ behavior
sections 4.4.8 and 4.4.9.
These increases have been associated with consequences that make it important to
consider. While initially the research of Gray and Wegner (Gray & Wegner, 2009) (Gray,
Young, & Waytz, 2012) pointed towards changes in the perceived responsibility of an
agent for the outcomes of its behaviors as its apparent agency increased, the extant
literature on anthropomorphism also points towards significant effects when using highly
agentic technologies to carry out tasks (Obhi & Hall, 2011). Specifically, the literature
suggests that when individuals perform joint-tasks with highly agentic technology, a sense
of joint-agency (i.e. shared-agency) develops where regardless of the actual role in
producing a result, an individual consciously registers agency for the outcome of an activity
despite non-consciously indicating a different level of agency (Obhi & Hall, Sense of
agency and intentional binding in joint action, 2011).
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Pacherie describes this phenomenon as a perceived boundary loss where selfawareness blurs and an increase in the sense we-ness or joint agency develops (Pacherie,
2012). Contrary to the self-extension reported by Carter and Grover (Carter & Grover,
2015), these joint-agency effects appear to be dependent on perceiving the technology as a
collaborator with its own intention, and the joint task as a responsibility of both the
individual and the technology (McEneaney, 2013, p. 803) (Limerick, Coyle, & Moore,
2014, p. 7) as discussed in section 4.2.2 on “Changing Self-Evaluations & the Sense of
Self”.

6.3.5.2 Perceiving Experience: Relational AI

On the other side of the model, multiple studies have shown how increasing the
apparent capacity to feel of an entity can lead to the development of relationships with it
allowing individuals to perceive the emotions of the entity (Lee, Baek, & Ju, 2018) (Böffel
& Müsseler, 2018), feel it in themselves (Riek L. D., Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, &
Robinson, 2009) (Lehmann & Broz, 2018), and even feel motivated to assist (Larsen, Lee,
& Ganea, 2018) (Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015). The stream of research of KoryWestlund and her advisor Cynthia Breazeal represent one of the most comprehensive views
of this topic.
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In her research, Kory-Westlund became interested in how social robots could be
used to help children’s learning, and hypothesized that the children’s in-class engagement
and learning can be significantly enhanced through the use of relational AI by building
long-term interactions. Relational AI was defined as those autonomous technologies that
aim to build and maintain socio-emotional relationships with users over the long term
through the use of a human-centered, collaborative and reciprocal focus (Kory-Westlund,
2019, pp. 58-59).

Figure 20 Kory-Westlund's diagram on the components of Relational AI as presented in
her dissertation work (Kory-Westlund, 2019).
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Kory-Westlund defined six characteristics of Relational AI which she used as a
basis to promote relationships between children and social robots (Kory-Westlund, 2019,
p. 60):
-

The AI needed to be capable of handling repeated encounters with the user
and as well as capable of acknowledging shared experiences between the user
and the AI.

-

The AI must also be capable of changing over time because of the interaction
with the user and this change must be exhibited in a way that users will perceive
as meaningful and contingent.

-

It must model human relationships by being responsive to the users’ behavior.
The author argues this is key to form rapport and showcase entrainment (i.e.
mirroring behavior) and social reciprocity.

-

The AI must also respond to the emotional states of the user and act in a
friend-like manner to promote attachment and build friendship, empathy, and
affection.

-

Finally, the AI must be capable of reciprocity exhibiting information
disclosures, offering help, converse, and performed joint activities with the
user.
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What Kory-Westlund’s conceptualization of Relational AI provides to the
discussion on anthropomorphism is a series of guidelines as to how the technology can be
developed to express higher levels of experience. The effects and importance of this is
further shown in her research stream. Her work shows important considerations of the
implications of relational behavior, engagement, and rapport building as tools to cultivate
a relationship that was then shown to lead to significant improvements in engagement and
performance (Kory-Westlund, et al., 2017) (Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, Exploring the
Effects of a Social Robot's Speech Entrainment and Backstory on Young Children's
Emotion, Rapport, Relationship, and Learning, 2019) (Kory-Westlund, Relational AI:
Creating long-term interpersonal interaction, rapport, and relationships with social robots,
2019). These effects appear to form the basis through which the social effects of
anthropomorphic technologies, such as social pressures and conformity effects, emerge as
the increasing bonding and empathy towards the artificial agent leads users to engage in
prosocial behavior with it (Kwak, Kim, Kim, Shin, & Cho, 2013) (Darling, Nandy, &
Breazeal, 2015).
Based on these views, while the effects of increase agency lead users to attribute
higher responsibility to the artificial agent and also enable them to share their own
perceived agency with it, the effects of increasing the perceived experience of the artificial
agent enables the formation of relationships and empathy towards the entity as well as the
emergence of social effects from it. The final consideration as to how individual will
interact with an artificial agent seems to surround the way they initially anthropomorphized
it.

272

6.3.5.3 Conscious and non-Conscious Sources of Anthropomorphism

As described by Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015),
the process of anthropomorphizing an artificial agent seems to rely on the same
neurological and cognitive mechanisms associated with the recognition of mind in other
humans including processes of agency detection, mind attribution and empathy
development, as well as conscious processes of causal and inductive reasoning.

Lieberman and Spunt have conducted a series of studies exploring how these nonconscious processes take place and argued that multiple mental processes work in
conjunction to explain different aspects of the question. In this stream of research, the
mirror neuron system of the brain works in together with the mentalizing system to identify
how and why other individuals’ actions are taking place respectively, and together they
mark the first step in the process of developing feelings towards other agents starting the
process towards achieving an empathic state (Lieberman M. , 2007) (Spunt, Falk, &
Lieberman, 2010).
According to Spunt and Lieberman, the mirror system of the brain (see section 2.3.2
for a review of the literature of this topic) (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) (Gazzola, Rizzolatti,
Wicker, & Keysers, 2007) is activated almost instantly at the beginning of an interaction
and functions to provide humans with a basic understanding of how an action took place,
while the mentalizing systems becomes highly active once an individual attempts to answer
the question of why the entity acted the way it did (Spunt, Falk, & Lieberman, 2010)
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(Geiger, et al., 2019). These two systems are described as forming the basis to how humans
perceive agents, and can either act separately or in conjunction to encourage the activation
of mindreading processes where the entity is attributed with cognitive and affective states
(Lieberman M. , 2007) which are equivalent to the process of anthropomorphization though
within the realm of human to human interaction. This process of mindreading forms the
initial step necessary in the formation of empathy towards other agents as it allow us to
understand what others are feelings, but it still must be expanded by processes of affect
matching and prosocial motivation, corresponding to feeling what the others are feeling
and desiring to act accordingly, to reach a full empathic state (Wicker, et al., 2003) (Spunt
& Lieberman, 2012).
Figure 21 Model describing the mechanisms guiding why we Anthropomorphize.

Relationships between different neural systems supporting the attribution of cognitive
and affective states to others as well as the development of an empathic state.
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This work within the field of social neuroscience supports the argument by
Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015) that automatic neural
processes enable individuals to perceive an artificial agent as humanlike, attribute them
with cognitive and affective states, relate and feel to these affective states, and finally react
with a desire to help, or avoid these agents (Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2014)
(Batson, 2014). Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal argue these processes are further expanded
by conscious and reflective processes of inductive reasoning where an individual transfers
prior knowledge about a subject or object on to a new one (Heit E. , 2000) and causal
reasoning where the individual uses acquired knowledge about the world to explain
behavior when dealing with nonhumans (Horowitz & Bekoff, 2007).

Figure 22 Illustration of Deductive/causal reasoning and Inductive reasoning by Bryman
(Bryman, 2012).

275

An agent can be anthropomorphized through either approach which can result in
both variations in the effects over the individual interacting with the agent and with
contradictions between the conscious and non-conscious evaluations that need to be
resolved (Vollmer, Read, Trippas, & Belpaeme, 2018).
The implicit bottom-up processes bring about an initial evaluation of the agent
guided by an individual’s mental representations and biases about the agent, which
encourage its continued evaluation as a social being and potential development of empathy
and bonding with the agent through the attribution of affective states to it (Riek L. D.,
Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson, 2009). On the other hand, the reflective processes
involve a more conscious evaluation of the agent which may results in the attribution of
simple cognitive and affective states to the agent that further affect the on-going interaction
(Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015, pp. 170-171).
Important difference between these processes becomes evident when we consider
the match or mismatch between these evaluations. Whereas human to human interaction
will typically result in a perceptual match between conscious and non-conscious
evaluations of the other individuals with the possible exception of the objectification and
dehumanization of others (Haslam, 2006) (Zlotwski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, &
Ishiguro, 2017), the social perception of artificial agents is likely to result in discrepancies
in how individuals perceive it (de Borst & de Gelder, 2015). These discrepancies in the
social perception of the agent can result in cognitive dissonance effects that an individual
must them solve, potentially explaining conflicting results found on the extant literature as
discussed in section 5.1.1 on Attitudes Toward Artificial Agents.

276

If no contradiction exist between the conscious and non-conscious perception of an
agent, it seem reasonable to consider the agent will be treated in a similar way as a human
treats another human, at least in terms of the agent being perceived as a social being.

Proposition 9: If the conscious and non-conscious perception of the entity match,
the entity should be treated as a) an object, or b) a full subject depending on the nature of
the perception.

However, differences between conscious and non-conscious evaluations are likely
to result in significant differences in how individuals perceive the artificial agent depending
on their cognitive load (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015, p. 172) and whether they are
explicitly asked to evaluate the agent as an anthropomorphic entity as discussed in section
4.2.3 on Beliefs and Mental Models about technology. Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal
(Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015) posit that if there is a high cognitive load such as the
individual being involved in an intensive task, the conscious evaluations would be
suppressed, and the non-conscious perception would flourish.

Proposition 9c: If experiencing a high cognitive load, an individual’s conscious
evaluations would be suppressed, and the non-conscious evaluation would be exhibited.
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On the other hand, if the individual is tasked to explicitly evaluate an artificial agent
while the cognitive dissonance remains unsolved, the non-conscious processes would have
little influence over the evaluation, and the conscious understanding of the agent would be
exposed.

Proposition 9d: If an individual experiencing cognitive dissonance is asked to
evaluate an anthropomorphic entity, the individual would excessively rely on the conscious
perception of the agent to describe it.

6.3.6

Putting It All Together
Despite the vast number of variables influencing the anthropomorphic attributions,

the way individuals interact with an artificial agent appears to be highly dependent on how
it was first anthropomorphized. The model above suggest that four categories play a
significant role in this perception but it remains important to recognize that they represent
ranges rather than discrete categories and as such most anthropomorphic attributions will
likely fit somewhere within that range. Moreover, as individuals’ interactions with the
anthropomorphic agent continue, their perception of the agent is likely to continue to
evolve making it difficult to predict exactly how they will engage. Nevertheless, the
framework presented above can inform our understanding of how cognitive load and
awareness of the nature of a technology can affect the interaction, and, more importantly,
how teams of users and artificial agents can develop a relationship among them, and change
their behavior when engaging in joint tasks.
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APPENDIX

Figure 23 Comparator Model of Motor Control as defined by Synofzik, Vosgerau, &
Newen (2008).
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1. The hybrid model of Perception of Agency
Figure 24 The Hybrid model of Agency Perception as presented by Moore in
(Moore J. W., 2016).

Figure 25 Model of Theory of Mind presented by Yoshida and Colleagues (Yoshida,
Seymour, Friston, & Dolan, 2010).
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Figure 26 Social and analytical cognition operating at odds with each other as if on a seesaw (Lieberman M. D., 2013).

2. Components of Theory of Mind (TOM)
Figure 27 Model detailing the components of Theory of Mind as presented by Gage, &
Baars (2018).
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Sundar,
2019)
(Go &
Sundar,
2019)

(Go &
Sundar,
2019)

(Go &
Sundar,
2019)

(Hoenen,
Lübke, &
Pause,
2016)

Neuron System
increased;

63

Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

64

Linguistic
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

67

Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues
Linguistic
Anthropomorp
hic Cues
Linguistic
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

68

Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

65

66

-

Social
Perception

-

Social
Perception

-

-

Public Selfawareness

Not Supported;
Significant. Personal
Linguistic style induced
higher social perception
than impersonal
linguistic style;
Significant. Visual
anthropomorphic cues
increased public selfawareness compared to
non-anthropomorphic
visual cues;

-

-

Public Selfawareness

Not Supported;

-

-

Private Selfawareness

-

-

Private Selfawareness

-

-

330

(Sah &
Peng,
2015)

(Sah &
Peng,
2015)

(Sah &
Peng,
2015)
(Sah &
Peng,
2015)
(Sah &
Peng,
2015)

Not Supported;
**Opposite Direction.
Contrary to what was
expected, Visual
Anthropomorphic Cues (Sah &
induced higher private
Peng,
self-awareness than non- 2015)

anthropomorphic visual
cues;

71

Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues
Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues
Linguistic
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

72

Public Selfawareness

69

70

74

Private Selfawareness
Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

75

Visual
Anthropomorp
hic Cues

73

-

Information
Disclosure

Not Supported;

-

Question Type

Information
Disclosure

Not Supported;

-

Question Type

Information
Disclosure

-

Information
Disclosure

-

-

Information
Disclosure

Private Selfawareness

-

Information
Disclosure

-

Information
Disclosure

-

-

Public Selfawareness
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Not Supported;
Significant. Increases in
public self-awareness
led to more questions
the participants refused
to answer;
Signiicant. The more
the particiapnts felt
private self-awareness,
the more they disclosed;
**[was not a priori
hypothesis] Not
Supported;
**[was not a priori
hypothesis]
Significant. Visual
anthropomorphic cues
caused an increased in
public self-awareness

(Sah &
Peng,
2015)
(Sah &
Peng,
2015)
(Sah &
Peng,
2015)

(Sah &
Peng,
2015)
(Sah &
Peng,
2015)
(Sah &
Peng,
2015)

(Sah &
Peng,
2015)

that in turn caused a
decline in disclosure;

77

Handheld
Device
Viewing
(opposed to
Non-handheld
Device
Viewing)
Handheld
Device
Viewing
(opposed to
Non-handheld
Device
Viewing)

78

Handheld
Device
Viewing
(opposed to
Non-handheld
Device
Viewing)

76

-

-

-

Explicit
Assessment of
Personhood

-

Implicit
Assessment of
Personhood

-

Psychological
Ownership

-
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Significant. Argues for
Lower Explicit
Assessment of
Personhood for the
Profiled Person;

(Banks,
Westerman
,&
Sharabi,
2017)

Significant. Argues for
Lower Implicit
Assessment of
Personhood for the
Profiled Person;
Partial Support.
Positively associated
with dimensions of
psychological
ownership over the
profile person; Partial
support because the
elements of
psychological
ownership were
measured
independently.
Specifcally, Holding the

(Banks,
Westerman
,&
Sharabi,
2017)

(Banks,
Westerman
,&
Sharabi,
2017)

device in hand reduces
belonging and selfefficacy dimensions of
psychological
ownership, while
territoriality,
accountability, and selfidentity were not
affected;
Significant. Head tilts
increased the attributed
human-likeness of the
robot;

79

Head posture

-

-

Perceived
Human
likeness

80

Head posture

-

-

Dominance

Not Supported;

81

Head posture

-

-

Attractiveness

-

Interpersonal
Warmth

Not Supported;
Not Supported. Though
results for the telenoid
robot alone were
significant suggesting
that the specific
appearance of the robot (Mara &
was playing some effect Appel,
here;
2015)

82

Head posture

-
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(Mara &
Appel,
2015)
(Mara &
Appel,
2015)
(Mara &
Appel,
2015)

83

Head posture

84

Behavioral
Realism

85

86

87

88

89

Behavioral
Realism

Behavioral
Realism
Higher
Fidelity
(Visual
Realism)
Higher
Fidelity
(Visual
Realism)
Higher
Fidelity
(Visual
Realism)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cuteness

-

Psychological
Copresence

-

Social
Richness of
Medium
Interactant
Satisfaction
with
Communicatio
n

-

Psychological
Copresence

-

Social
Richness of
Medium

-

Interactant
Satisfaction
with

-
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Significant. Robots
with head tilted were
rated as cuter;

(Mara &
Appel,
2015)
(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

Not Supported;
Significant. Higher
behavioral realism of
avatar will create greater (Kang &
social richness of the
Watt,
medium;
2013)

Not Supported;

Not Supported;
Significant. Higher
fidelity avatars (quality
of avatar image) lead to
greater reports of social
richness of the medium;

Not Supported;

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)
(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)
(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

Communicatio
n

91

Anthropomorp
hism of Avatar
(Visual
Realism)
Anthropomorp
hism of Avatar
(Visual
Realism)
-

92

Anthropomorp
hism of Avatar
(Visual
Realism)
-

93

Anonymity of
Avatars
(Visual
Realism)

94

Anonymity of
Avatars
(Visual
Realism)

-

-

95

Anonymity of
Avatars

-

-

90

-

Psychological
Copresence

-

-

Social
Richness of
Medium
Interactant
Satisfaction
with
Communicatio
n

-

Psychological
Copresence

-

Social
Richness of
Medium
Interactant
Satisfaction
with
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Significant. More
anthropomorphic
avatars led to greater
psychological
copresence;

Not Supported;
Significant. More
anthropomorphic
avatars led to greater
Satisfaction with
Communication;
Significant. Nonanonymous avatars led
to greater reports of
psychological
copresence;
Significant. Nonanonymous avatars led
to greater reports of
Social Richness of the
Media;
Significant. Nonanonymous avatars led
to greater reports of

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)
(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)
(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Visual
Realism)

96

Presence of
Avatar (Visual
Realism)

97

Presence of
Avatar (Visual
Realism)

98

Presence of
Avatar (Visual
Realism)

99

Actual
Partner's
Behaviour,
Perception of
Partner;

Communicatio
n

-

-

-

-

-

Psychological
Copresence

-

Social
Richness of
Medium

-

Interactant
Satisfaction
with
Communicatio
n

-

Participant's
Strategy
Selection
Behavior
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Satisfaction with
Interaction;
Partial Support. The
effect of the avatar
presence varied
depending of the avatar
characteristics and could
be positive, negative or
null;
Partial Support. The
effect of the avatar
presence varied
depending of the avatar
characteristics and could
be positive, negative or
null;
Partial Support. The
effect of the avatar
presence varied
depending of the avatar
characteristics and could
be positive, negative or
null;
**Significant.
Participants are
influenced to a greater
degree by the
representation of the
partner (perceived

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Kang &
Watt,
2013)

(Miwa &
Terai,
2012)

100

101

102

Actual
Partner's
Behaviour,
Perception of
Partner;

Actual
Partner's
Behaviour,
Perception of
Partner;
Actual
Partner's
Behaviour,
Perception of
Partner;

-

-

-

-

Participant's
Strategy
Selection
Behavior

-

Participant's
Strategy
Selection
Behavior

-

Impressions
about the
partner (Social
Desirability,

337

Partner) than by the
partner's actual
behavior; [How do we
graph or write this?
Also, it conflicts with
the 2nd Hypothesis
meaning that they
cannot be considered
confirmatory, instead
consider exploratory]
** Not Supported.
Participants were not
influenced to a greater
degree by the behavior
of the partner rather than
the perception;
** Not Supported.
Didn't find support to
the hypothesis that the
influence of one aspect
of the partner (actual
behavior and perception
of partner) varied
depending on the other;
** Not Supported. No
support for the
hypothesis (H4) that
participants will be
influenced to a greater

(Miwa &
Terai,
2012)

(Miwa &
Terai,
2012)

(Miwa &
Terai,
2012)

Individual
Likeability)

103

104

105

Actual
Partner's
Behaviour,
Perception of
Partner;

Participant's
Strategy
Selection
Behavior

Agent Type

-

-

-

-

Impressions
about the
partner (Social
Desirability,
Individual
Likeability)

-

Impressions
about the
partner (Social
Desirability,
Individual
Likeability)

Social
Perception

-
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degree by the
representation of the
partner than by the
actual behavior;
** Partial Support.
(H5) Participants'
likeability of the partner
was significantly
affected by the partner's
actual behavior. No
support was found for
the social desaribility
however;
** Partial Support.
(H6) Participants' social
desirability of the
partner was significantly
affected by the partner's
participant's own
behavior. No support
was found for the
likeability however;
Not Supported. No
support for most
dependent variables.
Only one main effect
found: artificial agent
experience more
negative feelings with

(Miwa &
Terai,
2012)

(Miwa &
Terai,
2012)
(von der
Pütten,
Krämera,
Gratch, &
Kang,
2010)

106

107

108

Behavioral
Realism

Behavioral
Realism
Anthropomorp
hic
Appearance

-

-

Social
Perception

-

-

Agent Type

-

-

Positive Social
Judgement

339

Low-Dominance than
Avatar (equivalent to
more social presence on
Artificial Agent than
Avatar which is contrary
to hypothesis);
Significant. Specifically
in the forms of a change
in the person perception
(higher negative lowdominance), and
increase in feelings of
social presence (mutual
awareness), and an
increase in use of words
during the interaction;
[NO EFFECTS WERE
FOUND FOR SELFDISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION]
**[representation is
probably incorrect]
Not Supported; No
Interaction was found
between agency and
behavioral realism;
Significant. The more
anthropomorphic a
computer representation,

(von der
Pütten,
Krämera,
Gratch, &
Kang,
2010)
(von der
Pütten,
Krämera,
Gratch, &
Kang,
2010)
(Gong,
2008)

109

Anthropomorp
hic
Appearance

-

-

110

Anthropomorp
hic
Appearance

-

-

111

Anthropomorp
hic
Appearance

-

-

112

Anthropomorp
hic
Appearance

-

-

the more positive the
social judgement it
receives;
Significant. The more
anthropomorphic a
Homophily
computer representation,
(group
the greater homophily it
perception)
generated;
Significant. The more
anthropomorphic a
computer representation,
Social
the higher the social
Influence
influence it generated;
**[significant for most
levels, except it
dropped slightly for
medium and high
anthropomorphic
levels] Significant. The
more anthropomorphic a
computer representation,
the more competence
Competence
participants perceived;
Significant. The more
anthropomorphic a
computer representation,
Trustworthines the more thrust worthy it
s
was perceived;

340

(Gong,
2008)

(Gong,
2008)

(Gong,
2008)

(Gong,
2008)

113

Anthropomorp
hic
Appearance
(of Avatar
representing
Participant)

114

Androgyny (of
Avatar
representing
Participant)

115

Androgyny (of
Avatar
representing
Participant)

116

Androgyny (of
Avatar
representing
Participant)

117

118

Use of Instant
Messaging
Computer
Efficacy (of
User)

-

-

-

-

-

Credibility (of
Avatar)

-

Credibility (of
Avatar)

-

Credibility (of
Avatar)

-

Anthropomorp
hic Perception
(of Avatar)

-

-

-

-

Computer
Efficacy
Anthropomorp
hic Perception
(of Avatar)
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Significant. The more
anthropomorphic the
appearance of the
Avatar the more
credible it was deemed;
Not Supported. No
direct link between
Androgyny (middle
between appearing male
and female) and
credibility;
Sinificant. People that
are perceived as more
androgynous are also
perceived as less
credible;
Significant. The more
androgynous an avatar
is, the less
anthropomorphic it is
perceived;
Significant. Users who
use more Instant
Messaging, feel more
computer efficacy;
Not Supported.
Computer Efficacy had
no effect on

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)
(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)
(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

119

Computer
Efficacy (of
User)

120

Androgyny (of
Avatar
representing
Participant)

121

Credibility (of
Avatar
representing
Participant)

122

----

-

-

-

----

-

Androgyny (of
Avatar)

-

Androgyny
Perception of
Participant

-

Credibility (of
Participant)

-----

-----

342

anthropomorphic
perception of Avatar;
Not Supported.
Computer Efficacy had
no effect on Androgyny
perception of Avatar;
Significant. Participants
represented by
Androgynous avatars
were perceived as being
more androgynous than
participants represented
by less androgynous
avatars;
Significant. Participants
represented by more
credible avatarswere
perceived as being less
credible than
participants represented
by less credible avatars;
SIGNIFICANT
EFFECTS FOUND
BETWEEN ANTHRO
AND TRUST,
COMPLIANCE, AND
TEAM
PERFORMANCE;
REVIEW ARTICLE

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

(Nowak &
Rauh,
2008)

(de Visser,
et al.,
2017)

123

124

125

----

Mind
Perception

Mind
Perception

126

Mind
Perception

127

Mind
Perception

128

Mind
Perception

----

-

-

Co-Presence
(Social
Presence)

Closeness

-----

-----

-

Co-Presence
(Social
Presence)

-

Closeness

-

Intention to
Use

-

Intention to
Use

-

Intention to
Use

343

AGAIN TO SPECIFY
HYPOTHESES;
Intrument Development
on Moral Agency;
Significant. Increases in
perception of mind led
to increases in
perception of copresence;
Significant. Mind
Perception within a
chatbot leads to greater
experience of closeness;
Significant. Mind
Perception lead to
increased intention to
use;

Not Supported;
Partial Support. All
paths were supported
except that the effect
was contingent on backchanneling cues and
paralinguistic cues so
that when neither was
present, the indirect
effect of mind

(Banks,
2019)

(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
2019)
(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
2019)
(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
2019)
(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
2019)

(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
2019)

perception on intention
to use was not
significant.
Additionally, the direct
effect of mind
perception on intention
to use was not
significant when testing
for the mediating effect
of closeness;

129

Paralinguistic
Cues

-

-

Co-Presence
(Social
Presence)

130

Paralinguistic
Cues

-

-

Closeness

131

132

133

Paralinguistic
Cues
Backchanneling
Cues
Backchanneling
Cues

-

-

-

-

Intention to
Use
Co-Presence
(Social
Presence)

-

-

Closeness

344

(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
2019)

Not Supported;
Partial Support.
Paralinguistic Cues
increased closeness only
in the high mindperception condition
(Lee, Lee,
without back-channeling & Sah,
cues;
2019)
(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
Not Supported;
2019)
(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
Not Supported;
2019)
Partial Support. Back(Lee, Lee,
channeling cues
& Sah,
increased closeness
2019)

when paralinguistic cues
were absent and mind
perception was high;

134

Backchanneling
Cues

135

Game
Cognition
Demand

-

Intention to
Use

-

-

Brand
Attention

136

Game
Cognition
Demand

-

-

Recall

137

Game
Cognition
Demand

-

-

Recognition

Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity)
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs

Brand
Attention

138

139

High Game
Cognition
Demand
High Game
Cognition
Demand

-

-

-

345

Recall

(Lee, Lee,
& Sah,
Not Supported;
2019)
Significant. (H1) Higher (Sreejesh
Cognition Demand leads &
to lower Brand
Anusree,
Attention;
2017)
(Sreejesh
Significant. (H1) Higher &
Cognition Demand leads Anusree,
to lower Brand Recall;
2017)
Significant. (H1) Higher (Sreejesh
Cognition Demand leads &
to lower Brand
Anusree,
Recognition;
2017)
Significant. (H2a) In
high cognition demand,
brand interactivity (as
opposed to game
interactivity and no
(Sreejesh
interactivity) generated
&
higher brand attention,
Anusree,
recall, and recognition;
2017)
Significant. (H2a) In
high cognition demand, (Sreejesh
brand interactivity (as
&

Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity)

140

High Game
Cognition
Demand

141

Low Game
Cognition
Demand

-

142

Low Game
Cognition
Demand

-

143

Low Game
Cognition
Demand

-

-

Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity)
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity)
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity)
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity)

346

Recognition

opposed to game
interactivity and no
interactivity) generated
higher brand recall;
Significant. (H2a) In
high cognition demand,
brand interactivity (as
opposed to game
interactivity and no
interactivity) generated
higher brand
recognition;

Brand
Attention

Not Supported;

Recall

Not Supported;

Anusree,
2017)

(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)
(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)
(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)
(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)

Recognition

Not Supported;

144

145

146

Game
Cognition
Demand

Game
Cognition
Demand

Game
Cognition
Demand

-

-

-

Brand
Anthropomorphism;
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity);
Brand
Anthropomorphism;
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity);
Brand
Anthropomorphism;
Mode of
Interactivity (Brand
Interactivity vs
Game Interactivity
vs No Interactivity);

Brand
Attention

Recall

Recognition

147

-

-

-

-

148

----

----

-----

-----
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Significant. (H3) Brand
Anthropomorphism
moderated the 2 way
interaction between
cognition demand and
mode of interactivity on
Brand Attention;
Significant. (H3) Brand
Anthropomorphism
moderated the 2 way
interaction between
cognition demand and
mode of interactivity on
Brand Recall;
Significant. (H3) Brand
Anthropomorphism
moderated the 2 way
interaction between
cognition demand and
mode of interactivity on
Brand Recognition;

[Exploratory]
No explicit hypothesis.
Significant support for

(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)

(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)

(Sreejesh
&
Anusree,
2017)

(Shank,
Graves,
Gott,
Gamez, &
Rodriguez,
2019)
(Cha, et
al., 2020)

149

Criticism
(Direction
feedback)

150

Criticism
(Direction
feedback)

151

Criticism
(Direction
feedback)

-

-

-

Task Difficulty

Perceived
Ability to
complete task

-

Intrinsic
Motivation

-

Recall

348

the argument that people
overcompensate for lack
of distinctiveness in
some factors by
reporting increased
distinctiveness in other
factors when comparing
humans and machines;
Not Supported. (H1)
Participants receiving
criticism from computer
on task percieved to be
easy perceive their
ability to complete the
task as higher;
Not Supported. (H2)
Participants receiving
criticism will be more
intrinsically motivated
than those receiving
dispositional praise;
Not Supported. (h3)
Participants receiving
criticism have lower
recall scores than those
receiving dispositional
praise;

(Bracken,
Jeffres, &
Neuendorf,
2004)
(Bracken,
Jeffres, &
Neuendorf,
2004)

(Bracken,
Jeffres, &
Neuendorf,
2004)

152

153

154

Criticism
(Direction
feedback)

Dispositional
Praise
(Direction
feedback)

----

-

-

----

Perceive
Intelligence

-

Perceive
Niceness

-

-----

-----
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Not Supported. (H4)
Participants receiving
criticism evaluate
computer as more
intelligent than those
receiving praise from it;
Significant. (H5)
Participants receiving
dispositional praise
evaluate computer as
nicer than those
receiving criticism;
(H6) Participants
receiving verbal
feedback will report
higher levels of the
relationship predicted in
H1 - H5. Significant for
Perceived ability to
complete task.
Significant but in
opposite direction such
that text communication
led to higher levels of
intrinsic motivation. H4
(voice condition effect
on perception of
intelligence of the
computer) was not

(Bracken,
Jeffres, &
Neuendorf,
2004)

(Bracken,
Jeffres, &
Neuendorf,
2004)

(Bracken,
Jeffres, &
Neuendorf,
2004)

155

Group
Membership

-

-

Interpersonal
Warmth

156

Group
Membership

-

-

Mind
Attribution

157

158

159

Interpersonal
Warmth

Group
Membership
Group
Membership

-

-

-

Mind
Attribution

-

Psychological
Closeness

-

Contact
Intentions

-
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supported. H5 (praise
effect on perception of
niceness) was not
significant;
Significant. Participants
perceived in-group robot
as being warmer than
the out-group robot;
**Significant.
Participants attributed
more mind to the ingroup robot. However,
when controling for
Warmth, the main
effects dissapear;
Partial Support. When
exploring the correlation
between Warmth and
mind attribution, a
positive partial
correlation was found;
Significant. Participants
reported feeling closer
to in-group robot than
out-group robot;
Significant. Participants
reported more positive
contact intentions

(Eyssel &
Kuchenbra
ndt, 2012)
(Eyssel &
Kuchenbra
ndt, 2012)

(Eyssel &
Kuchenbra
ndt, 2012)

(Eyssel &
Kuchenbra
ndt, 2012)
(Eyssel &
Kuchenbra
ndt, 2012)

160

Group
Membership

-

Design
Preference

-

161

Aid Condition

-

-

Decision
Accuracy

162

Age Group

-

-

Decision
Accuracy

163

Gender

-

-

Decision
Accuracy

164

Aid Condition

-

-

Task Time
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towards the in-group
robot;
Significant. Participants
reported a preference for
the design of the ingroup robot rather than
the out-group robot;
Partial Support. Both aid
conditions led to
increases in decision
accuracy, though there
was no significant
difference between the
non-anthropomorphic
and the
anthropomorphic aid
conditions;

Not Supported;

Not Supported;
Partial Support.
Participants in aid

(Eyssel &
Kuchenbra
ndt, 2012)

(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)
(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)
(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)
(Pak, Fink,
Price,

165

166

167

Aid Condition

Aid Condition

Aid Condition

-

-

-

-

Answer Time

Confidence in
Answer

-

Expressed
Trust in Aid

-

352

condition answered
questions faster, but
there is no significant
difference between the
non-anthropomorphic
and anthropomorphic
aids;
Partial Support.
Anthropomorphic Aid
led to faster answer time
compared to both nonanthropomorphic and no
aid, but nonanthropomorphic and no
aid did not differ;
Partial Support.
Anthropomorphic Aid
led to significantly
higher confidence in the
answer compared to noaid condition, but no
other effect was found;
Partial Support. No
main effect, however,
younger adults reported
significantly lower trust
in the nonanthropomorphic aid
than on the

Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)

(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)

(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)

(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)

anthropomorphic aid
condition when
compared to older
adults;

168

Gender

-

-

Expressed
Trust in Aid

169

Age Group

-

-

Expressed
Trust in Aid

170

Aid Condition

-

-

Behavioral
Trust

171

Character
(anthropomorp
hic
Appearance)
-

-

Sensitivity
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Not Supported;

Not Supported;
Significant. Participants
in the nonanthropomorphic
condition exhibited
lower levels than those
in the anthropomorphic
aid condition. Neither
Age Group nor Gender
affected this
relationship;

Significant.

(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)
(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)
(Pak, Fink,
Price,
Bass, &
Sturre,
2012)

(Chaminad
e,
Hodgins,
& Kawato,
2007)

172

Sessions
(biological
movement vs
artificial
movement)

176

Character
(anthropomorp
hic
Appearance)
Sessions
(biological
movement vs
artificial
movement)
Anthropomorp
hic Messages
Anthropomorp
hic Messages

177

Anthropomorp
hic Messages

173

174
175

-

-

Sensitivity

Significant.

-

-

Response Bias

Significant.

-

Response Bias

Not Supported;

-

Effectance
Motivation

-

Social Connection

-

Effectance
Motivation

Message Responses
Significant.
Anthropomorphic
messages were more
effective in motivating
environmental
movement participation
(conservation
behaviour) for
Conservation
participants with high
Behaviour
desire for control

Message Responses

354

(Chaminad
e,
Hodgins,
& Kawato,
2007)
(Chaminad
e,
Hodgins,
& Kawato,
2007)
(Chaminad
e,
Hodgins,
& Kawato,
2007)
(Tam,
2015)
(Tam,
2015)

(Tam,
2015)

178

179

180

Anthropomorp
hic Messages

Anthropomorp
hism of
Machine
Anthropomorp
hism of
Machine

-

Social Connection

Conservation
Behaviour

-

-

Gambing
Behaviours

-

-

Gambing
Outcomes

355

(effectance motivation),
but these
anthropomorphic
messages were less
effective for participants
with low desire for
control (effectance
motivation);
Significant. The
anthropomorphic
message was
significantly more
effective for participants
with a high desire for
social connection
(strong attachment
anxiety), but the reverse
pattern was observed for
low social connection;
Significant. Presenting
the slot machine in an
anthropomorphic
manner increased
gambling beahviors
even when using real
money;
Not supported.
Presenting the slot
machine in an

(Tam,
2015)

(Riva,
Sacchi, &
Brambilla,
2015)
(Riva,
Sacchi, &

181

182

183

Anthropomorp
hism of
Machine

Anthropomorp
hism of
Machine
Anthropomorp
hism of
Machine

Emotional
Experience

Emotional
Experience
Emotional
Experience

Gambing
Behaviours

-

Gambing
Outcomes

-

Gambing
Outcomes

-

356

anthropomorphic
manner did not lead to
more losses on the part
of the participant;
**Significant. Positive
emotional reactions
mediated the
relationship between the
anthropomorphic
presentation of the slot
machines and the
increased gambling
behaviours. The
negative emotional
reactions had no such
effect;
Significant.
Anthropomorphic
presentation led to an
increase in gambling
behaviours which in
turn led to an increase in
gambling outcomes (the
more participants
played, the less they
won);
**Partial Support.
Feeling alert, confident,
and excited indirectly

Brambilla,
2015)

(Riva,
Sacchi, &
Brambilla,
2015)

(Riva,
Sacchi, &
Brambilla,
2015)

(Riva,
Sacchi, &

184

185

Robot
Personality

Valence

-

-

-

Robot
Preference

-

Preferred
Interaction
Partner

357

mediated the link
between the
anthropomorphic
presentation of slot
machines and the
gambling behaviour;
Significant. Users
reported significant
preferences for specific
robots based on their
personality and
regardless of them
possessing the same
functionality [there was
significant effects of
anthropomorphization,
suggesting this was due
to anthropomorphism]
**Significant.
Participants reported a
preference to interact
with the avatar with
positive valence rather
than the negative
valence regardless of
appearance. There were
2 exceptions with
amazon Turk
respondents which

Brambilla,
2015)

(Mayer &
Panek,
2016)

(Wu &
Kraemer,
2017)

186

Appearance

187

Voice (audio
vs text vs
subtitled)

188

Visual Cues

-

-

-

-

Ascription of
human control

-

Judgement of
Script Creator

Judgement of
Script Creator

-

358

reported lower
significance in the cases
of the male avatar
associated with positive
language and the tiger
avatar associated with
negative language
(p>0.05);
No support. There were
no difference regardless
of group;
Significant. [experiment
1] Readers of the speech
were significantly less
likely to estate the script
was human-made rather
than computer-made
when compared to those
participants who heard
the speech [achieves
dehumanization];
Not supported.
[experiment 1]
Observers exposed to
visual cues were not
significantly different
from those who were
not exposed to visual
cues in judging whether

(Wu &
Kraemer,
2017)

(Schroeder
& Epley,
2016)

(Schroeder
& Epley,
2016)

189

Voice (audio
vs text vs
subtitled)

190

Visual Cues

191

Voice (audio
vs text vs
subtitled)

-

-

-

Judgement of
Script Creator

-

Judgement of
Script Creator

-

Judgement of
Script Creator

-

359

a human or a machine
created the speech;
Significant. [experiment
2] observers who
listened to the speech
were more likely to
anthropomorphize and
attribute the speech to a
human than those who
read the speech
[achieves
anthropomorphization];
Not supported.
[experiment 2]
Observers exposed to
visual cues were not
significantly different
from those who were
not exposed to visual
cues in judging whether
a human or a machine
created the speech;
Significant. [experiment
3] observers who
listened to the speech
were more likely to
anthropomorphize and
attribute the speech to a
human than those who

(Schroeder
& Epley,
2016)

(Schroeder
& Epley,
2016)

(Schroeder
& Epley,
2016)

192

Voice (audio
vs text)

Paralinguistic
Cues
[Mindless read
of essay vs
mindless read
of essay] (e.g.,
volume, pitch,
rate of speech)

Judgement of
Script Creator

-

360

read the speech
[achieves
anthropomorphization];
Significant. [experiment
4] Significantly more
participants attributed
the essay to a human
writer when they
listened to the mindful
voice compared to when
the listened to the
mindless voice, or the
read the text. No
significant difference
was found between the
mindless voice and the
text;

(Schroeder
& Epley,
2016)
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